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Book , K 4 3 



GENERAL M'^CLELLAN'S 



PENINSULA CAMPAIGN, 



Review of the Rp^port of the Committee on the Conduct of / 

THE War relative to the Peninsula Campaign, 



HIRA.M ketchum:. 



OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, 



COUNSELLOR AT LAW. 



1864. 






TO THE PITBT.TO. 



The following numbers were published in the Journal of Commerce through several 
successive months, ending in May, 1864, undfr the signature of the Author. They were 
designed to show that the Report of the Committee on the Conduct of the War had done 
gcreat injustice to MAJOR-GENERAL GEORGE B. McCLELLAN. By request these 
numbers are now collected and published in pamphlet form, and the Author asks for them 
an attentive perusal, and a candid and impartial judgment. 

HIRAM KETCHUM. 
Ma2/ 16, 1864. 



RiWiW 



The Joint Committee of th6 Senate 
and House of Representatives on the 
conduct of the war have made an ela- 
borate report, apart of which is calcu- 
lated, probably intended, to impair 
public confidence in the military ca- 
pacity of General McClellan. A re- 
port from a committee derived from 
80 high n source as the Legislative 
Department of the government will, 
as it ouglit, command public atten- 
tion, and intluence to some extent the 
mind of the country. The publica- 
tio-n of that report preceded, by some 
days, and even weeks, the publication 
of the evidence upon which it pro- 
fesses to be founded. The report has 
been published in many newspapers, 
and is industriously circulated in a 
pamphlet form. The opponents of 
General McClellan ought to be satis- 
fled with the influence to his discredit 
which this document was diffusing, 
especiallj" as he has not interposed 
one word to counteract that influence, 
and check its progress. The general 
has observed his characteristic silence 3 
yet his persecutors are not content 
with the amount of influence already 
enlisted against him, but are constant 
and perse vei-ing in their eff'orts to de- 
stroy him. The New York Times, 
published yesterday, Friday, has a long 
and bitter article, in which, strangely 
enough, it resorts to rebel testimony 
taken from the Eiehmond Whig, to 
depreciate the military character of 
Gen. McClellan. Would the Times 
be willing to admit testimony in favor 
of his high military character from the 
same source ? Such testimony the 
Times well knows is at hand, but I 
will not use it. 

Now I have read the testimony an- 
nexed to the report of the War Com- 
mittee with some care, and in my 
opinion tliat testimony, in connection 
;vith well known facts of public noto- 
t'iety, does not authorize the conclu- 
bions, uniavorablo to Gen. McClellan, 
inade public by the committee in their | 



report. It is evident to my mind 
that there is a concerted, a party 
effort, aided by the government, to 
peiwert the truth, and by such per- 
version to destroy General McClel- 
lan. This' effort shall not succeed 
if my oj)position, in concert with 
other, can defeat it. When I see a 
combination of the strong against the 
weak, an exercise of the vast power 
and influence of the government 
against an individual citizen who is 
innocent of any offence against that 
government, my sympathies in every 
such case are with the weaker party, 
and in the present case, whatever of 
power and influence I can exert, by 
the open use of my own name, and 
such reputation and chai'acter as I 
happen to possess in a city where I 
have lived for more than fifty years, 
shall be put forth without fear and 
without stint to accomplish a fair ad- 
ministration of justice iu the case 
under considei-ation. 

I intend, with permission, through 
the columns of the Journal of Com- 
merce, to submit, with a^ much bre- 
vity as is consistent with clear eluci- 
dation, a fair and impartial examina- 
tion of the material points connected 
with the operations of General Mo 
Clellan, brought out by the evidence 
before the War Committee. There 
are very few persons that have that 
evidence at command, for it is very 
voluminous. The newspapers could 
not be expected to publish the whole 
of it, but in making selections they 
might manage to be impartial. Es- 
pecially those who condemn McClel- 
lan ought to publish his testimony, 
but this they refuse to do. 
NO. II. 

My first proposition, which I mean 
to prove to the entire satisfaction of 
every reasonable man, is this : 

If General McClellan's jflan hsvd 
not been interfered with ; his plan set- 
tled and concurred in by the govern- 
ment before he left Washington for 



tbe peninsula, he would have cap- 
tured Richmond certainly as early as 
the month of June 1862, 

The evidence in support of this pro- 
position, to which I invite the candid 
and careful attention of the reader, 
shall now be given. 

The testimony of Prince de Join- 
ville, under his own name, was not 
drawn forth by the committee, but it 
was given to Europe and the world, 
and must have been known to the 
committee. This was the testimony 
of a highly intelligent witness, wno 
communicated the truth of what he 
knew himself, and none can question 
his truthfulness and impartiality. In 
quoting from the Prince's statement, 
I shall have to reproduce what has 
lately appeared in the editorial col- 
umns of the Journal of Commerce. 
When G-en. MeClellan went to York- 
town, he had no thought of besieging 
that position. The siege of that place 
was rendered necessary by causes en- 
tirely unforeseen, and unexpected by 
the general. He had made ample 
provision for the turning of that po- 
sition. Prince de Jonviile says (page 
41) : " The enemy held the James with 
the Merrimac and his gunboats; the 
York was closed by the Yorktown 
and Gloucester Point batteries. Ne- 
vertheless, by a disembarkation on 
the Severn, beyond Gloucester, he 
might carry the latter position, and 
open the way of the Federal gunboats 
into the York Eiver. A subsequent 
movement up the left bank, in the di- 
rection of West Point, would put us so 
far in the rear of the army cbai'ged 
with the defence of the lines of York- 
town that it would have been in a 
most perilous position. This accom- 
plished, the Confederates must have 
abandoned Gloucester, and fallen back 
hastily upon Eiehmond. The execu- 
tion of this coup de rnain had been left 
to a corps of the army commanded 
by Gen. McDowell. This corps was 
to be the last to embark at \yashing- 
Ton, and it, was calculated that it 
ought to reach Yorktown' in a body 
on its transports at the moment when 
the rest of the army, moving by Land, 
should appear before that post from 



Fortress Monroe." The Prince pro. 
ceeds : " Instead of finding it, Ave re- 
ceived the inexplicable and as yet 
unexplained intelligence that this 
corps, 35,000 strong, had been sent to 
another destination. The news loas 
received in the army with stupefaction, 
although the majority could not fore- 
see the deplorable consequences of a 
step taken, it must be su])posed, with 
no evil intention, but certainly with 
inconceivable recklessness. . . . 

This step, taken xohen it was, deranged 
a ivhole system of machinery fairly at 
loork." 

Here then, when the army was be- 
fore Yorktown, and before the idea of 
a siege had entered any man's head, 
was a sore disappointment. One of 
the foundations upon which the hope, 
nay, almost certaint}^, of speedy suc- 
cess had been reared, was suddenly, 
unexpectedly removed by a power 
winch the leader of the army could 
not control. Let us pause here for a 
single moment to consider what the 
present position and fameof this com- 
mander would be at this momeut if 
his just expectations had not been 
cruelly disappointed ; but what is of 
infinitely more consequence, Avhat, at 
this tune, would have been the posi- 
tion of our country but for this fatal 
step ! But disappointments do not 
stop here. After the siege of York- 
town, and after the army had reached 
the front of liichmond, another oppor- 
tunity was supplied by the vigilance 
and skill of the commanding general 
to retrieve the great error of the past 
and to capture Richmond. By the 
command of Gen. MeClellan, Gen.Fitz 
John Porter, with a portion of our 
array, marched in a fui'ious storm to 
Hanover Court House, twenty miles 
north of Richmond, routed the enemy, 
some 8,000 or 10,000 strong, killed 
200, took 700 prisoners, and captured 
one piece of artillery. The victory 
was gained on the 2Gth day of May, 
The advance guard of McDov>^ell, says 
Prince de Joinville, " was then ab 
Bowling Green, fifteen miles from tluib 
of Porter. It needed only an etfoir 
of tlio will ; the two armies wertj 
united, and the possession of IJicUai-ji/'J 



certain ! Alas ! this eifort was not 
made. I cannot," says he, " recall 
these fatal moments without a real 
sinking of heart." 

What loyal man in the country does 
not at this day join in the lament of 
the illustrious stranger? Here then 
another opportunity was lost to se- 
cure the great object of the peninsular 
campaign. It has long since been ad- 
mitted that if this opportunity had 
been improved, Richmond must have 
been taken, and in that case McClellan 
would have been the idol of his coun- 
try, for the rebellion against that 
country would have been crushed. 
Was it any fault of this general that 
the opjiortunity was not improved ? 
Certainl}^ not. Yet what man in the 
country has suffered so severely for 
the failure to seize an opportunity for 
certain success, which his sagacity as 
a military leader had created? Yet 
his sufferings bear no comj^arison to 
those of his beloved country, and I 
doubt not he grieves far less for him- 
self, for the loss of immortal renown, 
than for that country. The Prince de 
Join'^ille adds : 

" 'Not only did the two armies unite, 
but the order came from Washington, 
to burn the bridges which had been 
seized. This was the clearest way of 
saying to the army of the Potomac, 
and to its chiefs, that in no case could 
they count on the support of the 
armies of Upper Yirginia." This 
statement of De Joinville is substan- 
tially confirmed by evidence given 
before the joint committee. General 
Franklin icsiitics atpago 625 that the 
primary cause of the "failure of the 
peninsula campaign was " the detach- 
ment of McDoiceU's corps from the army 
of the Potomac, at the particular time 
it was detached. I th i7ik the detachment 
of that corps left General McClellan 
on thepeninsula xoith all his plans dis- 
arranged." Franklin was not ques- 
iiioned further on this point, but the 
■committee immediately changed the 
course of inquiry. The question which 
called forth the above answer was put 
by Mr. Odell, and seemed quite ac- 
cidental. General Henry J. Hunt, 
^nief in command of the Artillery of 



the Potomac, was a witness before 
the committee. He yet remains in the 
army of the Potomac, and is, I am 
informed, much relied upon, not only 
as an officer of great skill in bis line 
of duty, but confided in as an intelli- 
gent, truthful man, receiving the res- 
pect of his brother officers. 

Gen. Hunt fully concurs in the state- 
ment above quoted from De Joinville. 
The general says, (page 571) : 

" As I understood it, McDowell's 
corps, which was the last to embark, 
was to move across to West Point, or 
near to that place, a portion of it touch- 
ing at Gloucester, so as to throw itself 
between the enemy's works at York- 
town and Eichmond. Of course the 
withholding of that corps prevented 
the plan, if tha^ was the plan, from 
being executed as intended." He 
further says: " The next cause for the 
failure of that campaign was this : I 
think if a junction of all our forces 
had been made after the battle of Han- 
over Court House, ice should have made 
a sure thing of it." 

Thus then it is made manifest by 
the testimony and statements above 
referred to, that if General McClel- 
lan's plans had been executed, Eich- 
mond would have fallen. I can find 
nothing in Part I. of the committee's 
Eeport, containing 754 pages of printed 
matter, to countervail thts testimony. 
Now I confidently submit to every 
candid reader, was not General Mc 
Clellan entitled to the benefit of this 
fact in the report of the committee. ? 
It might have been impracticable for 
the government to furnish the means 
promised, but even that should not 
have deprived him of the credit of hav« 
ing conceived and adopted those plans. 
It might be, that though his ori- 
ginal plans were interfered with, and 
frustrated by those in authority over 
him. yet still the plans were credi- 
table, as their execution was certain 
to lead to success. 

In my future numbers I shall inves- 
tigate, first, whether there were good 
and satifactory reasons for not allow- 
ing General McDowell's command to 
render the service which it was 1^0 
perform ; and second, whether, not- 



-withstanding the abstraction of that 
command, General McClellan ought to 
have taken Eichmond. The object of 
this paper is to show that the general's 
plans were right. 

It appears by the evidence, as shown 
in my last number, that Kichmond 
would have been taken a year ago, if 
Gen. McClellan had received the aid 
promised by the government. If 
there is any fallacy in the argument 
which reaches this conclusion, let it 
be shown. I do not stx)p to notice 
the theory of Gen. Ethan Allen Hitch- 
cock: to that I may hereafter return, 
only remarking that the theory is a 
discovery of the General himself; he 
would be entitled, ujion application, to 
receive a patent for it, as tieto, but it 
might fail of the other qualification 
required in a patentable discovery, 
that is in being useful. 

The aid promised and withheld was 
the co-operation of Gen. McDowell's 
command. That this co-operation 
was promised and not given, are facts 
uncontradicted. The justification al- 
leged for keeping back this command 
is, that it was required for the protec- 
tion of Washington. Let us see how 
far this justification is supported by 
the evidence. 

At the time when, contrary to pub- 
lic expectation. Gen. McDowell did 
not march to the assistance of the 
army on the Peninsula, he was much 
censured; but it now appears, from 
his full and apparently candid testi- 
mony before the committee, that such 
'censure was unjust. From that testi- 
mony ^^e learn that McDowell's com- 
mand was the last to be embarked 
wv the Peninsula, that the corps first 
sent down should have nothing to do 
with his comand, which was to go be- 
yond Yorktown, while the first shouL^. 
go and threaten Yorktown. But after 
Gen. McClellan had moved with the 
army to Fortt'ess Monroe, and written 
to McDowell that his corps should be 
the last to move, the President be- 
came apprehensive that if his com- 
mand should go down below, the ene- 
my might take advantage of the de- 
fenceless condition of Washington, 
and while our forces were goinix 



6 



against Riclimond, tney might come 
against Washington. The President 
therefore ordered that McDowell's 
force should remain for the defence 
of the capital ; it did not move to 
Yorktown as promised. General Mc- 
Dowell testifies without reservation, 
that he personally used no influence, 
nor in any way sought to be detached 
from Gen. McClellan's command. He 
remained to act purely on the defen- 
sive, for the defence of the capital. 
He afterwards, upon inquiry of the 
Secretary of War, ascertained that it 
would be within the scope of his de- 
fensive instructions to go to Freder- 
icksburg. At Fredericksburg he could 
act for the defence of the capital. 
This was a decision of the War De. 
partment ; let 7iot this decision be for: 
gotten. In accordance with this de- 
cision, McDowell went down opposite 
Fredericksburg, and afterwards, by 
permission of the War Department, 
put a small force, merely for a defen- 
sive purpose, across the Eappahan- 
nock into Fredericksburg, After ly- 
ing some time in that city, the Gen. re- 
ceived information that the President 
intended to give nim authority to 
move down iipon Eichmond whenever 
Gen. Shield's division should join him. 
This division did join him, and the 
two generals were upon the eve of 
moving towards Eichmond when a 
telegram came announcing the raid 
of ^the rebel general Jackson up the 
Shenandoah Valley, Thus it is re- 
lated in Mc-Dowell's testimony: 

. " The President, or Secretaiy of War 
in the name of the President, tele- 
graphed to send a division up after 
Jackson. I did so, although I replied 
that it was a crushing blow to us ail. 
The President ordered another brig- 
ade to move up there, and then an- 
other brigade, and then another regi- 
ment. And finally the President put 
the question to me in this way — if I 
did not think that, as the department 
commander, it was my duty to be 
here in Washmgton. I replied that 
I had not so thought, or I should cer- 
tainly have been here; that I thought 
my presence was most required down 
below, buL as there was a doubt upon 



the matter I would come up. I had 
hoped that I should not be diverted 
from going to Eichmond." 

Gen. McDowell also informed the 
President, in answer to that telegram : 
" While I should be too late to effect 
any good up there, I should lose the 
opportunity of doing any good down 
below." 

Just here let it be noted that Gen. 
McClellan testifies : " When I heard 
/ of the advance of Jackson upon Gen. 
Banks, I telegraphed to the President 
that I believed the intention to be 
simply to prevent reinforcements be- 
ing sent to me. 1 had no idea it 
meant a serious threat upon Washing- 
ton." 

It is thus evident, without referring 
to other testimony, that General Mc- 
Dowell desired that his command 
should, in the first instance, go to 
Yorktown, and secondly that he 
should march from Fredei'icksburg to 
Richmond. As military men, McClel- 
ian and McDowell concurred in judg- 
ment as to the steps to be taken for 
the capture of Eichmond. The alarm 
of the Tresident for the safety of 
Washington prevented the taking of 
these steps. The next inquiry is, — 
was there any foundation for this 
alarm ? This inquiry shall be pursued 
in my next. 

The question now to be discussed is, 
Could McClellan have been sent to 
Eichmond without endangering the 
safety of Washington ? We have 
seen Generals McClellan and McDow- 
ell concur in the opinion that it could. 
The question was one to be decided 
by military men. I cannot find that 
this question was put by the com- 
mittee to any witness, who from his 
military knowledge and experience 
was presumed capable of giving a 
reliable opinion — the opinion of an 
expert. The question should have 
been thus framed : — " Suppose the 
command of General McDowell was 
necessary to assure the taking of 
Eichmond, could it have been sent 
either to Yorktown when McClellan 
Avent to that place, or afterwards to 
Hanover Court House to unite with 
Porter, ""-"'Sout endangering the capi- 



tal ? " What must have been the jwis- 
wer to that question? In the first 
place, the strength of the enemy, and 
the force at his command, which under 
all the circumstances, he would pro- 
bably bring against the capital, would 
have been considered. The command 
of McDowell, say 35,000 strong, il 
was proposed to send to Eichmond. 
If it had been sent, the fact would 
have been well known to the enemy, 
and this would have compelled him to 
employ a larger force to defend Eich- 
mond. We know from reliable testi- 
mony that the enemy expected the 
junction of McDowell and Porter on 
the 26th of May, and McDowell's fail- 
ure to come was ascribed by the enem.y 
to a treasonable omisssion of duty on 
his part. The junction of those two 
commands would in the judgment of 
the enemy have resulted in the cap- 
tare of Eichmond. The testimony of 
the Prussian oificer, then in the rebel 
service at Eichmond, may be relied 
on for this stateniient. Assuming, 
then, that McDowell had moved down 
to Eichmond, what force could the 
rebels have spared to assail Washing- 
ton ? Certainly not a large one, pro- 
bably none at all. Then, -secondly, 
what were the resources of the gov- 
ernment for the defence of Washing- 
ton, if McDowell's 35,000 troops had 
been sent to Eichmond ? I aver, 
without fear of contradiction, that ir 
when McClellan went down to For- 
tress Monroe in March, 1802, or at 
any other time up to the first of June 
in that year, the President had seen fit* 
to wi-ite the governors of llSTew York, 
Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts, 
throwing out all the other loyal New 
England States, and New Jersey, that 
he had been obliged to send away so 
large a force to assist in the capture 
of Eichmond, that fifty thousand men 
would be required in the fortifications 
at Washington to make a perfect de- 
fence of the capital, that number, most 
of them well discijjlined, well drilled, 
and well appointed troops, would have 
been in the capital in less than ten 
days from the date of the call, ready 
for immediate service. I know that 
10,000 of *his number from the city 



of i^ew York alone would have res- 
ponded to such a call in less than one 
week. There did come a call for 
troops from the War Department in 
the latter part of May. It was re- 
ceived by the 7th on the 26th day of 
that month, the day before the cap- 
ture of Hanover Court House, in the 
evening of that day, Sunday, and oh 
Tuesday morning this regiment, fully 
armed and equipped, fit for immediate 
service, was in Baltimore; the 22nd 
New York was there the next day, 
and several other regiments follow- 
ed within a few days, when there 
came an order countermanding the 
call for troops, much to the disap- 
pointment and chagrin of other regi- 
ments in this city desirous and eager 
to march. It was not in this city 
only, but in Boston and elsewhei'e, 
that this disappointment was felt. I 
have spoken of troops not actually in 
the field, whose services could have 
been commanded by the government 
in an emergency for the defence of 
the capital. Let us now see what 
troops were, at the time when Gen. 
McUlellan left Washington, actually 
in the service for this purpose. In 
his examination before the Committee 
on the conduct of the War, the fol- 
lowing question was put to General 
McClellan : — " When you took the 
army to the Peninsula, how many 
ti'uops were left for the defence of 
Washington ; where were they sta- 
tioned, and by whom were they com- 
jnanded ? " To which he gave the 
following answer: — "There has been 
published a letter which I wrote on 
board the steamer Commodore, on 
the lirst day of April last. (1862), to 
the Adjutant General, giving the 
number of troops left and their sta- 
tions. The numbers there given were 
furnished to me by my adjutant gene- 
ral, from the latest and most authen- 
tic returns in his possession. I recol- 
lect that the aggregate was something 
over 70,000, but I cannot give the de- 
tails." This statement was also tes- 
tified to by Gen. McO ellan before the 
McDowell Court of Inquiry. I am 
aware that General E. A. Hitchcock 
professed, in his testimony, before the 



committee, to be much " amazed and 
shocked at the testimony of Gen eral 
McClellan, because he included in this 
number of 70,000 not only the number 
in Washington, but also thosa troops 
employed to guard the approaches by 
the enemy to the capital, though sta- 
tioned and acting at some distance 
from it. In the judgment of General 
Hitchcock, a force could not act for 
the defence of the caj^ital unless 
posted in Washington, or on the op- 
posite shore of Virginia, or some- 
where in the immediate vicinity. 
Gen. McClellan took a different view 
of defensive forces ; he included all 
those, wherever stationed, whose ob- 
ject was to intercept advances upon 
the capital, from which quarter so- 
ever those advances might be antici- 
pated. If for instance, an advance 
on the city of New York was expect- 
ed from an enemy in Canada, it might 
well be that a force posted at Albany, 
160 miles distant, could act for the 
defence of this city. It was s(s I have 
shown, the decision of the War De- 
partment that General McDowell was 
acting within the scope of hi^ orders 
to protect Washington, although his 
command was actually at Fredericks- 
burg. The idea of General McClel- 
lan evidently was that all troops oc- 
cupying and guarding the avenues 
leading to the capital, through which, 
or some of them, the enemy was ex- 
pected to ajiproach and assail the capi- 
tal, in situations where they could be 
easily rallied to the capital itself, 
might, with propriety, be called troops 
for the defence of the capital. Who 
can dispute the soundness of this 
view ? To show the actual location 
of those forces, I will transcribe the 
letter of the general, referred to in 
his answer above quoted. The letter 
is contained in the report of the com- 
mittee. 

Headquarters Army op the Poto- 
mac, Steamer Commodore, April 1, 62. 
Brig. Gen. L. Thomas, Adj. Gen., U.S. A. 

General : — I have to request that 
you will lay the following communi- 
cation before the Hon. Secretary of 
War. 

The approximate numbers and po- 



9 



sitioiis of the troops left near and in 
.rear of the Potomac are about as fol- 
lows. 
■*; Gen. Dix has, after guarding the 
railroads under his chrw-ge, sufficient 
to give him 5,000 for the defence of 
Baltimore, and 1,988 available for the 
Eastern Shore, Annapolis, &c. Fort 
Delaware is very well garrisoned by 
about 400 men. The garrisons of the 
forts around "Washington 'amount to 
10,G0O men; other disposable troops 
now with Gen. Wadsworth being 
about 11,400 men. 

The troops employed in guarding 
the various railways in Maryland 
amount to some 3,359 men. These it 
il designed to relieve, being old regi- 
ments, by dismounted cavahy, and 
to send them forward to Manassas. 

Gen. Abercrombie occupies War- 
renton with a force which, including 
Col. Geary at White Plains, and the 
' cavalry to be at his disposal, will 
amouut to some 7,780 men, with 12 
pieces of artillery. 

I have the honor to request that all 
the troops organized for service in 
Pennsylvania and Ncav York, and in 
any of the Eastern States, may be 
ordered to AVashington. I learn from 
Governor Curtin that there are some 
3,500 men now ready in Pennsylvania. 
This foi'ce I should be glad to have 
sent to Manassas. Four thousand 
men from Gen. Wadsworth I desire 
to be ordered to Manassas. These 
troops, Avith the railroad guard above 
alluded to, will make up a force under 
the command of Gen. Abercrombie 
of something like 18,639 men. 

It is my design to push Gen. Blen- 
ker's division from Warrenton upon 
8trasburg. He should remain at 
Strasburg long enough to allow 
matters to assume a definite form in 
that region, before proceeding to his 
ultimate destination. 

The troops in the valley of the She- 
nandoah will thus (including Eien- 
ker's division, 10,028 strong, with 
24 pieces of artillery ; Banks' 5th 
corps, which en\l)race3 41 guns, some 
3,652 disposable cavalry, and the 
.railroad guard, about 2,000 men) 
^ amount to about 35,468 men. 



It is designed to relieve General 
Hooker by. one regiment, say, 850 
men, being with some 500 cavalry, 
3,350 men on the Lower Potomac. 

To recapitulate — 

At Warrenton there is to be - 7,780 men. 

At Manassas, say 10,859 " 

In the Valley of the Shenaudoali 35,859 " 
On the Lower Poiomac - - - 1,350 " 



In all 



55,4.56 



There would thus be left for the 
garrisons and the front of Washing- 
ton, under General Wadsworth, some 
18,000 men, inclusive of the batteries 
under instruction. 

The troops organizing or ready for 
service in New York, I learn, will 
probably number more than four 
thousand. These should be assem- 
bled at Washington subject to dispo- 
sition where their services may be 
required. 

I am, very respectfully, 
your obedient servant, 
GEO B. McCLELLAiN', 
Maj.-Gen. Commanding. 

This topic shall be pursued in my 
next number. 

I have shown, and the Committee 
on the conduct of the War had suffi- 
cient evidence before them to prove, 
that there was no cause for the alarm 
exhibited by the President, which kept 
him from sending McDowell's com- 
mand to Yoi-ktown, or to Hanover 
Court House. That this alarm was 
really felt b}^ the President, I am bound 
to believe. The question noAv is, who 
awakened this feeling of apprehen- 
sion ? Who is responsible for it? I 
have no doubt that Generals James S. 
Wadsworth and E, A Hitchcock are 
the persons. 

On the 21st day of April, 1862, Gen.. 
Wadsworth made a report to the Sec- 
retary of War; the next day he tes- 
tified before the committee and veri- 
fied the accuracy of his report. This 
document states the number of men 
left under his command for the defence 
of Washington, to be 19,022 j^resent 
for duty. This does not differ mate- 
rially from Gen. McClellan's lettei 
above copied ; but the essential difior- 
ence between these reports is this, cnie 



10 



states only the number of troops in a 
very limited command, while the pther 
defines the number, in other far more 
extensive commands, all for the de- 
fence of Washington, The President 
was led to believe that Wadsworth's 
19,022 troops was the aggregate force 
left for the defence of the capitol. He 
says in a communication to Gen, Mc- 
Clellan dated April 9, 18G2_, "Do you 
really think I should permit the line 
from Eichmond via Manassas Junc- 
tion, to this city, [Washington] to be 
entirely open, except what resistance 
could be presented by less than 20,- 
000 unorganized troops ? This is a 
question "which the country will not 
allow me to evade." Thus, it is proved 
that the President was fully possessed 
with the idea that there was no force 
for the defence of the capital but that 
reported to be under General Wads- 
worth. He supposed the whole line 
from Richmond via Manassas Junction 
to Washington to be entirely open, 
and that the enemy on that line would 
encounter no resistance except from 
Wadsworth's command. No wonder 
he felt some apprehension. It seems 
impossible that the President could 
ever have seen McClellan's letter da- 
ted April 1, then on file in the War 
Department. From that report he 
would have learned that at Manassas 
and Warrenton almost in front of 
Washington, and directly on the line, 
to Richmond there were besides those 
under Wads worth's, 18,639 troops, 
and twelve guns, or 36,639 men and 
4-1 field . guns directly apjjHcable to 
the defence of Washington, without 
counting the 1,350 men on the lower 
Potomac, who could also have been 
drawn in if an attack was imminent. 
Besides all this there were 35,467 
troops and 65 guns in the Shenandoaii 
Valley ready to move to the defence 
of Washington if necessary. There 
were in fact all told 77,500 men and 
103 field guns for the defence of Wash- 
ington and its approaches, without 
counting the force under Gen. Dix at 
Baltimore, which amounted to ten 
regiments and two battalions of in- 
fantiy, one regiment of cavalry, and 
live batteries. These numbers are 
from official returns. 



Gen. Wadsworth testifies before the 
War Committee that he had with- 
in his jurisdiction ^'•everything for 
the defence of Washington'' and fur- 
ther testifies that the total amount 
of men present for duty under his 
command was 19,022. The general 
evidently left the impression upon 
the minds of the Committee that these 
troops were the sole reliance for the 
defence of the capital; the same im- 
pression must have been received by 
the President, and contributed to the 
delusion under which his mind Li- 
bored. Wadsworth 's report was 
brought to his attention, and, basing 
his suggestion upon this reporj], Hitch- 
cock intimated to the Secretary of 
War that McClellan had left the capi- 
tal defenceless; that he had violated 
his orders, and rendered himself re- 
sponsible for all the consequences. 
Here was a mare's nest. Hitchcock 
says : — "When this state of tilings be- 
came known to the Secretary of War, 
Mr. Stanton, he required General 
Thomas and myself to make a report 
upon the execution of the President's 
order, the letter of Gen. McClellan of 
the Ist April, the report of General 
Wadsworth of the 2d April, and one 
or two other papers requiring us to 
give an opinion whether Gen. 3Ic0lellan 
had complied, or not, with the require- 
ments of the order of the President.'* 
Who made this state of things known 
to the Secretary of War? General 
Hitchcock himself, doubtless. A court 
of inquiry, in fact, though not in name, 
was thus instituted to report whether 
or not McClellan had obeyed orders. 
All that a court of inquiry has power 
to do, is to inquire and report to the 
power appointing it. 

That court made a report to the 
War Department. Hitchcock testifies: 
" The report went of course to the 
President, and, on the next day, if I 
mistake not, the 3d of April, the Pre- 
sident came to the war office and held 
quite a long conversation with the 
chiefs of the various bureaus of the 
War Department, the Secretary of 
War being present. At the conclusion 
of that "consultation the President 
himself ordered that one of the Corps 



11 



of tlie Army of the Potomac wliich 
"were then in front of Washington 
should be detained for the defence of 
the capital. The selection was left 
with the Secretary of War who desig- 
nated the Corps commanded by 
McDowell. I will mention," says 
Hitchcock, "that Gen. McDowell him- 
self was not present, and I believe 
knew nothing of the steps which led 
to his detention here until after the 
oi'der was issued. As soon as General 
McClellan heard of this he complained 
of it. He wished the whole of McDow- 
ell's Con)S sent to him." 

Now I call upon every officer of the 
army, and upon every American eiti- 
zen to give his attention for a brief 
space of time to the scenes hei-e de- 
scribed. 

George B. McClellan, a yoimg 
general with little experience in ac- 
tual service, without an}^ solicitation 
on his part, is called b}^ his govern- 
ment to a post of the highest respon- 
sibility. He is placed in command of 
the largest army b}^ far ever brought 
together in his native land, an arm}'- 
organized for the purpose of suppres- 
sing an insurrection the most formid- 
able the world has ever beheld, an in- 
surrection which threatened the over- 
throw of the government, and the ex- 
tinction of popular liberty. At a 
distance from the capital; in the very 
face of the enemy, anxious beyond all 
expression for success; excited and 
agitated by the consciousness that 
the ej-es of his countrj'-, and the whole 
civilized world are eagerly fastened 
ui)on him, scanning and criticising all 
he does, and all he leaves undone. 
This is one scene in the drama. Now 
turn to another. At the capital of 
his country this same young com- 
mander, in his absence is charged 
with having disobej-ed the order of 
his supei'ior in command, in neglect- 
ing to secure the safety of that capi- 
tal against an invading foe ; a grave 
offence. A court or commission of 
inquirj' is instituted before which he 
has no notice to appear, of its vely 
existence he is not aj)prised. Ignor- 
ant of any charge brought against 
him, with no counsel or friend to 



speak for, or defend him, he is tried 
before the court, a report condeming 
him is brought in. The President 
and all the officials of the War De- 
partment are assembled to hear and 
cogitate upon this report; the Com- 
mander-in-Chief approves of it and 
passes sentence upon the absent ac- 
cused. The stiletto has been thrust 
into his back, and he is ignorant of 
the assault until he finds himself faint- 
ing from the loss of blood That 
sentence is that he shall be denied the 
co-operation of a corps which had 
been promised him, and which he 
deemed essential to success, because 
he had violated express directions in 
neglecting the safety of the capital. 

Now let us see whether General 
McClellan was in truth guilty of the 
charge preferred against him. The 
charge was that he had violated an 
order " that Washington should be 
perfectl}^ secure." But who shall say 
in what "security" consists? The 
President says : " My explicit direc- 
tions that Washington should, in 
the judgment of all the commanders of 
corps, be left entirely secured, had 
been entirely neglected." The com- 
manders of corps were therefore made 
sole judges of what was required for 
security. These commanders were 
Generals Keyes, Heintzelman, Mc 
Dowell and Sumner. Thej^ were ab- 
sent, with the exception of McDowell, 
on the peninsula, with McClellan. 
We have seen what McDowell's opinion 
was. All these commanders of corps 
were examined before the War Com- 
mittee, but none of them was asked 
whether he considered the forces ac- 
tually ♦left by Gen. McClellan, suffi- 
cient to ensure the safety of the capi. 
tal. The testimony of neither of 
them was before Generals Hitchcock 
and Thomas, and there is little doubt 
that every one of them would have 
admitted the force, actually left there, 
to be sufficient to secure the safety of 
Washington. There was thei-efore no 
authority for the decision that in the 
judgment of commanders of corps 
\Yashington Avas left unsafe. 

General Hitchcock testified that 
Gen. McClellan complained of that d<»- 



12 



cision mado in the office of the Secre- 
tary of War on the 3d of April, ^es, 
he did complain : his letter to the 
i. President is in the following words: 
i Near Yorktown, April 5, 7 1-2. p.m 
*' The enemy are in large force along 
our front, and apparently intend ma- 
king a determined resistance. A re- 
connoisance just made by Gen. Bar- 
nard shows that their line of works 
extends across the entire peninsula 
from Yorktown to Warwick river. 
JMany of them are very formidal)le. 
Deserters say they are being rein- 
forced daily from Richmond and from 
Norfolk. Under these circumstance^ 
I beg that you will reconsider the or- 
der detaching the first corps from my 
command. In my deliberate judg- 
ment the success of our cause will be 
imperiled by so greatly reducing my 
force Avhen it is actually under the fire 
of the enemy, and active operations 
have commenced. Two or three of 
my divisions have been under fire of 
artillery most of the day. I am now 
of the ojnnion that I shall have to fight 
all the available force of the rebels not 
far from here. Do not force me to do 
80 with diminished numbers ; but 
whatever your decision may be, I will 
leave nothing undone to obtain suc- 
cess. G-. B. McClellan, 

Major General. 
A Lincoln, President. 

This letter speaks for itself, it needs 
no comment. 

The rejoort and testimony of Gen. 
James S. Wadsworth might be sub- 
jected to severe animadversion. His 
statements are contradicted by relia- 
ble testimon3^ The report of Col. 
William B. Green to General Barry, 
Inspector of Artillery, has been exten- 
sively published. It shows conclu- 
sively the gross inaccuracy of General 
Wadsworth. Moreover, the opposi- 
tion, if not bitter hostility of General 
Wadsworth to General McClellan is 
well known in military circles at 
Washington; it can be shown that 
Wadsworth did not wish Ptichmond 
to be taken by McClellan. But I shall 
not dwell upon this topic ; my object 
in these comcannications is single, and 
I shall not bo diverted from its pur- 
suit. 



JSTow I submit to all men whetlier 
these two points have not been estab- ■ 
lished by the testimony contained in 
the re^^ort of the Committee on the 
conduct of the war. 

1. If General McDowell's command 
had not been denied General McClel- 
lan, he would have taken Richmond 
a year ago. 

2. There was no justifiable reason 
for withholding ihat command. 

Beyond all controversy, the Com- 
mittee were authorized by tha evi- 
dence, to report these conclusions, 
and in failing to do so, they have done 
General McClellan signal injustice. I 
arraign that committee, collectively 
and individually, at the bar of public 
opinion, and charge them with that 
injustice. 

I shall next proceed to show that 
General McClellan did the best he 
could with the foi'ces under his com- 
mand. 

YORKTOWN. 

The next duty is to inquire whether, 
although deprived of the co-operation 
of McDowell's command, McClellan 
ought, under all the circumstances, to 
have taken Richmond Avith the force 
under his command. It has been as- 
serted with great confidence that he 
ought; the Committee on the Conduct 
of the AVar unanimously censure, nay 
condemn him for not having taken the 
rebel capital, and captured the army 
which defended it. It is obvious that 
this condemnatory sentence cannot be 
met successfully by a general denial; 
the grounds upon which it rests must 
be carefully examined, step by step, 
first at Yorktown, then from York- 
town to RiclMuond. then before Rich- 
mond, &c. I shall pursue this inquiry 
in the light of such evidence as was 
furnished by the state of things exist- 
ing at the times respectively when the 
movements of the army were made. 
It would be unfair to view these move- 
ments in the light of information sup- 
plied since General McClellan was or- 
dered to leave the PenLnsuJa, and not 
accessible before that time. I shall be 
pardoned, it being unavoidable, for 
giving some details of evidence which 
may seem dry and tedious to such of 



13 



my readers as are in a hiivry and can 
onl}^ read short paragraphs. There 
are some of my country-men, even in 
these times of agitation and bustle, 
Avho are willing to be at pains to in- 
vestigate, and ascertain, if they can, 
the truth on a subject like that under 
consideration. To such 1 must be con- 
tent to address myself. The tirst po- 
sition to be examined is Yorkfoicn. 

It is admitted that Gen. MeClellan 
appeared before Yorktown with an 
army consisting of 107,000 ti'oops, 
well equipjied, well drilled, well sup- 
plied, and composed of men of physi- 
cal, intellectual, and moral power, 
each as have never been surpassed in 
any military organization. This army 
deserves the highest wi'ought eulogy 
that has ever been passed upon it. 
Tliis eulogy has been recorded b}' the 
Commanding General of the Army of 
the Potomac, and histor}^ will trans- 
mit it to future generations. 

Let it be remembered, for the fact 
seems to have been kept studiously 
out of mind, that the army which this 
loyal and ever to be honored host 
went to subdue wei-e composed of 
American citizens, most of them na- 
tive born, numerically equal, probably 
superior to our own, well officered, 
Avell drilled, under strict discipline, 
fighting behind entrenchments, on soil 
claimed to be their own, and animated 
Avith a zeal which the resistance of an 
invading enemy alone can inspire. 
Now although the loj-al army sur- 
passed the rebels in the material of 
Avar, this was counterbalanced by the 
liard lessons they had learned in the 
school of privation and sufferings 
tkey were at home fighting on the 
defensive, in positions chosen by them- 
selves, behind ramparts of their own 
construction. Men versed in the art 
of war have learned from the records 
of former military conflicts, to com- 
puve Avith mathematical accuracy the 
adA^antages and disadvixntages of ar- 
mies in such circumstances, composed 
of the same race of men, neither supe- 
rior to the other in spirit or militarj- 
]M"owess. With sucli an enemy in 
front discharging his fire, wcW miglit 
McClcllan implore the President, do 



not force me to fight with diminished 
numbers. 

General MeClellan in all liis milita- 
ry operations has acted under tlie in- 
spiration and guidance of tAVO gene- 
ral principles. 

1. The rebellion had assumed a 
character so formidable as to place the 
country in a state of civil Avar. Ar- 
my Ava^ arrayed against army in the 
tield. The rules for the government 
of belligerent parties which modern 
civilization furnishes, were of binding 
force. General MeClellan had receiv- 
ed the education of a soldier ; he was 
well-instructed in these rules. He 
had before him the example of Gen. 
Scott, who had always conducted war- 
fare in conformity to these rules, nev- 
er for an instant departing trom their 
injunctions, and this great General 
had, received the approbation of his 
country for his course. On no consid- 
ei'ation, to gratify no man, or set of 
men, Avould Gen. MeClellan violate 
these rules and deviate from ihe path 
pursued by his illustrious predecessor 
under Avhom he had learned the art 
of Avar. Such a violation, such a de- 
parture, would fix a stain upon his 
character as a soldier, Avhich no suc- 
cess could efface; besides it would dis< 
honor the flag of the Christian nation 
which he served. To do this was im- 
possible for George B. MeClellan. 

2. MeClellan, Avhile he meant to do 
Avhat he could to put doAvn the rebel- 
lion, to exert every nerve to accom- 
plish this object, 3-et was anxious to 
do it without any unnecessary loss of 
life of the soldiers led by him; he 
kncAv Avho these soldiers Avere, whence 
they came, how they Avei'e connected 
in their respective homes and neigh- 
borhoods, and what \^alue to set upoii 
tbeir lives. 

These were his principles; and, be- 
sides these, as a matter of ftict, he had 
the conviction that the enemy was a 
very formidable one ; others could af- 
ford to despise him, but he could not. 
He could haA'e Avished it otherwise^ 
but his personal knowledge of the of- 
ficers who led that enemy, and the 
spirit and prowess of the troops led 
by them, forced this conviction on his 



14 



tinderstjinding; he could not ia-noreit, 
bul us a soldier he felt his obligation 
to act upon it. 

All these composed the creed of 
Gen. McClellan ; and if the tirades of 
abuse amounting almost to the ravings 
of lunatics, which have been spoken 
and written against him, from Sena- 
tor Chandler's speech on the floor of 
the Senate, down to the late editoi'ial 
article in the New York Times, shall 
be closely analyzed and examined, it 
will be seen that this creed is that 
which mainly' stirs up the ire of his 
opponents. 

McOlellan marched from Fortress 
Monroe towards Yorktown on the 4th 
of April 1862, and soon reached the 
fortitled position which was evacuated 
by.the enemy in great precipitation 
on the 4th day of May, one month 
thereafter. The retreat of the ene- 
my from a very strong and well forti- 
fied position was compelled by our ar- 
my in one month. 

The charge against the command- 
ing general is that he spent too much 
time before Yorktown — that he should 
have taken it immediately on his ar- 
rival before itb}^ assault, and not wait- 
ed the operations of a siege. 

What is the testimon}'- upon this 
point ? It shall be fairly given. The 
Prince de Joinville, an eye witness, 
says: — " We reached the Confederate 
lines which opened on us at once, with 
a sharp fire of artillery. We replied, 
but without making any imjiression 
on the well defined works which cov- 
ered the hostile cannon. The creek 
had been reconnoitered and found im- 
passable by infantry, both on account 
of the depth of water, and of its marshy 
borders, in which the troops would 
have been under a cross-fire of num- 
bers of sharpshooters concealed in the 
woods and behind the embankments. 

•' Throughout the seven miles of 
Confederate lines he encountered the 
same attitudeof alert defence. Every 
vv^herc cannon and camps. Of course 
the inference was that we were ar- 
rested by forces apparently formid- 
able, and before a position not easily 
carried." 
. General McCiellan before the com- 



mittee testifies : " Question. Could 
not the line of vs^orks have been as- 
saulted when you arrived before them 
in full force M'ith a ft^ir prospect of 
success? — Answer. I think not. 1 
resorted to the operations of a siege, 
after a more careful personal exami- 
nation than a commanding general 
gives to such things j and I was ful- 
ly satisfied that the course I adpoted 
was the best under the circumstan- 
ces." 

" Question. — You did not open your 
batteries as they were finished, one 
by one, but waited until all were 
ready, did you not? — Answer. We 
did, and expected to open fire from 
them all on Monday morning. A few 
shots were fired for a sj^ecial purpose 
from battery No. 1 against vessels 
landing at the wharf." 

" Question. Would it not have been 
better to have ojDcned your batteries 
as they were completed, without w^ait- 
ing for the completion of all of them ? 
— Answer. I think decidedly not; be- 
cause they would probably have been 
overwhelmed by the concentrated 
fire of the enemj'". The object was to 
%vait until we had such an overwhelm- 
ing force at our disposal as would 
crush everything before us." 

General John C. Bai'uard, chief of 
General McClcllan's engineer corps, 
who next to the general command- 
ing, is the highest authoritj^, reported 
at the time: — '-It was not deemed 
practicable considering the strength 
of that line and the difficulty of 
handling our forces (owing to the im- 
practicable character of the country), 
to bieik the line across the isthmus, 
and too hazardous to attempt the 
reduction of the place " (Yorktown> 
" by assault." — " The forcing of sucti 
a line with so little loss, in itself is an 
exploit less brilliant, perhaps, but 
more worthy of study thaii would 
have been a murderous assault, even 
if it had proved successful." These 
are extracts from the engineer's re- 
port now made public, I believe, for 
the first time, but that report was ac- 
cessible to the committee. 

General Erastus D. Keyes com- 
manded a division iu the Army of the 



15 



Peninsula. He av^s before Yorktown. 
His advance was stopped by a line of 
defence nine or ten miles long, forti- 
fied by breast works, erected, nearly 
the whole distance behind a stream, 
or succession of ponds, nowhere ford- 
able; one terminus behind Yorktown, 
and the other ending in the James 
Eiver which is commanded by the 
enemy's^ gun boats. He says : — " York- 
town is Ibrtified all around with bas- 
tioned works, and on the water side, 
it, and Gloucester, are so strong that 
the navy are afraid to attack either. 
The approaches on our side are gen- 
erall}' ihrough low, swampy or thickly 
wooded grounds; over roads which 
we are obliged to repair or make 
before we can get forward our car- 
riages. The enemy is in great 
iorce, and is constantl}^ receiving re- 
inforcements from the two rivers. 
The line in front of us is therefore 
one of the strongest ever opposed to 
an invading foce in any country. In- 
dependently of the strength of the 
lines in front of us, and of the force 
ot the enemy behind them, we cannot 
advance until we get command of 
either York (n- James River." 

Generai/ Fitz John Pouter who 
commanded the advanced corps and 
who also conducted the siege of York- 
town, reported : " Personal recogni- 
zances confirmed by the reports of 
engmeer officers, and the troops, show- 
ed the York'itown defences to be 
strong, and Avell armecl, and connect- 
ed with those on the Warwick by 
field works for artillery and infantry'-* 
that the bridges were destroyed and 
the approaclies to the dams which 
bad backed up the water to overflow 
+he banks were obstructed by abbatis 
and defended on the right bank by 
stone forts, wliich were Avell armed 
and manned and connected by infantry 
parajDets." — '• Officers on picket re- 
ported the enem}^ apparently in great 
numbers and very active, while desert- 
ers stated that troops at Yorktown 
and vicinity, originally about 15,000, 
had been greatly increased by arrivals 
from Norfolk and Eichmond, and were 
confident of successfullv defending the 
place.'' 



In opposition ro tliis is the testi- 
mony, 1st, of Gen. Silas S, Casey. 
He says : " That part of the army 
that went to Yorktown, I think, should 
have stormed the works, as from the 
information I received afterwards 
there were but about 7,000 or 8,000 
men on the arrival of the first corps 
on the peninsula." This is all this 
witness says about storming the 
works. If General Casey had c-om. 
manded the ai-my, he would not have 
acted on information received after- 
wards. 

2. General Samuel P. Heintzle- 
MA". The following testimony tran- 
scribed from the report was read by 
the General; "Question. If there was 
onl}^ about 7,000 men in Yorktown, 
and you had so large an arm}', what 
military objection had you to isolating 
the place and attacking further up the 
Peninsula? Answer. By the time we 
got to Yorktown their army had been 
largely reinforced there, though 
nothing like as fast as ours. Question 
What was the estimated strength of 
our army there ? Answer. I never 
heard. I was always of opinion that 
we could have forced their lines; and 
from information that I got at the 
Adams House, about two miles from 
Williamsburgh, the day before the 
battle there, I was satisfied we could 
have done so." 

3. General Joseph Hooker testi- 
fied : " Prom my examination of the 
works at Yorktown, and reaching 
away beyond the position that I occu- 
pied, I felt that their lines could be 
pierced without any considerable loss 
by the corps with which I was on du- 
ty- — Heintzleman's corps. We could 
have gone right through, and gone to 
the rear of the enemy. They would 
run the moment we got to their rear, 
and we could have picked up the pris- 
oners. Eight there at Yorktown the 
enemy had expended a great deal of 
labor. But I would have marched 
right through the redoubts which was 
a part of the cordon they hnd, and got 
on the road between Yorktown and 
Eichmond and thus compelled the ene- 
my to fight me on my ground, and not 
have fouiJ-ht them on theirs." Thisi 



testimony is characteristic of this wit- 
ness ; and he would undoubtedly have 
marched right through the redoubts, 
always provided the enemy had not pre- 
vented him. He would, too, have com- 
pelled the enemy to fight him on his 
own ground, -pYOviAQd he could have got 
-possession of the ground, ajid kept it. 

So then it will be seen that the wit- 
nesses in favor of beseiging Yorktown 
are : 1. Prince de Joinville, 2. General 
McClellan, 3. G-en. Barnard, 4. Gen. 
Keyes, and 5. Gen. Porter. In favor 
of stoi'ming the works. Generals Heint- 
Lelman, Casey, and Hooker. This 
being a question to be decided by the 
opinions of military men. I take into 
consideration such opinions only, the 
opinions of what the law terms experts; 
other oj)inions are not competent evi- 
dence. It ought perhaps to be stated 
in this connection that General Bar- 
nard, although he gave the opinion 
above quoted from his report made at 
the time of the siege, yet afterwards 
changed his mind. The evidence oi 
this change was furnished by a most 
extraordinaiy report made by him to 
General McClellan long after the siege 
of Yorktown; after it was well un- 
derstood what testimony the commit- 
tee Bought in respect to General 
McClellan, and, strange to say, even 
after this general had been relieved o.' 
his command, and when it was sup- 
posed he was not in favor with the ad- 
ministi-ation. It must have been pain- 
ful to General Barnard to feel himself 
compelled to attempt the ruin of a 
brother officer at such a time, and un- 
der such circumstances; but let the 
veteran engineer console himself with 
the assurance I now give him, that 
General McClellan is not ruined in re- 
I piitation ; he is not dead. He may be 
annoyed, but he is not in disgrace, nor 
j6 ho friendless, 

BBFOEE YOEKTOWN. 

I did suppose that what had been 
. ?aid in my last number would have 
been sufficient to show that General 
McClellan was deserving of commen- 
dation, rather than censure, for decid- 
ing to besiege the enemy's works at 
Yorktown in preference to carrying 



16 

them by what, in the opinion of Gen- 
eral Barnard, would have been a mur- 
derous assault even if successful. The 
country has since had some experience 
of such assaults at Fredericksburg. 
The sole consolation for our disasters 
in these conflicts is found in the fact 
that, although we lost many thous- 
ands in killed and wounded, yet per- 
haps the enemy suffered as severely 
as ourselves. But, on referring again 
to the report of the committee, I see 
that a sti'ong point is attempted to be 
made against the general for what is 
termed his " delay before Yorktown." 
The following paragraph is taken from 
the pamphlet edition of the committee, 
published and sold in the office of the 
JVeio York Tribune. The capitals and 
italics are also copied : 
"DELAY BEFOEE YORKTOWN. 

" All the testimony goes to prove 
that when our troops first landed on 
the Peninsula the force of the enemy 
there consisted of Magruder's com- 
mand, variously estimated at from 
7,000 to 12,000 men, except by Gene- 
ral McClellan, who estimated it at 
from 15,000 to 20,000. The Hon. Le- 
muel J. Bowden, U. S. Senator from 
Virginia — then living within the rebel 
lines, near Williamsburg, — testifies 
that the rebels did not determine to rein- 
force Magruder until it ivas apparent 
that our forces intended to stop before 
Yorktown, and intended to commence a 
regular siege o the place. It is now 
evident, whatever may have been the 
opinion of our officers at the time, that 
oiir forces when they first appeared be- 
fore Yorktown could have pierced the 
line of works across the Peninsula there 
without much difiicxdty, isolating York- 
town and cutting off reinforcements, 
when the place must have fallen in a 
very short time. Some of our generals 
expected and desired that that should 
be done. Gen. Heintzelman forwarded 
to Gen. McClellan the application of 
Gen. Hamilton, commanding a divi- 
sion, for permission to force the ene- 
my's lines. No answer was received 
to the application." 

I shall refute these statements in 
their order. It is not true that the 
rebels did not intend to reinforce Ma- 



17 



gruder until it was determined to com- 
mence a regular siege of "Yorktown. 
PROOF. 

^ General McClellan did not contem- 
plate the necessity of a siege when he 
first advanced (April 4th) upon York- 
town, after landing on the Peninsula; 
he then expected to be joined by 
McDowell's command. On the 4th of 
April he issned orders for the contin- 
ued march of the army at an early 
hour the next morning. General 
Keyes', General Couch's, and General 

/Smith's divisions were ordered to 

f)Ositions on the Yorktown and Wil- 
amsburg road, which would enable 
them to prevent the escape of the gar- 
rison at Yorktown, and to intercept 
reinforcements coming in. But Gene- 
ral Keyes reported the impossibility 
of carr^'ing those orders into effect, 
apetcifj'ing, among other things, tiiat 
"the enemy is in great force, and is 
constantly receiving reinforcements from 
the two rivers. The line in front of us 
is their new one of the strongest ever op- 
posed to an invading force in any coun- 
try." This report bore date April 7lh. 
On the 5th and Gth of April ho had 
prevlousl}' reported that the enemy's 
works (^Lee's Mills) in front of Smith, 
cannot oe carried by assault. General 
Keja^s was not before Yorktown, but 
in front of the enem}'^, on the War- 
wick. General McClellan himself tes- 
tified: " \Ye did not know, before we 
landed on the Peninsula, of the line of 
works along the Warwick. We knew 
that Yorktown was surrounded by a 
continuous line of earthworks, but we 
did not know of the line of the AVar- 
wick." 

General Casey, who it will be re- 
membered, acted under General Keyes, 
Hnd did not join for several days after 
Keyes, says : 

" From information I received after- 
wards," (that is after the evacuation 
of Yorktown), " there were but 7.U0U 
or 8,000 men there on the arrival ot 
the five corps " (not before Yorktown. 
but) ''onthe Peninsxda" General Heint- 
zelman says : " B}' the ^time we got to 
Ydrkrown their army (the enemy's) 
had been largely reinforced.'^ General 
McClellan, in answer to the inquiry, 



" What was the force of the enemy 
when Heintzelman lauded on the Pe- 
ninsula ? " says : " I do not know posi- 
tively ; but my belief is that there 
was not at that time much more than 
Magruder's original command, which, 
I think, we had always estimated at 
from 15,000 to 20,000 men. Move- 
ments of troops had been going on 
across the James River to the Penin- 
sula some days before my arrival. I 
remember that immediately upon my 
arrival at Fort Monroe, I was told that 
quite a large number of troops had been 
crossed over to Yorktown from the sonth 
bank of the James. I therefore hur- 
ried my own movements, and started 
from Fort Monro sooner than I would 
liave done. From the best informa- 
tion that I have been able to get, I 
think that large masses of reinfoix'e- 
ments arrived at Yorktown from one to 
two days before I reached 'its vicinity. 
Johston himself arrived there the day 
before I did." 

Thus much for the proof in opposi- 
tion to the testimony quoted from 
Hon, Lemuel J. Bowden (United 
States Senator !) The senator says 
he practiced law for a number of 
years, from Willimsburg down to 
Hampton, including Yorktown. He 
is asked by the committee : " In your 
judgment what would have been the 
result had a vigorous attack been 
made upon YorktOAvn proper, or a 
flank attack made?" The law gives 
value to the judgment of none but 
experts ; it does not allow such judg- 
ments or opinions to be given in evi- 
dence, except perhaps when the wit- 
ness is clothed with the dignity of " a 
Senator," and I freely admit that the 
"judgment" of Senator Bowden is of 
as much value as the judgment of 
Senator Chandler, or Senator Sher- 
man ; Senators all ! But let us hear 
the reply of the witness. He could 
not forget that though a senator, he 
had practiced law ; he therefoi*e says : 
"I have vftr}' little skill, if any, in 
military affairs, but my decided im- 
pression is," &c. This answer was a 
rebuke as severe as couid have been 
given, for putting such a question to 
sach a man. If there had been any 



11 



holiest lawyer on that committee, with 
even the elementary knowledge of the 
law of evidence, he would have said to 
the witness : " You are excused from 
giving any further answer; if you 
are not a militar}^ man, your opinion 
is no evidence, and if you are a mili- 
tary man, your impression would not 
be evidence." But the witness was 
not interrogated, and he proceeds to 
tell, not what he knew but what ho 
had heard from other Union men, bet- 
ter qualified to judge than himself; 
he concludes his narration of hearsay 
testimony in these words : " This I 
gathered from others, for 1 did not 
myself go to Yorktown after the Con- 
federates took possession of it until 
they evacuated it." If any one ol 
my readers desires to know what, in 
particular. Senator Bowden "gather- 
ed from others," I will refer him to 
the report of the committee, page 583. 
I beg leave to take leave of the Sena- 
tor, with commendation for his modes- 
iy. and I will say for him that I re- 
gard his judgment in military mat- 
ters as highly as I do any other law- 
3'er of my acquaintance. 

But the committee say : — •' It is now 
evident, whatever may have been the 
opinion of our officers at the time, 
that (here come the italics) our forces^ 
when they first appeared before York- 
town^ could have pierced the line of 
works, &c." 

I have just show^n what the officers 
at the time thought, but I do not find 
in the report that any, but General 
Ilointzelman, were as wise after the 
time as the committee represent. This 
General says, I was always of the 
opinion that we could have forced 
their lines, and from information I 
got at the Adams House, ar;uut two 
miles from Willimsburg, the day be- 
fore the battle there, I was satisfied 
we could have done so. The veteran 
general does not tell the committee 
from whence he derived this infoz-ma- 
tion; perhaps it was Senator Bow- 
den, for he lived up there. If the 
general did get his information from 
this source, he certainly shows proper 
respect for the " civil authority," a 
commendable trait in a military man. 



The report at the conclusion of the 
paragrapn quoted says : 

'• General Heintzelman forwarded 
to General McClellan the application 
of General Hamilton, commanding a 
division, for permission to force the 
enemy's lines. No answer was re- 
ceived to the application." This pas- 
sage of the report is founded on the 
following testimony given by General 
Heintzelman: "We were willing to 
tiy to force the lines with a single 
brigade. General Hamilton made the 
application, and I forwarded it to the 
commanding general." 

On the 16th April Brigadier Gen- 
eral Hamilton reported that the line 
ot rebel works for three quarters of a 
mile could have been carried by a sin- 
gle brigade, with very little loss, and. 
" I further report that I believe 1 can 
carry these works and hold them 
without much loss." This is the ap- 
plication made by Gen. Hamilton. 
Gen Hamilton, when lie made this re- 
port, was under the impression that 
the artillery in our batteries Nos. 7 
and 8 had driven the enemy from 
Winn's Mills works, which was erro- 
neous. No answer or direction was 
given to Gen. Hamilton in reply to 
his suggestion, because it was well 
known, and it had been reported by 
the general conducting the siege, that 
it had been found impracticable to 
cross the Warwick anywhere in the 
vicinity of Winn's Mills, this river not 
being fordable and the bridges de- 
stroyed ; also that " a close and tho- 
rough reconnoissance on the 25th 
made by that excellent officer of the 
army. Col. Jesse Gove, with his regi. 
ment, the Twenty-Second Massachu- 
setts Volunteers, confirmed his for- 
mer report of the 5th and 11th, that 
the Warwick was not fordable, the 
bank swampy, and the dams near its 
headwaters, on account of artificial 
obstructions, unapproachable in face 
of the enemy on the opposite banks." 
Gen. Grover, part of lleintzelman's 
command, after carrying a small 
work, defending a dam east of the 
Warwick, near Winn's Mills, drew^ off 
his forces because the Warwick could 
not be crossed, the narrow dam at 



19 



that point being defended oy several 
strong works well manned Winn's 
Mills were near the headwaters of the 
"Warwick. Gen. Barnard ?ays in his 
report: "The first group of works 
(the enemy's) is at Winn's Mills, 
where there is a dam and a bridge. 
This bridge the enemy destroyed." 

Thus I have examined and refuted 
sentence by sentence — the reader will 
see that this detail was necessary — 
the italicised libel of the committee 
which has been circulated by thou- 
sands and tens of thousands, by the 
aid of a metropolitan press, and the 
machinery of the United States gov- 
ernment, and all for what ? to destroy 
the reputation, as a soldier, of Geo. B. 
McClellan. 

I have seen a copy of General Bar- 
nard's report, bearing date May 6, 
1862, and of Gen. Barry's, bearing 
date May 5, 1862, and of General Fitz 
John Porter, bearing date May 8, 
1862. These reports seem to me to 
give evidence of professional talent of 
a high order. The words in which 
(kis report of Gen. Barnard concludes 
have been quoted, and shall not be re- 
peated. Rut the following additional 
qtjotations fi'oni the same report may 
be aptly given here. " If we could 
have broken the enemy's lines across 
the isthmus, we could have invested 
Yorktown, and it must, with its gar- 
rison, soon have fallen into our hands. 
It was not deemed practicable, con- 
sidering the strength of that line and 
the difficulty of handling our forces 
(owing to the impyacticable chai'acter 
of the country) to do so. If we could 
take Yorktown, or drive the enemy 
out of that place, the enemy's line 
was no longer tenable. This we could 
do by a single operation It was 
deemed too hazardous to attempt the 
red^iction of the place by assault," 
Pei'liaps General Hooker would not 
have deemed it " too hazardous/' but 
here let me say what I declare upon 
reliable authority, that this same gen- 
eral nevcT saw the defences of the 
enemy behind the Warwick. General 
Barry, fully confiding in the artillery 
placed and pointed under his com- 
mand, reported that our batteries, 



when opened, •' would have compelled 
the enemy to surrender in 12 hours." 
But the committee did not call Barry 
and Porter to the witness' stand, — they < 
selected their own witnesses; yet it ! 
must have been known to them that 
these generals knew a great deal 
about the siege of Yorktown. The 
enem}^ did not give General Barry an 
opportunity to try his well-placed 
guns, and demonstrate the power and 
efficiency of his batteries, but directly 
decided to evacuate before they were 
opened. What a tribute was this eva- 
cuation to the unsurpassed skill and 
generalship of McClellan! A force of 
equal, if not superior number retires, 
precipitately, from their own chosen 
and deliberately constructed fortifica- 
tions, without firing a gun. Who for 
a moment imagined that Major Gen- 
eral McClellan would, under similar 
circuinstances, have retired fi'om for- 
tifications erected for the defence of 
any loyal city under his command? 
This young genei-al would never have 
evacuated had he been behind such 
fortifications with an army numeri- 
cally equal in his, front. It cannot be 
denied that this siege and its result 
was an eminent military success. Why 
was not that great captain, Lieut. 
Gen, Winfield Scott, asked his profes- 
sional opinion of the operations before 
Yorktown? The reply is easy — be- 
cause the committee well knew he 
would not give an answer to suit their 
purpose. Yet while the siege of York- 
town, as a military enterprise, is re- 
garded with admiration by distin- 
guished soldiers at home and abroad; 
while it illustrates in a remarkable 
degree the proficiency of our country 
in the science and art of war, a com- 
mittee of an Araei'ican Congress make 
it a theme of censure, and strive by 
the most studied arts to defame 
and degrade their own illustrious 
countryman who suggested the plan 
and supei'vised the whole conduct of 
that siege. Shame ! shame ! 

The joint committee must have in- 
tended to rebuke the action of the 
House of Eepresentatives, which on 
the 9th May, 1862, passed the follow, 
in<r i-esolution of thanks: — "Eesolved 



20 



'I*hat we receive with profound satis- 
faction intelligence of the recent vic- 
tories achieved by the armies of the 
Potomac, associated from their locali- 
ties with those of the Eevolution, and 
that the sincere thanks of this House 
are hereby tendered to Major General 
George B. JAcClellan, for the display 
of those high military qualities which 
Secure important results with but lit- 
tle sacrifice of life. 

I have done with Yorktown, unless 
the committee or some of its members 
see fit to reply to what is here record- 
ed. I do not wish to be considered 
the defender of General McClellan. 
He needs no defence. The simple un- 
varnished narrative of what he has 
done, and what he has left undone, in 
the service of his country, and his rea- 
sons for his action and non-action, 
will form not only his defence but his 
eulogy. My office is to arraign before 
the American people and the world, 
the joint committee of Congress. It 
will aiford me sincere gratification to 
be convinced that this committee does 
not deserve the marked reprobation of 
all intelligent and honorable men. 

Since I sent my last number to the 
press I have been addressed by a mer- 
chant of high position and respecta- 
bility, substantially as follows : " Well ! 
I see you have turned military man, 
and are engaged in the discussion of 
inilitary questions." My reply to 
snch a question is — I am no military 
man, and am no judge of military 
matters ; that is to say, my judgment 
is not the result of such theoretical 
and practical knowledge as entitles 
my opinions to be received as evi- 
dence to guide the judgment of others. 
I am not an expert. But I do profess 
to some knowledge of the rules of 
evidence, and also to some £,cquaiut- 
ance with the Constitution of my 
country, and to the duties -imposed 
upon public officers by that Constitu- 
tion. 

1. As to the rules of evidence. 
Every witness may testify to facts 
which have fallen under his own ob- 
servation, or which he personally 
knows ; but information derived from 
others is hearsay evidence, and is 



open to many objections. It is very 
unsafe to form conclusions from such 
testimony. 

As I have before shown, opinions 
can only be received as evidence when 
they proceed from witnesses who have, 
from theory and practice, peculiai 
knowledge of the subject upon which 
they testify. These rules are the re- 
sult of long experience in the prac- 
tical business of mankind, especially 
in controversies brought before courts 
of justice, and they have been estab- 
lished with the view to aiding the hu- 
man mind in the endeavor to arrive at 
truth through the medium of human 
testimony. Another rule is, that 
leading questions shall not be put to 
a witness J that is to say, a question 
shall not be asked which suggests to 
the witness the answer which is de- 
sired and expected. Considering that 
the joint committee was composed of 
members, a large majority of whom 
were known to be unfriendly to Mc- 
Clellan, and were intent upon his deg- 
radation, and considering too, that 
most of the witnesses were dependent 
for their positions, and especially for 
their promotion, upon the favor of 
the Administration, leading ques- 
tions would not be likely to elicit the 
truth. Witness the single case of 
General Barnard, in illustration of 
this remark. Now I affirm, from a 
thorough and attentive perusal of the 
evidence contained in No. 1 of the 
committee's report, that all these 
rules have been grossly and repeatedly 
violated by the committee in taking 
testimony. To specify : A great deal 
of improper and hearsay evidence 
has been received in answer to ques. 
tions put by the committee. Numer- 
ous opinions have been drawn forth 
and recorded, from witnesses whose 
opinions were not evidence. The re- 
port abounds with leading questions 
which plainly suggest to the witness- 
es the answei's desired, and the ans- 
wers are, for the most pai't, given as 
desired. 

2. As to the Constitution, and du- 
ties of official agents of the govern- 
ment : 

The President, the chief of theso 



official organs, is by virtue of his 
office, commander in chief of the 
army, hut that of itself, does not 
qualify him to take command of the 
army or to interfere in military opera- 
tions. The idea, that because he is 
the constitutional conmander in chief 
of the army, he shall take command 
in fact, is absurd, according to the 
theorj'' of our constitutional govern- 
ment. The country has been engaged 
in three wars with foreign nations 
since the Eevolution. The short war 
with France, under John Adams, se- 
cond Pi'esident of the United States, 
the' war with Great Britain, under 
Mr. Madison's Administration, and 
the war with Mexico, under Mr. Polk's 
Administration. Neither of these 
Presidents ever for a moment under- 
took to interfere directly with troops 
or regiments in the field. The idea of 
John Adams, or James Madison, emi- 
nent statesmen as they were, bestrid- 
ing a horse and reviewing an army, 
would strike any American citizen of 
their day as ridiculous. A President 
may put in office, by consent of the 
Senate, the incumbents of the War 
Department; but when duly filled with 
officers, constitutionally chosen, this 
department must manage and control 
military operations in time of war. 
The like is true of every other depart- 
ment. Who expects the President to 
control the operations of the Treasury 
Department? Would Mr. Chase al- 
low for a moment such interference or 
oonti'ol? Certainly not. President 
Lincoln has pi'actieally violated this 
established theory of our government. 
He has interfered directly, in his own 
proper person, with military opera- 
tions ; he has personally directed gen- 
erals in command what they ought 
to do, and what they ought to leave 
undone. What has been the result ? 
Nothing but evil and disaster. I have 
shown, beyond the possibility of refu- 
tation, that but for the interference of 
the President, General McClellan 
would have taken Eichmond a year 
ago. Unless this war is conducted by 
military men, upon militar}- princi- 
ples, it needs no prophet to tell us it 
can never succeed. It is a well known 



21 



fact that the General-in-Chief at 
Washington does not control the mil- 
itary operations of the country, ]y\i% 
he is constantly interfered with -and 
controlled by the constitutional Com- 
mander-in-Chief, and this constitti- 
tional commander is constantly under 
an outside pressure, not directed by 
military science, which he has more 
than once acknowledged his utter ina- 
bility to resist. Is it possible that our 
cause should prosper when these 
things exist ? My remedy is : — ^Let 
George B. McClellan be made Gene- 
ral-in-Chief and Acting Secretary of 
War, and then let him control the 
operations of the war, without inter- 
ference, just as Ml*. Chase now con- 
trols the operations of the Treasury 
Department without interference. 
Then success will follow, and confi- 
dence will be felt that military opera- 
tions will be properly conducted. 

This number is an episode sug- 
gested by the question casually put to 
me as above stated. I shall accom- 
pany the Army of the Potomac from 
Yorktown to Williamsburg in my next 
number. 

FEOM YOEKTOWN TO 
WILLI AMSBUEG. 

Yorktown was evacuated on the 
4th of May, 1862 ; suddenly, unex- 
pectely, precipitately evacuated. What, 
then, was the duty of General Mc 
Clellan, and did he perform that duty ? 
It is obvious that fresh, hot, and vig- 
orous pursuit was one branch of that 
duty. By this means the enemy, or 
a part of his force, might be encoun- 
tered and captured. Another and 
more important branch of his duty 
was, if posaible, to intercept the re- 
treat of the enemy by throwing a 
force between him and Eichmond. 
Let us see what the general actually 
did ; his own testimony on this point 
is too clear and comprehensive to re- 
quire elucidation or abridgment. Here 
it is : " As soon as I knew that 
the enemy had evacuated Yorktown. 
I ordered the cavalry under General 
Stouemau, with the horse-artillery in 
pursuit. I directed the divisions of 
Kearney and Hooker to move by the 
direct road from Yorktown to Wil 



liamsburg, while the divisions of 
Smith, Couch, and Casey, were order- 
ed by the road from Warwick Court 
House to Wiliiamsburgh. Franklin's 
division, which was on the Transports, 
was ordered up to Yorktown, with 
the intention of moving it to the vi- 
cinity of West Point, in order to in- 
tercept the retreat of the enemy. The 
divisions of Eichardson, Sedgwick, 
and Porter were moved to the imme- 
diate vicinity of Yorktown, ready 
either to support the troops who had 
advanced by land, or to go by water, 
as circumstances might render advisa- 
ble. The general instructions given 
to the troops ordered in pursuit were 
to overtake the enemy and inflict as 
■much damage as possible. This was 
on Sunday. That night 1 heard that 
the cavalry had come up with the ene- 
my in the vicinity of Williamsburg, 
and that the infantry were within a 
half hour's march, rapidly approach- 
ing, and would undoubtedly earry the 
position. Gen. Sumner was in com- 
mand of the troops ordered to the 
front. I remaiiLed at Yorktown on 
Sunday, and on Monday morning en- 
gaged in arranging for the forwarding 
of Franklin's division to West Point, 
and in consultation with the naval 
commander, as well as other duties 
incident to my position. 

I heard nothing from the front on 
Monday morning that gave me any 
idea that there was anything serious 
involved. I heard nothing from Gen- 
eral Sumner. The first intimation I 
had that there was anything at uU se- 
rious was from Governor Sprague, 
■who came to me at Yorktown and told 
me that things were not going on well 
in front. This was. I think, about 
noon ; it may have been half an liour 
or an hour one way or the other. lie 
told me that things were not going 
well, and that my presence in front 
was necessary. As soon as I heard 
that I took a boat, went down to camp 
where my horses were, and immedi- 
ately left for the front, meeting on 
the way the Prince de Joinville, and 
an aid of General Sumner, who had 
been sent back to hurry me up. Up 
to this time 1 had had no information 



22 



from General Sun^iier or any one in 
command, that there was anything at 
all serious in front. 1 arrived on the 
ground, I should thmk, about an hour 
or an hour and a half before dark. I 
acquainted myself, as rapidly as pos- 
sible, with the state of affairs, and 
immediately oi-dered reinforcements 
to General Hancock, who was heavily 
engaged when I arrived, and I endea- 
vored to communicate with General 
Heintzelman, who was on the left of 
our position. I was told that it was 
impossible to communicate directly 
with our left under General Heintzel- 
man. I sent an officer, Capt. Alexan- 
der, with a company to endeavor to 
open communication with General 
Heintzelman, that I might learn the 
state of affairs there. He returned 
after dark with the information that 
it was impracticable to get through 
the marsh. I tnen went round some 
seven or eight miles, by way of the 
rear, to communicate. 

During the night I heard from Gen- 
eral Heintzelman that Hookei*'s divi- 
sion had been badly cut uj), and could 
not be relied upon for very heavy 
work in the morning; that Kearney's 
division, although it had suffered se- 
verely, could be fully relied upon to 
hold its own; and that no advance 
could be made in that quarter without 
having reinforcements. 

I felt satisfied, from what I knew of 
Hancock's jDOsition, that the battle 
was won : that he had occupied the 
decisive point, and gained possession 
of a portion of the enemy's line; and 
that they must make a night retreat 
or we would have greatly the advan- 
tage of them in the morning. So fully 
was I satisfied of that, that I counter- 
manded orders that I had given in the 
afternoon, for the advance of Richard- 
son's and Sedgwick's divisions to the 
front and sent them back to Yorktown 
to go by water; feeling sure that the 
battle was won." Here is the whole 
story, uncontradicted by any reliable 
testimony. The (jommittee make no 
open and direct attack upon General 
McClellan for failui-e of duty in pur- 
suing the enemy to Williamsburg, but 
they make insinuations by which they 



23 



mean to leave an impression that he 
was remiss in duty. The most salient 
of these indirect attacks are italicised 
by the Tribune in his edition of the 
report. The passages thus made prom- 
inent are these: •' Gen. McClellan re- 
mained behind in Yorktoion to superin- 
tend the sending of two divisions up the 
York River to West Point." * * 
" He" (Gov. Sprague) "testifies that 
when Gen. McClellan was told the 
condition of affairs at the front, he re- 
marked that he had supposed ' those 
in front could attend to that little 
matter.' " The report of the commit- 
tee adds : "After some time General 
McClellan started from Yorktown. and 
reached the vicinity of Williamsburg 
about 5 o'clock in the afternoon." 

The charges are, then : 1. General 
McClellan remained behind^ &c. The 
committee mean to imply th?.t he 
ought to have been in front, facing the 
danger, 2, Upon being informed of 
the collision at Williamsburg, he made 
light of it; and 3. He was slow, when 
informed there was trouble in front, 
in giving relief 

1. General McClellan, instead of 
going himself in pursuit of the re- 
treating enemy, sent several of his 
corps commanders, men of high mili- 
tary reputation, and of experience, 
while he remained at Yorktown to 
dispatch a body of troops by water to 
intercept the retreat ol the enemy, by 
netting between him and Richmond. 
Before the evacuation of Yorktown it 
was impracticable for our naval force 
to go up York River. At a narrow 
pass in this river, between Yorktown 
and Gloucester Point, there were very 
formidable fortifications and arma- 
ments on both sides — on the side of 
Yorktown and on the side of Gloucester 
Point; these were under the control of 
the enemy before the evacuation. If 
either of these positions was in our 
hands the obstacle in the \-iny of our na- 
val opei'ations up York River would 
have been removed. The original pur. 
pose was that McDowell's force should 
take Gloucester Point, when Yorktown 
could not have liailod to be evacuated, 
and a free passage to Eichmond made 
for our army not only by land, up the 



Peninsula, but also up the York River. 
The execution of this purpose having 
been defeated, as we have seen, the 
next thing to be done was to gain the 
works on the Yorktown side, and the 
same result would have been ba-ought 
about. After the evacuation York 
Eiver was unobstructed, and now it 
became a very desirable object to em- 
bark a force at Yorktown, send it up 
York River to West Point, and thus 
intercept the retreat of the enemy to 
Richmond. For this purpose it be- 
came necessary to make suitable ar- 
i-angement-s with the naval command- 
er, and get the troops on board and 
under way. McClellan judged that 
the best interests of the service re- 
quired him to remain, and personally 
supervise the accomplishment of this 
work, for there were difficulties in the 
.way which required to be removed. 
Who can queston the soundness of 
this decision ? Yet this prevented the 
general from being at or near Wil- 
liamsburg Avhen an actual collision 
occurred. When he was sent for, and 
appi'ised of the danger, he went 
promptly. But because a collision did 
occur — and it would not have occurred 
if Gen. Stoneman had been more tar- 
dy in pursuit — and because there was 
dano-er which General McClellan was 
not present to share, the committee 
most unfairly, most unmanfully, think 
a proper opportunity is afforded, 
which they are prompt to improve, to 
insinuate that the general shrinks at 
the prospect of danger, and is deficient 
in personal courage. I say an " insin- 
uation" is made ; it would have been 
imprudent, probably unsafe, for the 
committee to make a direct charge of 
cowardice; they theretbre find it con- 
venient to deal in insinuations; "un- 
safe," not that Gen. McClellan would 
liave noticed it, but there are proba- 
bly many brave men in the army less 
discreet, exercising less self-control 
than the general, wlio might have re- 
sented it by chastising the authors of 
such a charo-e. Similar insinuations 
are made in other parts of the com. 
mittee's report, intended to wound 
the sensibilities of a soldier, which 
shall be noticed hereaftei'. 



24 



The committee seem to think thai 
the commander-in-chief of 100,00( 
men can best prove his fitness for his 
high position by rushing into danger, 
and exposing his own life; the Joint 
Committee of Congress need instruc- 
tion on this point, and any corporal 
in the army could give them that in- 
struction. 

2 The general " made light of it." 
That expression is incorporated in the 
report, being extracted from the tes- 
timony of. Grovernor Sprague, who 
testifies: "With one orderly I left the 
advance at 12 o'clock to go to York- 
town and communicate the condition 
of aftairs to G-eneral McClellan, who 
was supposed to be at Yorktown, 
though no communication had been 
received from him since early the day 
before. I reached Yorktown in about 
one hour and a half and found Gene-, 
ral McClellan with General Fitz JFohn 
Porter and General Franklin. I com- 
municated to him the condition of af- 
fairs at the front, and urged him to go 
up there at once. His reply was that 
he thought they could take care of 
this little matter, but he said he would 
immediately leave for the front." " I 
afterwai'ds ascertained that General 
McClellan arrived at the front about 
five o'clock." 

This testimony of Governor Sprague 
was thought worthy of being incor- 
porated in the report, and of being 
made pi'ominent in the Tribune's edi- 
tion, and yet the committee could 
hardly have relied on the accuracy of 
the witness Sprague, for according to 
his testimony the general must have 
been with the army in five hours after 
he, Sprague, left Williamsburg, a dis- 
tance of twelve miles, and traveled 
over a road almost impassable. Yet 
the committee say, '• after some time 
Gen. McClellan started from York- 
town, &c." Yet it did so happen that 
after the general hail ai'rived at Wil- 
liamsburg, reinforcements were sent 
in the proper direction, order and con- 
fidence were restored, lie saw at 
once that the enemy had been 
whipped, and . in-imediately ordered 
several genei-als to return at once to 
Yorktown and embark with Fraiiklin. 
This will do lor Williamsburg 



FROM williamsbuhg to 

CHICKAHOMINY. 

It has been shown in these papers 
that General McClellan would have 
taken Eichmond a year ago, if he had 
been permitted to execute the pur- 
poses he had formed M'ith the concur- 
lenco of the Administration. This is 
not denied by the opponents of Gen. 
McClellan ; but they say, first, that 
there were good grounds for the with- 
holding of McDowell's command, and, 
secondly, that, without the aid of this 
command, there were several oppor- 
tunities for taking Richmond, which 
the general failed to improve. Among 
other opportunities neglected was 
that which occurred immediately af- 
ter the battle at Williamsburg, when, 
it is said, our army could have entered 
Richmond. 

The first of these grounds has been 
replied to. 1 now come to the second; 
which shall be examined in the light 
of the testimony and contemporane- 
ous history, with as much candor, 
fairness and impartiality as I can ex- 
ercise. 

After describing the battle of Wil- 
liamsl>urg, in which he bore a con- 
spicuous part. General Hooker is asked 
by the committee this question : " I3 
it your judgment that you could have 
gone into Richmond then ? " To 
which he answei-s : " I think we could 
have moved right on, and got into 
Richmond by the second day after 
that battle without another gun being 
fired." General Keys is asked.: "Do 
you know why there was not an im- 
mediate and general pursuit of the 
enemy after the battle ? " He replied : 
" I do not." Again : " In 3'our judg- 
ment, as a military man, should or 
should not there have been an imme- 
diate 2)ursuit?" Answer — "My opi- 
nion, as a military man, is that the 
most vigorous and immediate pursuit 
should i\ave been made after the bat- 
tle of Williamsburgh." Question — 
"In your judgment, if an immediate 
and vigorous pursuit had been made, 
what would have been the result?" 
Answer — " If an immediate and vig- 
orous pursuit of the enemy had been 
made, 1 think we should have over- 



m> 



taken portions of liis troops, and have 
been able to ca^jture such baggage as 
he took with l)im. I think also it 
•would have hastened our arrival in 
the ueigbborhood of IJichniond, and 
"vve should have been able to attack 
the enemy before he had made the 
preparations for defence and obtain- 
ed the reinforcements which our delay 
gave him an opportunity^ of doing." 

General McClellan testifies that it 
is about fifty miles from Williams- 
burg to the Chickahominy, that is to 
Ifew Bridge. He is then asked : " It 
has iieen stated that some two weeks 
were occupied in the movement from 
Williamsburgh to the Chickahoiminy ; 
will you explain the reason for that ?" 
Answer — " I do not remember the 
exact time; I can only say that we 
w^ere very much delayed after the 
affair at Williamsburg by the condi- 
tion of the roads, and the diffiult}'^ in 
bringing up supplies. We had a great 
deal of trouble of that kind before 
reaching the Chickahominy. I think 
the movemeht was made as rapidly as 
possible under the circumstances." 
Question — " After leaving Williams- 
burg you met with no serious resist- 
ance fron\ the enemy until after cross- 
ing of Bottom's Bridge, did you ? " 
Answer — " Merely cavalry affairs. 
Tbcre w^ere some sharp cavalry af- 
fairs, but no resistance in large force." 



" Several of the generals testif}'^ that, 
had the anemy been promptly fol- 
lowed up after the battle of Williams- 
burg, they could be followed into 
liicliinond — one of tbeni says with- 
out firing a gun. Gen. McClellan 
says that the roads were so bad in 
consequence of the rains, that it was 
nnjiracticabje to make a vigorous pur- 

bUiL." 

-All the testimony bearing upon the 
point under i-eview, and the reference 
of ihe committee to the same, is here 
transcribed. General McClellan is at 
issae with Generals Hooker and 
K eyes, and the committee evidently 
fiwvor the testimou}- against McClel- 
lan. 1 hope my readers will patiently 
lollow me while I investigate the 
question — is the bias of the commit- 
tee in the right direction ? 



It IS ti'ue that tne roads were bad 
in consequence of the rains, and that 
made it impracticable to pursue the 
enemy vigorously. On the night 
when the rebels evacuated Williams- 
burg, Prince de Joinville says " that 
the rain was falling in torrents," and, 
before that time, and ever since the 
leaving of Yorktown, there had been 
copious rains. On the night before 
the battle at Williamsburg, General 
Hooker says " that the roads had be- 
come so very muddy — raining very 
hard — the mud was knee-deep, and 
my men had become eo fatigued that 
I halted right in the road, intending 
to renew the march at the dawn of 
day in the morning." But the condi- 
tion of the roads was not the only 
eause why General McClellan could 
not proceed on the morning after the 
battle. He says he was prevented 
" by the condition of the roads, and 
the difficulty in bringing up supplies." 
It will be remembered that the base 
of supplies for our army was York- 
town, and the base of supplies for 
the rebel iirmy was Richmond. 

We were marching from our base 
of supplies, and the enemy was march- 
ing to his base of supplies. Our army 
left Yorktown in great haste to pur- 
sue the retreating enemy; it took as 
small an amount of provisions and 
ammunition as conld be conveniently 



The committee say in their report : ' transported in a rapid march — the 



roads being in a wretched condition 
for travel. General Casey testifias: 
" On the morning of the 4th of May, 
when there^ was some evidence that 
the enemy was about evacuating their 
lines, I was ordered at a half hour'b 
notice Lo go to the river and leave 
everything behind — tents, blankets, 
knapsacks and everything. When 
I got there the enemy had evacuated 
their works. I then intended to send 
back for the tents, blankets and knap- 
sacks for my men. But I got a per- 
emptory order from General Sumner 
to push on after the enemy, without 
waiting for anything. The conse- 
quence was that my division — a great 
many of them — were without blank- 
ets and knapsacks for severl weeks. 
It was raining terribly all the time, 



26 



and the consequence was that I lost 
a great many men from that exposure, 
as they were obliged to lie down in 
the mud, exposed to the rain, without 
any protection whatever." Gov. 
Spragne says : " We had started off 
to Yorktown so hurriedly that no 
preparations for rations had been 
made, aud many of the regiments had 
nothing to eat." Gen. Heintzelman 
says : " Most of the troops were out 
of ammunition." Heintzelman, as 1 
am informed, reported on the 5th of 
May that all his provisions would be 
exhausted that night, and that Hook- 
ers's and Kearney^s commands were 
so much exhausted and injured by the 
contest as not to be reliable for service 
the next morning. Kearney's ammu- 
nition and provisions were mainly 
exhausted. These being the facts, 
who can fail to see that it was utterly 
impracticable to pursue the enemy 
immediately after the battle of Wil- 
liamsburg. On the 4th of May about 
45,000 troops started from Yorktown 
by land in great haste to pursue a re- 
treating enemy, carrying with them 
such ammunition and supplies only as 
could be carried on a rapid march. 
Generals Franklin, Sedgwick and 
Porter went up the York Eiver with 
their commands to West Point, at 
which place Franklin with his 11,000 
troops arrived on the evenina: of the 



6th and the morning of the 7th of gable affluent of the York. 



May. After the retreat from Wil- 
liamsburg, Johnson, the rebel com- 
commander, marched rapidly to West 
Point to prevent the landing of Frank- 
lin's command before Sedgwick and 
Porter should arrive with their com- 
mands. It must be obvious that in 
this condition of thfngs Gen. McClel- 
lan could not march upon Eichmond 
until he had established a base of sup- 
plies nearer to Eichmond than York- 
town, and brought up his commissary 
stores asd ammunition for the sup- 
ply of his army to such base of opera- 
tions. These supplies had to be 
brought up the \ork Eiver, and land- 
ed at Elton, on the oide of the Pam- 
unkey Eiver opposite West Point. 
Elton was the first temporary depot 
for these supplies, and the next tem- 



porary depot was Cumberland, situ- 
ated on the Pumunkey about fifteen 
miles from West Point, while the 
main base of supplies was finallj^ 
fixed at White House on the Pamun- 
key Eiver, where the railroad from 
West Point to Eichmond crosses the 
Pumnnkey, and about thirty miles 
from Eichmond. To make these ne- 
cessary arrangements required all the 
time that was taken to prepare the 
Army of the Potomac to proceed on 
its march to the Chickahominy. 

The testimony, therefore, of Gener- 
als Hooker and Keyes is very loose 
and unreliable. The Prince de Join- 
given to Europe and 
most clear, accurate 
history of the cam- 
paign on the Peninsula that has yet 
appeared, after describing the capture 
Oi \\ illiamsburg, proceeds : — '• The 
mass of Federal trooj^s was detained 
by the necessity of waiting for pro- 
visions from Yorktown, the arrival of 
which was retarded by the state of 
the roads. They came at last, and as 
the fine weather dried the roads up 
very fast, a two days' march brought 
us up with the corps which had dis- 
embarked and established a depot at 
tiie head of York Eivei*. The whole 
army was collected around this point, 
and then resumed its march to Eich- 
mond, along the Pumunkey, 



ville, who has 
the world the 
and soldierlike 



a navi- 



How evident therefore it is that the 
testimony of Hooker is uttei-ly incre- 
dible, when he says, " I think we 
could have moved right on and got 
into Eichmond the second day after 
the battle without another gun being 
fired." Fifty miles' march from Wil- 
liamsburg to the Chickahominy in 
two days, the roads being in the worst 
condition imaginable for travel, the 
army being without food, short of am- 
munition, and a portion of it exhaust- 
ed after severe fighting — who can be. 
lieve such a witness? But this is the 
opinion of General Hooker — the pro- 
fessional opinion — and all distin- 
guished men of his profession ac- 
quainted with the character of Gene- 
ral McClellan will put as much confi- 
dence in this opinion as in that other 



27 



opinion which he has uttered under 
oath : " I do not hesitate to say that 
the faihire of the Peninsula campaign 
is to be actributed to the want of gen- 
eralship on the part of our command- 
er." While that record remains, Gen- 
eral Joseph Hooker will never have 
the confidence of the Army of the 
Potomac, for that army will never be- 
lieve that he can be a safe and relia- 
ble leader '* who bears false witness 
against bis neighbor." This general, 
whom the Prince de Joinville styled 
" an admirable soldier," has, since he 
gave his testimony against General 
McClellan, been placed at the head of 
a larger army than that commanded 
by McClellan on the Peninsula — an 
army well clad, well supplied, and 
well appointed in every respect, and 
he has had the opportunity of meeting 
the enemy; how he improved that 
opportunity the country knows, the 
world knows, and especially do the 
oflScers and soldiers who fought under 
him know; they are capable of 
instituting a comparison between him 
and the general whom he has defamed, 
and I greatly err if that general will 
shrink from the comparison. 

Gen. McClellan is not the only mi- 
litary chief who has been assailed in 
the testimony of Hooker, who says 
"that Gen. Sumner was in command 
(at Williamsburg) with a large force, 
certainly not less than 30,000 men. 
He could have advanced through the 
line of defences across the Peninsula 
at Williamsburg without losing ten 
men. The enemy could not fire for I 
had him in a vice. I wanted him to 
advance, and until three o'clock of that 
day I expected he Avould advance and 
march through the line held by the en- 
emy, and go to picking up prisoners. 
During this time m-y own troops were 
engaged with not less than three or 
four times my number. Gen. Kear- 
ney, wlio was the last of all the army 
to leave Yorkcown — except Porter's 
division, which was left to gai'rison 
Yorktown — was the first to come to 
my assistance. If General Sumner 
had advanced, the rebellion would have 
been buried there. He did not ad- 
vance at all ! Here, then, it would 



seem that that veteran General Sum- 
ner lost a glorious opportunity to fin- 
ish the rebellion." But it happens Ihat 
the old general was there before the 
committee also to testify. He says 
that none of his own corps were 
there. It was ten miles in the rear. 
He was in command there by virtue 
of his seniority in rank. He occupied 
the centre. Question by Mr. Odell — 
" What was the number of troops un- 
der your command at the centre ?" 
Answer — " My impression now is that 
before General Peck arrived there was 
not to exceed a brigade and a half of 
infantry at that point, or about two- 
thirds of Smith's division. There was 
a large body of cavalry there, but I 
did not look upon them as available 
troops to hold that point against an 
attack from the woods." Question. — 
'• About how many men were there in 
that brigade and a half?" Answer.— 
" I do not think there could have been 
to exceed 3,000 men ; all the rest of 
the forces under my control were in 
the rear, coming up." It will be seen 
that the number of troops under Gen. 
Sumner's command differs from the 
statement of Gen. Hooker as three to 
thirty. General Sumner further tes- 
tifies : " An application was made to 
me for reinforcements for Gen. Hook- 
er; I think 1 complied with the appli- 
cation by sending my staff ofiicers to 
the rear to hurry up the ti'oqps from 
the rear. I did not deem it safe to 
send any more troops from the cen- 
tre, and the result showed that it was 
fortunate I had not done so. I allude 
to the attack made by the enemy in 
the afternoon at the centre." Thus 
much for Gen. Hooker, the present 
commander of the army of the Poto- 
mac. 

But what shall be said of Gen. 
Keyes ? He has a reputation in the 
array differing widely from that of 
Gen. Hooker; he is regarded as a re- 
liable man — how could this general 
give the professional opinion that 
" the most vigorous and immedi- 
ate pursuit should have been made 
after the battle of Williamsburg?" 
How could that distinguished general 
have answered the following ques- 



^28 



tions if they had been put ; Was it 
practicable for the army to have 
moved when their provisions were ex- 
hausted ? When they were short of 
ammunition, to have moved at all be- 
fore a base of supplies was established? 
From the facts above stated, all of 
which are of the most reliable charac- 
ter, it will be seen how Gen. Keyes 
must have answered these interi-oga- 
tories if they had been put to him. It 
is melancholy to think that men who 
never lack courage on the field of bat- 
tle should fail to speak their honest 
convictions when they have reason to 
suppose that the utterance of undis- 
guised truth will give offence to those 
in power. We have seen a melan- 
choly exemplification of this truth in 
the ease of General Barnard, and we 
fear a similar illustration is exhibited 
in the case of General Keyes j he 
knew what kind of testimony the 
committee wanted. General Keyea 
gave this testimony, it will be recol- 
lected, when Gen. McClellan was no 
longer at the head of an army, but 
supposed to be in disgrace. He was 
examined on the 26th March, 1863. 
We think there is some foundation for 
the fear above expressed — not as to 
the physical courage of General 
Keyes, tor he is no coward, but as to 
the higher quality of moi'al courage, 
in the folloAving statement : On the 
16th of April, 1862, General Keyes 
sent a report, from which we have be- 
fore quoted, to the Assistant Adjutant 
General of the Army of the Potomac. 
We take the following extract from 
this report: " I was thus enabled in 
the first day to comprehend with tol- 
erable clearness the position of the 
enemy from a short distance above 
Lee's Mills down to James Eiver. He 
is in a strongly fortified position be- 
hind Warwick; River, the fords in 
which have been destroyed by dams, 
and the approaches to which are 
through dense forests, swamps and 
marshw'?. No part of his line, as far as 
discovered, can be taken by assault with- 
out an enormous loaste of life.." Other 
quotations have been given from Gen- 
eral Keyes in former numbers. 

This was the opinion of General 



Keyes, officially expressed, when ho 
was with the army before the lines at 
Yorktown ; but before the committee, 
after General McClellan was relieved 
of his command, he says, among other 
things. " My impression now is, that 
if the whole army had been pressed 
forward we could have found a point 
to break through But I give this 
simply as my impression." After 
stating that Yorktown was very 
strongly defended, and if we made an 
assault on it we should have met with 
severe loss, he says : " I will not say if 
we had pressed on immediately on ar- 
riving in front of their lines, we might 
not have found a point where we could 
have broken the line, and then have 
invested Yorktown on two sides, 
when the fall of it, of course, would 
have been hastened. It is my opinion 
that if we had pressed on rapidly 
when we first ai'rived, we might have 
found a point through which we could 
have broken." 

Thus it will be seen that the genera- 
makes' a distinction between Yorkl 
town proper and the lines of the ene- 
my on the Warwick, extending to 
James Eiver. He was sot before 
Yorktown with his command, hut on 
the lines, and it is as to the praetica- 
bility of assaulting the lines that he 
speaks in the report above referred to. 
BEFORE RICHMOND. 

These numbers are resumed after an 
interim of intense public anxiety, and, 
I may add, of great joy, in which the 
popular mind and feeling have been 
too much engrossed to give any at- 
tention to historical events. The Ar- 
my of the Potomac, after sad experi- 
ence at Fredericksburg, and a signal 
and most important victory at Gettys- 
burg, is now where it was after the 
not less important victory at Antie- 
tam, when General McClellan was re- 
lieved of his command. Had the Ad- 
ministration not seen fit to remove 
General McClellan, the ofilcers of the 
Army of the Potomac, with almost 
entire unanimity, always excepting 
Major General Joseph Hooker, would, 
it is believed, bear testimon}^ that in 
their judgment our army would not 
have been defeated in Virginia on the 



two occasions referred to, and, cer 
tainly, the rebel army of Cleneral Lee 
would not have ventured a second in- 
vasion of Maryland and Pennsylvania. 
That invasion has, however, been 
made, attended with immense destruc- 
tion and loss of property, the most 
frightful alarm of peaceable citizens, 
and very serious loss of life. Shall 
there be no day of reckoning for tliese 
things? We shall see when the ballot 
boxes receive the votes of the Ameri- 
can people. Until then let us be pa- 
tient, and be especially careful that 
no previous irregularities change the 
ehai'acter of the issue then to be de- 
cided. 

When the enemy retreated from 
Williamsburg he returned to his capi- 
tal and his base of supplies. Our ar- 
my had not established a base of sup- 
plies between Yorktown and Rich- 
mond. It requires not a militai'y man 
to say that a large army cannot cany 
on its proper operations, nay, tnat it 
cannot exist, without being in near 
and easy commimication with its de- 
pot of dail}' food, ammunition, and 
other indispensable supplies. The ca- 
pital of the enemy was fortified j be- 
fore Grcneral McClellan pursued the 
enemy to his capital with a view to 
assault it, he must of course establish 
a base of supplies for his own army, 
and store it with the necessary articles 
of consumption. That base of sup- 
plies was established at the White 
House, on the Pamunkey Eiver, a 
stream rising in a i-egion of country 
north of Richmond, and discharging 
its waters in the Charles River at 
West Point. The Pamunkey River is 
navigable from the Charles to the 
White House, so that this base of sup- 
plies was accessible by water. The 
White House, too, was in direct com- 
munication with Richmond by a rail- 
road running from West Point to that 
capital. So soon as this base of sup- 
plies was fixed and stored, Greneral 
McClellan moved his armj^ on Rich- 
mond. General McClellan was asked 
before the rommittee — Question. It 
has been stated that some two weeks 
were occupied in the movement from 
Williamsburg to the Chickahominy . 



29 



will you explain the reason for that? 
Answer. 1 do not remember the exact 
time; I can only say wo were v^ery 
much delayed after the affair at Wil- 
liamsburg by the condition of the 
roads and the difficulty in biingi^gup 
supplies. We had a great deal of 
trouble of that kind before reaching 
the Chickahominy. I think toe move- 
ment was made as rapidly a? possible 
under the circumstances. 

This answer cannot fail to satisfy 
all reasonable persons. The enemy 
reti-eated to Richmond ; he could have 
entered his fortitied capital had he 
chose to do so, and certainly General 
McClellan could not divine whether 
he would enter or not. It was a rea- 
sonable supposition that he would. 
What defense the enemy could have 
made behind his fortifications at Rich- 
mond is not known to this day ; we 
never assaulted those fortifications, 
and have no certain knowledge ol 
their construction or their strength, 
But this we know — the city of Rich- 
mond is capable, from its position and 
surroundings, of being fortified so aa 
to repel the assault of an invading ar- 
my. For one whole year before, the 
enemy was apprised of our intention 
to capture Richmond, and during all 
that time he was laying out and con- 
structing fortifications to resist an as- 
sault. He had officers skilled in the 
art of engineering aud the art of de- 
fence. These facts are certainly known. 
What we should have found Rich- 
mond if we had attempted an assault 
can only be conjectured; but the pro- 
bability is that we sljould have been 
required to operate by siege, as was 
done at Yorktown and at Vicksburg, 
and in both instances successfully, one 
without loss, and the other at a great 
sacrifice of life. We say it is probable 
we should have besieged it, because it 
is certain the rebel force behind the 
fortifications exceeded in number our 
troops in front of them. This fact is 
capable of i)roof', and I call upon the 
opponents of General McClellan to 
consider it, to ponder it, and then con- 
fess their error in assailing his con- 
duct and his character. 

General Barnard testified before the 



30 



length 



committee as follows: "No less an 
authority than Napoleon says that, 
aided by fortifications, 50,000 men, 
and 3,000 artillerymen can defend a 
capital against 300,000 men, and he as- 
serts the necessity of fortifying all 
national capitals." What reply can 
you make to these facts, gentlemen ? 
Can you join the President of the 
United States and others in censuring 
General McClellan for calling for rein- 
forcements ? 

'Had the Chickahominy and the mar- 
gins of that river been in their usual 
condition, our army could have crossed 
that stream and followed the enemy 
as near to Kichmond as it would have 
been safe to approach his fortifications. 
But the Chickahominy was not in its 
usual condition, nor was it in the con- 
dition it was when Gen. McClellan be- 
gan to change his base of operations. 
Thus, this stream is described with 
professional accuracy in the testimony 
of General Barnard : " A word is pro- 
per here respecting the Chickahom- 
iny, which, at the season we struck it, 
was one of the most formidable obsta- 
cles that could be opposed to the ad- 
vance of our army — an obstacle to 
which an ordinary river, though it be 
of considei-able magnitude, is compa- 
ratively slight. The Chickahominy, 
considered as a military obstacle, con- 
sists of a stream of no great value, a it in the way of our armyf Cocrid a 



point. Through this belt of swamp 
the stream flows sometimes in a 
single channel, more frequently di- 
vided into several; and when but a 
foot or two above its summer level, 
overspreads the whole swamp." * 
* * " It was currently reported at 
the time of our arrival that the stream 
was nowhere fordable." * * * 
" Although it was thus shown that the 
stream was no obstacle for infantry, 
the swamp and the bottom lands were 
impracticable to cavalry and' artillery. 
It was necessary to provide bridges, 
and, except at the site of the New 
Bi'idge, to cordui'oy a certain 
of road on each margin." 

Now at this distance of time, when 
space has been given for cool reflec- 
tion, it is hoped that General McClel- 
lan will be pardoned by his enemies 
for the condition in which he found the 
Chickahominy, and the swamps and 
submerged lands consequent upon that 
condition. It has been reproachfully 
charged by a member of the War Com- 
mittee, on the floor of the Senate, long 
before the report of that committee 
was made, that we went to digging. 
" We found the worst swamp there 
was between Richmond and Williams- 
burg, and sat right down in the centre 
of it and went to digging." Who was 
it that made the swamp i* How came 



swamp, and bottom lands. The stream 
flows through a belt of heavily tim- 
bered swamp, which averages three or 
four hundred yards wide. A few hun- 
dred yards below New Bridge is a 
short length of the stream not mar- 
gined by swamp timber,- but every- 
where else between New and Bottom's 
Bridges the belt of swamp timber is 
continuous and wide. The tops of the 
trees rise just about to the level of the 
crests of the high lands bordering the 
bottom, thus perfectly screening from 
view the bottom lands and slopes of 
the high lands on I be enemy's side. 
The disappearance, in the place indi- 
cated cf swamp timber near New 
Bridge, and the dwindling away of 
the same at some points above the 
bridge to isolated trees, gave us some 
glimpse of the enemy's side near this 



major general, in full command, have 
prevented it by a general order? 
" Who hath divided a water course for 
the overflowing of water, or a way 
for the lightning or the thunder? 
Hath the rain a father, or who hath 
begotten the drops of dew ?" There 
was indeed a " swamp" and more than 
a swamp, as we have seen, a complete 
submersion of a most formidable char- 
acter. This overflow was so sudden 
and unexpected that some persons 
conjectured that sluices had been cut 
above Richmond, and water let in 
from other sources to increase the 
volume of the stream. The rebels said 
it was an interposition of Divine Pro- 
vidence to save their capital. Certain 
it is that General McClellan had no 
power to Tjrevent this overflow. Nor 
ought the general to be censured with 



extreme severity by his radical fel- 
low-citizens, because there "went lip 
from these surcharged swamps a mi- 
asm which poisoned the atmosphere 
and caused sickness in the camps. 
The general could not help it; all he 
could do was to remain at his post, 
faithful in the discharge of duty, and 
inhale the same poisoned atmosphere 
inhaled by those under his command. 
He was not censured by the privates 
in the ranks of his army, nor by the 
officers either, until some of them 
were called to swear before the War 
Committee. The army of the Poto- 
mac at that time was composed of 
men capable of judging ot the qualifi- 
cations and the merits of their com- 
manders. That arm}' did not censure 
their chief commander, but they loved 
him. The most affecting anecdote I 
ever heard was related to me by a 
member of the N. Y Ttb regiment. 
This regiment was stationed for three 
months in the summer of 1862 in Bal- 
timore. It was a part of their duty 
to assist the wounded soldiers coming 
daily from the Army of the Potomac 
to land, and aid them to the hospitals, 
or in the further prosecution of their 
journey. These wounded and sick sol- 
diers expressed an ardent attachment 
for General McClellan. One young 
man, very feeble, was assisted to land 
by the person Avho related to me the 
anecdote; he summoned up his re- 
maining strengtli, raised his head, 
rested on his elbow, cheered for Gene- 
ral MoCIc<!hin, and died. 

(Tcncral Jlownrd, an educated and 
a'-eomplished soldier, a graduate of 
West Point, and afterwards a profes- 
sor in tliat celebrated institution, made 
a speech to his fellow-citizens in Port- 
land, Maine, from which the following 
is an extract : 

" My friends, much has been said in 
regard to the general intrusted with 
tiie command there — much adulation 
and much abuse. I believe in my heart 
that General McClellan is worthy to 
be trusted. You can trust tim, but 
you must submerge political parties, 
lunvover, in tlie good of the country. 
You sent me forth to one of your in- 
stitutions, without any special jiolitics 



31 

except love of country. This war is 
educating us up to that standard of pa- 
triotism. When we shall have shed a 
little more blood, we shall learn to 
live more in accordance with the spirit 
of our fathers. I know that I am no 
worshipper of men. I do not believe 
that General McClellan has passed 
through the campaign thus far with- 
out a mistake, but for one I trust him 
and urge you to. Trust him, not as a 
god, but as a general. He has shown 
at every movement great ability and 
caution; too much so, perhaps, for 
some who are inclined to doubt him j 
l^ut whether so or not is to be tested 
by results. I hope we don't need th« 
instruction of another Bull Kun to 
teach us to be caittious. It is best to 
be. The old men say so, an4 when 
you find a young man combining abil- 
ity with caution, you may trust him, 
for you have there the sprightliness 
of 3'outh combined with the consider- 
otian and reflection of age." 

The general, at the time of making 
that speech, had lost an arm in one of the 
battles before Richmond. He has since 
done distinguished service in the field 
at Chancellorsville and at Gettysburg. 
He adds to his high militaiy qualifica- 
tions the character of a sincere and 
enlightened Christian. He was not 
called to testify before the War Commit- 
tee. 

[The previous matter i7as contained 
in eleven numbers, which through in- 
advertance, have been run together. 
Hereafter we shall give the numbers 
as in the original publications.] 
NO. XII. 

We have seen what was the condi- 
tion of the Chickahominy on the ar- 
rival of our army at the stream and 
the formidable obstacles thereby inter- 
posed to our military oi^erations. 
General McClellan cannot, of course, 
be responsible for this condition of 
things ; he could not use his artillery 
or his cavalry, as we have seen bv 
the testimon}^ of General Barnard. 
It was impossible in that condition of 
the ground to make any aggressive 
demonstrations upon Eiehmond; be- 
fore those were attempted, as he was 
compelled to wait until the waters 



32 



which had swelled the streams and 
saturated the bottom land on its 
borders, should subside, and the 
ground become dry and hard. In the 
mean time all he could do was to pre- 
pare to repel assaults on his own level 
before Richmond by the rebel forces 
operating on their own grounds. But 
it was certain that General McClel- 
lan needed reinfoi'cements, and he 
had not yet despaired of being joined 
by McDowell's forces collected at 
Fredericksburg. " They covered no- 
thing at this place," says the Prince 
de Joinville, and were so notoriously 
useless to the Federal cause, that in 
the Confederate journals they were 
spoken of as the " fifth wheel of the 
coach." The Prince proceeds: "It 
was known that McDowell desired 
ardently to give the lie to these rail- 
eries by bringing at the decisive 
moment, his assistance to the cause of 
the Union. Accordingly, JMcCIelian 
had no sooner arrived before Kich- 
mond than ho undertook to discover 
what he had to hope for from this 
quarter. No official advices either 
from Washington or from Fredericks- 
burg had informed him of McDowell's 
presence at that point, but rumor and 
probability agreed so well in placing 
him there that the General-in-Chief 
resolved to make an attempt to estab- 
lish a communication with him. On 
the night of the 26th (May 1862) " he 
sent forward General Porter's divi- 
sion, with a few squadrons of cavalry, 
in a furious storm to Hanover Court 
House, a village about twenty miles 
north of Richmond, where the rail- 
way to Fredericksburg crosses the 
Pamunkey. The troojjs of Porter 
moved rapidly, and about mid-day on 
the 27th came upon the hostile divi- 
sion of Branch at Hanover Court 
House. This they assailed with vigor, 
dispersed it, and took one of its guns. 
Assailed in their turn by Confederate 
troojis who had suflered them to pass 
by the woods wtere they lay hidden, 
turned on their new enemies and scat- 
tered them also. This brilliant affair 
cost the Federals 400 men, and left 
General Porter in possession of a can- 
non, of 500 prisoners, and of two 



bridges, one on the Fredericksburg, 
and one on the Yirginia Central Rail- 
road. The advance guard of Mc 
Dowell was then at Bowling Green, 
fifteen miles from that of Porter. It 
needed only an effort of will; the two 
armies were united, and the fall of 
Richmond certain 1 Alas ! this effort 
was not made. I cannot recall those 
fatal moments without a real sinking 
of the heart. Seated in an orchard 
in the bivouac of Porter, amid the 
joyous excitement which followed a 
succes.sful combat, I saw the Fifth 
Cavalry bring in whole companies of 
Confederate prisoners, with arms and 
baggage, their officers at their head.' 
May I be pardoned so far to digress 
as to say, which it has no doubt, 
greatly pained the foreign prince to 
hear, that his friend Porter, has been 
stripped of his bivouac, and turned 
out upon the world, with every mark 
of disgrace that his government could 
stamp upon him ; but the prince and 
the world may rest assured that these 
marks shall be effaced from a charac- 
ter as radiant of military honors as 
any in his native land, by a grateful 
country, and the patriotic soldier shall 
yet be restored to the rank of which 
he has been unjustly deprived. This 
opinion and prediction I venture after 
a careful study of the official record 
of General Porter's trial. 

This battle at Hanover Court House 
has been adverted to in those numbers, 
but cannot properly be omitted here 
in describing the progress of the cam- 
paign in chronological order, although 
liable to the charge of repetition. I 
shall notice the battles before Rich- 
mond in future numbers. 
NO. XIll. 
FAIR OAKS. 

There can be no just judgment 
formed of the measures adopted and 
executed by General McClellan in the 
conduct of his campaigns, except oy 
considcriug them first in their general 
plan, and then examining them in de- 
tail. The general outline of his ope- 
rations, as dictated by himself alone, 
or as agreed upon in council with 
others, shall be fairly and fully stated; 
for the present, let every day's work 



33 



be csrutinized, and the questions put 
be fairly answered, — What could the 
general have done to-day which he did 
■ not do ? What has he left undone to- 
da}"" which he might have done ? 

In Ki3wering these questions it is 
not only right but indispensable that 
the unforeseen and natural obstacles 
interposed in the way of his opera- 
tions should bo duly regai'ded. For 
instance, who could have foreseen, 
what human power could have pre- 
vented the copious and unexpected 
showers of rain which poured down 
and swelled the Chickahominy, and 
submerged the margins of this 
stream — a wide area of bottom land — 
renderina: the o-round unfit for milita- 
ry movements i* In addition to this 
natural occurrence, the general was 
met by a military ai'ray of the most 
formidable character. These were the 
forces to be conquered, and the eye of 
the fair critic must be kept constantly 
upon them, as well as upon the force 
subject to our own command. 

It has been shown that the junction 
of McDowell had been prevented " at 
the moment," says the Prince de 
Joinvillc, " when the junction would 
have been decisive of the campaign." 
" Henceforth,^' adds the Prince, " the 
army of the Potomac could only rely 
upon itself. No time was to be lost 
before acting, for every day augment- 
ed the disproportion between the 
forces of the adversaries, and it was 
to be feared the Federals encamped 
amid the marshes of the Chickahom- 
iny would suffer severely from the 
great heats now setting in. We had 
een for some days fiice to face. The 
Federal advance was but five miles 
distant from Eichmoud. Skirmishes 
were of daily occurrence, and with 
the feelings on both sides, a general 
action was inevitable. Gen. McClel- 
lan waited for two things before mak- 
ing the attack. He waited for the 
roads, which the rain had swamped, 
to become solid and practicable for his 
artillery, and for the completion of the 
numerous bridges which he was throw- 
ing over the Chickahominy." The 
character of the localities, lh>. impos- 
sibility of quitting the railway by 



which the army was supplied, and the 
necessity of keeping on his guard* 
against any attempt of the enemy to 
turn his position, had forced the gen- 
eral to divide his troops into two 
wings, on the opposite banks of the 
river. It was consequently most im- 
portant to be able to mass them rap- 
idly, either on the right bank for an 
offensive movement against Rich- 
mond, or on the left bank against any 
attempt to turn the position. Here it 
will be seen that the side of the stream 
towards Richmond is called the rf^Af 
bank, while the opposite side is called 
the left bank. "The danger of turning 
the position was much to be feared, 
for the Confederates had retained pos- 
session of several bridges on the up- 
per Chickahominy, which would per- 
mit them to occupy the excellent 
positions that are to be found on the 
left bank, just so soon as the Northern 
army should abandon these positions. 
To make this more plain, the Confede- 
rates could cross the stream in its upper 
part, and come down and get between 
our forces on the right, and our base 
of supplies, the White House, if we 
failed to guard the left bank with a 
sufficient force to intercept such a 
movement. In this Avay they would 
have shut us up upon the right bank 
blockaded, starved, and reduced to an 
extremely critical position. "The 
roads," says the same intelligent and 
impartial witness, " were long in dry- 
ing, the bridges were long in build- 
ing." " Never have we seen so rainy 
a season, ' said the oldest inhabitant. 
" Never did we see bridges so difficult 
to build," said the engineers. The 
abominable river laughed at all their 
efforts; too narrow for a bridge of 
boats, too deep and too muddy for 
piers; here, a simple brook some ten 
yards Avide flowing between two pieces 
of quicksand, in which the horses 
stuck up to their girths, and which of- 
fered no bearing; there, divided into 
a thousand tiny rivulets spread over a 
surface of three hundred ya,-rds, and 
traversing one of those woody moras- 
ses which are peculiar to tropical 
countries, changing its level and its 
bed from day to day, the i-iver in its 



34 



capricious and uncertain sway annul- 
led ana undid to-day the' labors of 
yesterday, carried on under a burning 
Bun, and often under the fire of the 
enemy.'' These quotations are testi- 
mony of unbiased and highly intelli- 
gent ey witnesses of what they re.ate, 
far beyond the influence of h6pe or 
fear of the United States or Confed ■ 
erate Governments. I say " witness- 
es," for this statement is the result of 
the joint personal observation of 
the Prince de Joinville and his two 
nephews. 

In this condition of things what was 
to be done ? The enemy, as we have 
seen, did not find it necessary to re- 
treat behind the intrenched and forti- 
fied works of his capital, but he showed 
himself on elevated and advantageous 
positions outside of those works. 
Thus posted wo could not — it was en- 
tirely impracticable, in- the state of 
things then existing, for Gen. McClel- 
Ian to make an offensive demonstra- 
tion. All he could do was to wait, 
and safety required that, while wait- 
ing, he should fortify his own position 
to enable him to resist attacks of the 
enemy. Tliis he did, and the necessiuy 
of so fortifying was soon demonstra- 
ted, as we shall see. 

The left wing of our army had 
crossed the river at Bottom Bridge, 
and the right wing remained on the 
other side to repel a flank movement 
of the enemy, as has been shown. The 
left wing proceeded on the railwa}'^ 
leading from our base of supplies to 
Eichmond, about half the distance 
from the river to the capital, to a sta- 
tion called Fair Oaks. A short dis- 
tance south of the railway, and run- 
ning in the same general direction, 
was the country road leading from 
Williamsburg to Eichmond. On this 
road, south of Fair Oaks, and no great 
distance therefrom, is a place called 
Seven Pines. The left wing was formed 
of four divisions encamped on the 
Eichmoud side of the river, along the 
railway on either side. On the oppo- 
site side of the river lay the right 
Aving of the army, consisting of live 
divisions and the resources. To pass 
from one end to the other would have 



made a journey of something like fif- 
teen or twenty miles, but in so passing 
there was only one bridge to be 
crossed, and that was Bottom Bi'idge 
The distance in a direct line between 
the extremities of these two wings 
was short. It was to unite the two 
arms of our forces that three or four 
bridges across the river were com- 
menced. One alone was fit for use on 
3l8t May, 1862. To defend the en- 
campments of the left wing, entrench- 
ments and rifle pits were dug at Fair 
Oaks and Seven Pines. General Heint- 
zelman' with his two divisions crossed 
the Chickahominy at Bottom Bridge 
on the 25th May. This General says: 
" The next day I rode to the front 
and saw how the troops were posted. 
Engineers were sent over, and were 
directed to fortify a position about the 
Seven Pines. In making this forward 
movement there were frequent skir- 
mishes that did not amount to much. 
We commenced two or three lines 
across the road and country there be-, 
fore we finally got located." 

The commencement of a series of 
lines and fortifications furnishes the 
foundation for the charge brought by 
Senator Chandler, of Michigan, one of 
the War Committee, against General 
McClellan, in the utterance of which 
this Senator made the Senate Cham- 
ber ring on the 16th July, 1862. The 
charge was : " We found the worst 
swamp there was between Eichmond 
and Williamsburg, and sat right down 
in the centre of it and went to dig- 
ging. We sacrificed thousands and 
tens of thousands of lives of the 
bravest troops that ever stood on the 
face of God's earth, digging in front of 
the inti'enchments and before the 
whipped army of the rebels." The 
state of facts which preceded this dig- 
ging, and rendered it necessary, has 
been truly and faithfully described in 
plain prose, and now that the poetic 
muse of the Michigan Senator has had 
time to rest after her daring flight, I 
would ask him — were you authorized 
to make an attack so gross, and so ut- 
terly groundless upon a soldier who 
was doing what he could in circum- 
stances most trying, to put down the , 



rebellion against his government by- 
all the means of civilized warfare ? 
Was it manly to assail one who could 
'. not reply ? Whose mouth was closed 
( by the rvoprieties of his position, as 
[ well as by the rules established for the 
government of that position. Mr. 
Chandler, you ought to be ashamed of 
-this rude, and, I may add, vulgar as- 
j^ault. All the harm I wish you is that 
\ ^ou should be tried and punished at 
ilheir discretion, by the soldiers from 
Michigan, so highly eulogized by all 
who have fought under Major General 
3IcClellan. 

On the 31st of May, only six days 
^fter Gen. Heintzelman had crossed 
the river, the enemy commenced in 
large force the attack upon the left 
,wing of our army at Seven Pines ; on 
Jthat day and the next, there was 
.fought at Seven Pines and at Fair 
Oaks one of the most sanguinary bat- 
tles of the war, in which our arms re- 
pelled a force of the enemy greatly 
superior in numbers, and were on the 
last day victorious over that enemy. 
, In the record contained in a work 
, recently published, entitled " War 
Pictures from the South, by B. Estvan, 
Colonel of Cavahy in the Confederate 
Army," the state of things among the 
Confederates which led to this attack 
is thus described : " In the meanwhile 
disease spread among our (the Confe- 
derate) forces to a considerable ex- 
tent; virulent, obstinate fevers, caused 
by the miasma of the neighboring 
swamps, prevailed to a great extent, 
and the ravages that ensued became 
so great as to cause much anxiety to 
General Johntson. The deaths, in- 
deed, were so numerous that sufficient 
persons could not be procured atEich- 
mond to undertake the task of bury- 
ing the bodies, which lay exposed in 
the church-yards by hundreds, spread- 
ing pestilence around. The medical 
faculty anticipated fearful consequen- 
ces from this state of things, and Gen- 
eral Johnston contemplated gloomily 
the inroads disease was hourly mak- 
ing in his brave army, which almost 
seemed as if it wer" doomed to sink 
altogether into an inglorious grave. 
In this dire emergency he resolved at 



35 

all costs to attack his intrenched op- 
ponents." 

What credit ought to be given to 
this record others can form their own 
judgment, I have no opinion to give. 

It is not my object to give a descrip- 
tion of the battle of Fair Oaks; no 
charge has been made against Gene- 
ral McClellan for the conduct of this bat- 
tle; it was everyway honorable to our 
arms and the result furnished good 
ground for rejoicing on our part. But 
it is charged against General Mc Clel- 
lan, that immediately after this battle 
he lost an opportunity which fairly 
offered to enter Eichmond. The re- 
port says : *' The officers engaged in 
that battle who have been examined 
testify that the army could have pushed 
right into the city of Richmond with 
little resistance ; that the enemy were 
very much broken and demoralized, 
throwing away arms, clothing, &c., 
that mi^ht impede their flight." 

This I understand to mean that our 
soldiers composing the left wing of 
the army were bound to follow the 
rebels immediately after the battle of 
Fair Oaks into Eichmond. So under- 
stood, the report of the committee is 
not supported by evidence, as I shall 
show. General Heintzleman says : 
" The next morning I learned that 
the enemy had retreated in great con- 
fusion, and on Sunday we gained 
nearly all the ground we had lost the 
day before. I sent General Hooker's 
half division forward, and sent an 
officer to General Eichardson, who 
commanded one of General Sumner's 
divisions, and asked him to co operate 
with us, and find out what the enemy 
was doing. He saw General Sumner, 
but he said he could make no recon- 
noissance without orders from General 
McClellan. I sent my troops forward, 
and they got within about four miles 
of Eichmond. They sent back word 
how far they had got, and I sent 
word to General McClellan. He order- 
ed me to stop, and fall back on the old 
line. From information we got from 
the rebels I had no doubt r>e might 
have gone right into Eichmond." 
This is the testimony of an officer en- 
ga^-od in the battle, and it hardly sus- 



36 



tiains the declaration of the committee. 
General Sumner, also engaged in the 
battle, gives no testimony whatever 
to support the committee's report. 
General Joseph Hooker is asked by 
the committee : " Suppose that the 
next day after the repulse of the ene- 
my at Fair Oaks, General McCl^llan 
had brought his whole army across 
the Chickahominy, and made a vigor- 
ous movement upon Richmond, in 
your judgment, as a military man, 
what would have been the effect of 
that movement ? " To this question 
he replies : " That at no time during 
the whole of the campaign did I feel 
that we could not go to Eichmond." 
The witness preferred to testify as to 
his " feeling," and not to give his judg- 
ment " as a military man," General 
Hooker is a wholesale swearer. But 
the general must be understood as 
giving it as his opinion that both 
wings of the army could have entered 
Jlichmond : for he is not inquired of 
as to " one wing.' General Keyes, 
who took a conspicuous part in the 
battle of Fair Oaks, and has testified 
in relation to it with great precision 
and deliberation says : " It would 
have been necessary, in my judgment, 
to have had a portion of the right 
wing of the army to enable us to 
follow the enemy into Eichmond." 

So, then, it is very clear that accord- 
ing to the testimony of the generals 
engaged in the battle who were ex- 
amined as witnesses, that it was only 
by joining the right and left wings of 
the army that it would have been 
authorized to pursue the enemy into 
Eichmond after the battle of Fair 
Oaks. 

It will be recollected *.hat there was 
but one bridge. Bottom Bridge, over 
which the right wing could have pas- 
sed, and the wings of this line were 
80 extended, that it would have taken 
all of two days to enable the right 
wing to pass over this bi-idge, and 
that such a movement if made, would 
have been attended with danger of 
having our whole army cut otf from 
its base of supplies. It must be con- 
cluded, therefore, tnat it was im- 
practicable, with the means at our 



command, to follow the enemy into" 
Eichmond after the battle of Fair 
Oaks. General McClellan's own testi- 
mony on this point is very conclusive : 
" Question. Immediately after the 
battle of Fair Oaks could you not 
have advanced on Eichmond " If not, 
why not?" To which the general 
answers : " I do not think it would 
have been possible at that time to 
have taken our artillery with us. The 
result of which, independent of all 
other considerations, would have been 
to have brought us in front of the 
enemy's works at Eichmond, without 
artillery, where they had heavy guns. 
That and the condition of the bridges 
were the principal reasons for not 
advancing at that time." 

Ought not the committee to have 
been satisfied with that answer, espe- 
cially as they failed in embarassing 
the general by the next question they 
put, which was : " The enemy retired, 
after taking with them their artillery, 
after their defeat, did they not ? " A 
very adroit question this; but the 
general was too used to strategy to 
be caught ; he therefore defeats the 
object of the committee by telling 
the simple truth in the most artless 
manner : " Answer. They had very 
few guns in action. I am not sure 
they had any guns. It was on their 
part almost entirel}^ an infantry af- 
fair." I have done with Fair Oaks. 

No. XIV. 
GEOSS INJUSTICE OF THE COM- 
MITTEE. 

The Tribune edition of the commit- 
tee report italicizes the following sen- 
tence: " Gen. McClellan was loith the 
main part of the army on the left hank 
of the Chickahominy. After the fighting 
was over he came across to the right hank 
of the river." 

Questions like the following were 
put to the witnesses examined by the 
committee. 

Question — Where was Gen. McClel- 
lan during the fight at Williamsburg? 

Answer — He remained at the camp 
near Yorktown. 

Question — How far was that from 
the field of battle? 

Question — Why was not the com- 



manding general nearer at hand then? 
Question — To General Sumner — 
Where wa? General VlcClellan during 
those baHl ^8 ? (Seven Pines and Fair 
Oaks.) 

Question — Where was General Mc- 
( lellan during your second fight at 
Malvern ? 

The committee was appointed to in- 
quire into " the conduct of the war," 
Questions like those quoted in respect 
to battles where success crowned our 
arms, and where, of course, the con- 
duct of the war had been fully and sa- 
tisfactorily shown, clearly manifest 
the intention of the committee to in- 
quire into the conduct of General 
McClcUan — to put him on trial. Sena- 
tor Chandler's sj)eech, already quoted, 
makes this intention still more palpa- 
ble. Now, I know not but a commit- 
tee might have been appointed b}- 
both llouses of Congress to inquire 
into the conduct of Genei*al McClel- 
lan or of any other officer in the ai'- 
my, and that such committee would 
not have been competent to pursue 
such an investigation. But it is clear 
that a committee thus constituted 
would, though not nominally, but 
really, have been in the natureof a ju- 
dicial tribunal — a Court of Inquiry at 
least. Before a committee, or any 
tribunal of this character, the party 
whose conduct and character were 
subjects of investigation, ought to 
have a hearing, or, at least, to indicate 
the names of persons to be called as 
witnesses on his behalf This seems 
to me a plain requirement, according 
to all fair and honorable proceedings. 
The report of such a committee 
against a general in the army would, 
in the eyes of many, of most persons, 
be regarded as a conviction, and popu- 
lar condemnation would follow as an 
almost necessary consequence. No- 
thing more unjust can be well con- 
ceived than such a condemnation upon 
exparte testimony, without allowing 
the party most interested an opportu- 
nity of defending himself. 

Now let ns see what course was ac- 
tually pursued by this committee. 
They called Avhat persons they chose 
as witnesses, and thev omitted to call 



37 

such persons as they chose to excJudo. 
The committee did not call Major 
General Fitz John Porter, who was as 
active and efficient befoi'e Yorktown 
and in the battles before Eichmond 
as any general in the army General 
IIoM^ard, as we have before shown, 
was not called; nor Generals Meagher 
and Sickles, very intelligent and high- 
ly educated gentlemen, all of whom 
had personal acquaintance with the 
doings of our army on the Peninsula. 
Wh}^ were they not called ? They had 
all expressed publicly their high ad- 
miration of Gen. McClellan. General 
McClellan himself was examined. If 
the committee realiy desired to know 
why this leader of the army did not 
personally mingle in the fights of hig 
troops, or either of them, why was 
not the general himself questioned? 
Can it be doubted that he would have 
given a reason satisfactory to all mili- 
tary men. Very lately I met an offi- 
cer of the American army whom I 
first knew when he was a mere youth 
of great promise in the celebrated 
academy at Jamaica, Long Island, and 
who has been in the militaiy service 
of his government nearly fifty years, 
and, as a thoroughly educated milita- 
ry officer, has no superior in the coun- 
try, if he has in the world, and he vol- 
unteered the declaration to me that in 
every situation in which he had been 
placed, General McClellan had done 
as well as he could, and that was as 
well as any other man could have 
done. I would give more for that 
piece of testimony, coming as it did 
from a gentleman cf stainless integ- 
rit}^, and undoubted moral as well as 
physical courage, than for as many re- 
ports as the " War Committee" could 
write. 

SUMMARY REVIEW. 
It has been shown that General Mc- 
Clellan did right in not attempting to 
carry Yorktown by assault before he 
had laid siege to it, and that alter the 
siege operations were completed, the 
post was evacuated without waiting 
for an assault. It has been ohown 
that when the enemy evaeuatod he 
was pursued with great promj^tness 
and rapidity until he reached his n&x% 



38 



fortified position at Williamsburg, and 
that, after a short but severe conflict 
there, he was comiDelled to retreat in 
all haste to his capital. It has also 
been shown that as soon as General 
McClellan had taken suflicient time to 
establish a base of supplies at the 
White House, he followed his retreat- 
ing foe to the Chickahominy and be- 
yond it, that he attacked and cap- 
tured Hanover Court House, but 
failed, by no fault of his own, to form 
a junction with McDowell's command 
at the latter place ; that he fought the 
battles of Seven Pines and Fair Oaks, 
and repulsed the enemy in force vast- 
ly superior to his own on the second 
day of the fight, and that he was not 
prepared after these contests to enter 
Richmond for several reasons, and es- 
pecially because he could not move his 
artillery against the fortifications of 
that '.'apital. 

Since the appearance of my article 
on " Yoi-ktown" my attention has 
been directed to certain passages con- 
tained in a recent^publication, entitled 
" The First Year of the War, by Ed- 
ward A. Pollard," printed in Eich- 
mond. These passages are here tran- 
scribed. 

' General Magruder, the hero of 
Bethel, and a commander who was ca- 
pable of much greater achievements, 
was left to confront the growing- 
forces on the Peninsula, wliich daily 
menaced him with an army of seven- 
ty-five hundred men, while the great 
bulk of the Confederate forces were 
still in motion in the neighborhood of 
the Eappahannock and the Rapidan, 
and he had no assurance of reinforce- 
ments. The force of the enemy was 
ten times his own ; they had com- 
menced a daily cannonading upon his 
lines ; and a council of general ofiicers 
was convened, to consult whether the 
little army of 7,500 should maintain 
its position in the face of tenfold odds, 
or retire before the enemy. The opin- 
ion of the council was unanimous for 
the latter alternative, with the excep- 
tion of one ofiicer, who declared that 
every man should die in the intrench- 
ments before the little army should 
feU back. ' By G— , it shall be so/ 



was the sudden exclamation of Gene- 
ral Magruder, in sympathy with the 
gallant suggestion. The resolution 
demonstrated a remarkable heroism^ 
and spirit. Our little forces were' 
adroitly extended over a distance of 
several miles, reaching from Mulberry 
Island to Gloucester Point, a regiment 
being posted here and there, in every 
gap plainly open to observation, and 
on no other portions of theline, the 
men being posted at long intervals to 
give the appearance of numbers to the 
enemy. Had the weakness of General 
Magruder at this time been known to 
the enemy, he might have suffered 
the consequences of his devoted and 
self-sacrificing courage; but as it was, 
he held his lines on the Peninsula un- 
til they were reinforced by the most 
considerable portion of Goiioral John- 
ston's forces, and made the situation 
of a contest upon which the attention 
of the public was unanimously fixed, 
as the most decisive of the war," 

From this historical record, it ap- 
pears that Magruder's small force of 
7,500 men, Avas spread out from Mul- 
berry Island, in the James River, 
across the Peninsula to Yorktowu, 
and beyond to Gloucester Peint, on 
the York Eiver, opposite Yorktown. 
Tlie 7,500 troops must therefore have 
nc itled the garrison in Yorlatown. 
luis is hardly credible, but he was en- 
abled to hold his lines until they were 
reinforced by the most considerable por- 
tion of Gen. Johnston's forces. It fol- 
lows, then, that after this reinforce- 
ment, Magruder was able to cope with 
our forces. The question is then — at 
what time was this reinforcement 
brought up ? Foi'tunately we are able 
to ascertain this point of time without 
the aid of Mr. Pollard's history. I 
am compelled to reproduce here some 
extracts from the testimony hereto- 
fore given. Gen. McClellan testifies: 
" Movements of troops had been going 
on some days before my arrival. I re- 
member that immediately upon ray 
arrival at Fort Monroe, I was told 
that quite a large number of troops 
had been crossed over to Yorktown from 
the south bank of the James. I there- 
fore hurried my own movements, and 



39 



started from Fort Monroe sooner than 
I would have done. From the best 
information that I have been able to 
get, I think the large masses of rein- 
K)rcements arrived in Yorktown from 
one to two days before I reached its 
vicinity. Johnston himself arrived 

THERE THE DAY BEFOEl", I DID. Gen. 

Heintzelman says: '■'■By the time- xoe 
got to Yorktoxon their army (the ene- 
my's) had been largely reinforced." 

I am not quite sure that Mr. Pol- 
lard's statements were entitled to so 
extended a notice; but the radical en- 
emies of General McClellan would not 
scruple to use even the enemy's testi- 
mony to injure the general upon 
whose destruction they are intent, 
therefore this battery I trust has been 
silenced. 

No. XY. 
BEFOEE EICHMOND. 

After the battle of Fair Oaks, 
fought on the 1st day of June, 1862, 
our army remained before Richmond 
until General McClellan decided to 
change his base of operations by 
retiring across the Peninsula to James 
River, where the supplies of the army 
could be furnished by our navy. This 
decision was made on the evening of 
June 2Cth. Of the intermediate time 
between the battle of Fair Oaks and 
the movement towards the new base, 
1 propose to treat in this number. 

The committee bring no distinct 
charges a<rainst the General for mis- 
conduct of any sort except that they 
intimate strongly that the right di- 
vision of our army should have been 
crossed over the Chickahominy, and 
formed a junction with the left divi- 
sion, on the Richmond side of this 
stream. Indeed, the committee seem 
to have been convinced that, without 
a junction of these two divisions, an 
attack on Richmond would have been 
inexpedient. The reasons for retain- 
ing one divisiion on the left side of 
Chickahominy have been already 
given. It was to prevent a move- 
ment of the enemy whereby our army 
would have been cut otf from its base 
of supplies, the White House, J ^st 
hero it seems to me that a portion of 
the testimony of General Henry T. 



jTust v,'ill greatly enlighten the mind 
Oi' the reader, lie is asked: "But at 
Fair Oaks the enemy had been routed 
and been driven from their position, 
had they not?" Answer — "No sir, 
they had driven us from our position, 
and we re-took it. The country there 
was low and swampy, and the few 
lines which we could have advanced 
were those which had been prepared 
by the enemy, in the same way as the 
lines of our own position had been 
prepared by us. We were enabled, by 
means of an inferior force to hold our 
own against their combined attack. 
Being upon our own ground, Ave final- 
ly repulsed them. Had we changed 
positions and attacked them upon 
their own ground, being restricted by 
the nature of the ground to certain 
lines of attack which they had pre- 
pared, I think the result would have 
been different; probably a reverse to 
us. During the whole of that cam- 
paign, I considered that a serious re- 
verse to us there would, in all proba- 
bility, lead to the destruction of the 
army as an organized force." One 
cannot but be forcibly struck with the 
similarity of our position at Fair 
Oaks and the moi-e recent great battle 
at Gettysburg. Had our army at- 
tacked the enemy's lines here, instead 
of being attacked on our own ground, 
who can be free from the apprehen- 
sion that the " result would have been 
different, most probably a reverse to 
us" 

" Question — Is it, then, your opinion 
that we were not stron<£ eiiouo:h at 
any time before Richmond to have 
coped Avith their army there?" Ans- 
wer — " I cannot say that ; we might 
have been successful, or might not 
have been, if we attacked. But I 
should have thought it imprudent'or 
improper to have attacked, where 
there was not a fair prospect or a cer- 
tainty of making the attack a 8ui*e 
thing. In that, however, I am merely 
giving my own judgmeat about the 
matter. The point is this; with the 
information we had of the strength ot 
the enemy's forces ; knowing that ho 
had been preparing the ground, and 
had that advantage, that he warS mi- 



10 



encumbered with sick, his hospital 
being behind him : witli all the advan- 
tage of an interior position and lines ; 
the two armies vere so much on terms 
of equality, as I jadged from all I 
could learn from those whom I thought 
were well informed, ■that an attack of 
that kind would have been in the 
highest degree doubtful ; and as long 
as there was a force within accessible 
distance, and there was any hope that 
it might join us, and enable us to bring 
the combined force to bear, I would 
have considered it imprudent to have 
made an attack." Question — '• I did 
did not mean that the enemy, after 
the battle of Fair Oaks, should have 
been followed up by the* same force 
that had defeated them, but that our 
whole force should have been brought 
across the Chickahominy directly 
after that battle, and moved on to 
Richmond." Answei- — " I have known 
intimately the rebel commander at 
that place — Genei^al Johnston — and I 
think that tcould have been exactly what 
he wanted and desired." 

General Keyes is asked — " Why the 
arm}^ remained so long as it did with 
one portion on the right and the other 
on the left bank of the Chickahom- 



iny 



? " To which he answered — 



Without being able to answer defi- 
nitely, as I should if I had command 
of the army, I can state that I alwaj's 
supposed that the enemy would be 
able to cross the Chickahominy above 
where we wei'e, and come down in the 
rear, and cut off our communication 
with the White House, which was the 
depot and base of our supplies, unless 
we had left a very strong force on the 
left bank of the Chickahominy." Gen. 
Keycs also testifies that he can give 
no military reason for permitting the 
army to remain after the battle of 
Pair Oaks inactive for so long a time; 
but he very properly adds: " I con- 
sider that the fact that I am not able 
to give a reason is very inconclusive, 
as I was not in a position to know 
what reasons influenced the command- 
ing general to keep the array in such 
a condition.' 

General McClellan is asked — " Did 
not the want of communication be- 



tween the right and left wings of our 
army prevent you reaping those ad- 
vantages which you might have other- 
wise obtained from the defeat of the 
enemy at Fair Oaks ? " Answer — " I 
think that if there had been reliable 
communication between the right wing 
and the centre and left wing, we could 
have gained greater advantages by the 
battle." 

These quotations from the evidence, 
and they could be multiplied, show 
conclusively that the committee ut- 
terly failed to convict General McClel- 
lan of want of professional ability o^ 
skill in not uniting the two wings of 
the army before they were united. 

The testimony discloses copies of 
telegrams between the President, the 
Secretary of War, and General Mc- 
Clellan during the time under re- 
view, a summary statemeut of which 
shall be given. 

On the 7th .June, Mc^ lellan to the 
Secretary ot War, informing that the 
Chickahominy Eiver had risen so as 
to flood the entire bottoms to the 
depth of three or four feet. The men 
were working night and day up to 
their waists in water to complete the 
bridges, " The whole face of the coun- 
try is a perfect bog, entirely impassa- 
ble for artillery, and even cavalry, ex- 
cept directly in the narrow road, 
which renders any general movement, 
either of this or the rebel army, utter- 
ly out of the question at present until 
we have more favorable weather.*', 
June 13 — The same to the sanae : " The 
enemy are massing their troops near 
our front, throwing up earthworks on 
all the approaches to Richmond, and 
giving every indication of fight." 
June 14 — " I hope two days more will 
make the ground practicable. 1 shall 
advance as soon as the bridges are 
completed, and the ground fit for ar- 
tillery to move; would be glad to 
know whether troops can be sent 
here;" urges the necessity of placing 
the troops sent from McDowell's com- 
mand under his control, saying, "If I 
cannot fully control all his troops 1 
want none of them. In no other way 
can they be of any assistance to me. 
The indications are, from our balloon 



reconiioissances, and from all other 
Bources, that the enemy are intrench- 
ing, daily increasing in force and de- 
tern) ination to hght desperately." 
June 18 — Gives notice to the Secreta- 
ry that rebel troops have left Rich- 
mond to reinforce Jackson. June 18. — 
Same day. — The President telegraphs 
that Jackson has been reinforced by 
ten thousand fi\)m Eiclunond. The 
President adds — " If this is true it is 
as good as a reinforcement to 3^ou of 
unequal force." Same dayMcClellan 
rejoins — " If ten or fifteen thousand 
men have left llichmond to reinforce 
Jackson, it illustrates their strength 
and confidence. After to-morrow we 
shall fight the rebel army as soon as 
Providence Avill permit. We shall 
await only a favorable condition of the 
earth and sky, and the completion of 
some neccssar}' preliminaries." June 
20 — The President again telegraphs 
the General that a despatch had been 
received from Gen. Sigel corroborating 
the repoi-t that Jackson is being rein- 
forced from Ivichmond — suggesting 
tliat it may not bo true ; if he knew it 
was not true more force could be sent 
to McClellan, but as the case stood 
this could not safely be done. 

There follows a detailed statement 
from the Adjutant General's office, 
showing that on the 20th June, 1862, 
McCleUan's army contained as fol- 
lows — " aii'gregate present for duty, 
115,102; hn special duty, 12,225 ; ab- 
sent, 29.511. Total aggregate of pres- 
ent and absent, 156.808. 

June 25. — McClellan to the Secre- 
tary of War, desiring particular infor- 
mation as to the podlLion and move- 
ments of Jackson. 

Juno 25-McClel'an telegraphs:"! 
incline to think that Jack.':<on wiltl at- 
tack my right and rear. The rebel 
force is stated at two hundred thou- 
sand, includinfc Jackson and Beaure- 
garci I shall have to contend against 
vastly superior odds, if these reports 
be true, but the army will do all in the 
l)Owcr of men to hoi (I their position, 
and repulse any attack. 1 regret my 
great inferiority of numbers, but feel 
that I am in no way responsible for it, 
as I have not failed to represent re- 



41 



peatedly the necessity for rein- 
forcements; that this was the deci- 
sive point, and that all the available 
means of the government should be 
concentrated here. I will do all that 
a general can do with the splendid ar- 
my I have the honor to command, and 
if it is destroyed by overwhelming 
numbers, can at least die with it, and 
share its fate ; but if the result of the 
action, which will probably occur to- 
morrow, or within a short time, is a 
disaster, the responsibility cannot he 
thrown on my shoulders. It must 
rest where it belongs. I feel that there 
is no use in airain askina: for reiufc-^"ce- 
ments. 

June 26. — The President to General 
McClellan : " The despatch suggesting 
the probability of your being over- 
whelmed by two hundred thousand, 
and talking of where the responsibility 
will belong, pains me very much. I 
give 3'ou all I can, and act upon the 
presumption that j'-ou will do the best 
you can with what you have, while 
you continue, ungenerousl}^, I think, to 
assume that I could give you more if 
I would. I have omitted, and shall 
omit, no opportunity to send you re- 
inforcements whenever I possibly can. 
" P.S. — General Pope thinks if you 
fall back, it would be much better 
towards the York River than towards 
the James. As Poj)e now has charge 
of the capital, please confer with him 
through the telegraph. 

" A. Lincoln.'* 
I shall defer comments upon these 
facts (and this extraordinary post- 
script, too), briefly but fairly stated, 
until my next number ; we have ar- 
rived at a most important point in the 
progress of the camjDaign. In the 
meantime, will the reader please di- 
rect his attention to the following in- 
quiries : 

1. Could General McClellan possi- 
bly have done anything more or bet- 
ter before Richmond than he actually 
performed ? 

2. Had he been reinforced, could he 
have taken Richn">ond r* 

3. Ought he not to have been rein- 
forced ? 

I shall endeavor to discuss these 



42 



questions with fairness and caudor in 
my next. 

No. XVI. 
CHANGE OF BASE. 

My notice of the progress of the 
Army of the Potomac has been brought 
down to June 26th. On the next day, 
June 27th, 1862, tbe battle of Gaine's 
Mill was fought. Fair Oakes, it will 
be remembered, is on the right bank 
of the Chickahominy, tbe side towards 
Richmond; Gaines's Mill is on the 
left bank of this stream. At Gaines's 
Mill our forces were led by Gen. Fitz 
John Porter. The number of our 
forces engaged in that battle is vari- 
ously estimated by the witnesses who 
have testified. Some put their num- 
ber below, others above 30,000. The 
general in immediate command on 
our side puts our number above 30,000, 
and so would have stated had he been 
examined as a witness, but, strange to 
say, he was not called. It was evi- 
dently the theory which the commit- 
tee endeavored to make out, that 
Porter's command should have been 
united to the command on the oppo- 
site side of the river before the battle 
of Gaines's Mill. On the other hand. 
Gen. Porter entertains the opinion 
that had he been reinforced by several 
regiments from the right bank of the 
Chickahominy he could have succeed- 
ed in effectually repelling the greatly 
superior numbers that assailed him, 
and, as a consequence, our troops 
could have assaulted the fortifications 
before iiichmond. Indeed he does 
not hesitate to say that had he been 
furnished with 500 axes at the time 
when he sent for them by General 
Barnard, he miglit have successfully 
defended his position. But through 
some misapprehension or negligence, 
the request, which sliould have been 
delivered by Gen. Barnard at head- 
quarters, was not delivered, and the 
necessary aid was consequently with- 
held. But it should be rememb,ered 
that the generals in command on the 
Iiichmond side of the Ciiickahominy 
were expecting an attack, and were 
therefore reluctant to part with any 
part of their respective commands. 
General McClellan is asked : " As 



soon as you had reasonable cause to 
believe that the enemy proposed to 
attack you in force, should not the 
two wings of your army have been 
united to repel the attack ? And was 
this done^? And if not, wljy not ? " 
Answer — •' The right wing was drawn 
to the immediate vicinity of the 
bridges as soon as was practicable 
under the circumstances, after we 
knew definitely of Jackson's approach. 
The intentions of the enemy were dif- 
ficult to divine. He apppearcd in 
force on both banks of the Ciucka- 
hominy, and made several sharp at- 
tacks on the right bank as well as tiie 
left. So that I do not think ro.orc 
troops could wisely have been sent to 
the support of Porter than w^ere ac- 
tually sent." Question — '• \YiuUover 
might have been the intentions of the 
enemy, as an attack was to be made 
by him, would it not have been bettor 
to have placed both wings of our 
army on the same side of the Chicka- 
hominy prior to the, battle of Gaines's 
Mills f" Answer— V." I do rrjt think 
they ought to have been brouglit to 
the same side of the river before they 
actually were." This course of in- 
quiry was closely pressed upon the 
general through a number of other 
questions, but he persists in testify- 
ing — " We had great difticulty in as- 
certaining the intentions of the ene- 
my. I do not see that, under the cir- 
cumstances at the time, we could have 
done differently from what we did do.' 
After the conclusion of tins battle, 
which was as bravely and obstinately 
fought as any battle during the war, 
it was finally decided by Gen. McClel- 
Ian to change his base of operations 
to the James liiver, and our whole 
force, on the night of this battle, was 
withdrawn to the right bank of the 
Chickahominy J the last troops left 
about daybreak of the succeeding day. 
The trains commenced moving to 
James Iliver that night, June 28, 1862. 
On the 27th June, 12M., McClellan 
telegraphs the Secretary of War: 
" My change of position on oth-^r side 
is just in time. Heavy attack now 
being made by Jackson and two other 
divisions. Expect attack also on this 



N 



side." Same day, 3 P.M , Gen. McClcl 
lan's chief of staff telegraphs the 
Secretary of War : " We have been 
fighting all clay against greatly su- 
perior numbers." " Our men fight 
like veterans, and will do all that men 
can do." At 20 minutes past midnight, 
morning of Juno 28th, McClellan 
telegraphs the Secretary of War : " I 
know the full history of the day. On 
this side of the river (the right bank) 
we repulsed several very strong at- 
tacks. On the left bank our men did 
all that men could do — all that soldiers 
could accomplish ; but they were 
overwhelmed by vastly superior num. 
bers, even after I brought my last 
reserves into action. The loss on 
both sides is terrible. I believe it will 
prove the most desparate battle of the 
war. The sad remnants of my men 
behave as men. Those battalions 
who fought most bravely and suffered 
most are still in the best order; my 
regulars were superb, and I count 
upon "what are left to turn another 
battle, in company with their gallant 
oomradcs of the volunteers. 

" Had I twenty thousand, or even 
ten thousand fresh troops to use to- 
morrow, I could take Eichmond ; but 
I have not a man in reserve, and shall 
be glad to cover my retreat and save 
the material and personal of the army. 
If we have lost the day, we have yet 
preserved our honor, and no one need 
blush for the Army of the Potomac. 

" 1 have lost this battle because my 
force was too small ; I again re])eat I 
am not responsible for this ; and I sa}' 
it with the earnestness of a general 
who feels in his heart the loss of every 
bi*ave man who has been needlessly 
sacrificed to-day. I still hope to re- 
trieve our fortune ; but to do this the 
government must view the matter 
with the same earnestness that I do ; 
you must send me very large rein- 
I'orcements, and send them at once. I 
shall draw back to this side of the 
Chickahominy, and thiuU I can with- 
draw all our material Please un- 
derstand that in this Dattle we lost 
nothing but men, and those the best 
we have. In addition to what I have 
alread}' said, 1 only wish to say to the 



43 



President chat I think he is wrong in 
regarding me as ungenerous when I 
said that my force was too weak. I 
merely reiterated a truth which to-day 
has been too plainly proved. I should 
have gained this battle with ten thou- 
sand freshmen. If at this instant I 
could dispose of ten thousand fresh 
men, I would gain a victory to-mor- 
row; I know that a few thousand men 
more would have changed this battle 
from a defeat to a victory. As it is, 
government must not and cannot hold 
me responsible for the result. I feel 
too earnestly — I have seen too ma- y 
dead and wounded comrades to feel 
otherwise than that. The government 
has not sustained the army. If you 
do not do so now, the game is lost." 

Let this letter be read with care. It 
exhibits an earnestness which, if it had 
been properly met bj" the War De- 
partment, would have ensured the 
capture of Richmond; but it liiiled, as^ 
all previous appeals since the battle 
of Williamsburg had failed, to ex- 
cite that vigor and activity on the 
part of the government which, be- 
yond all peradventure, could have fur- 
nished, as before shown, the required 
reinforcements. Hud there been the 
same earnestness manifested that has 
since been' exhibited to take Vicks- 
burg, or Charleston, or to repel the 
late invasion of Lee's army of the 
States of Maryland and Pennsylvania, 
General McClellan would have ful- 
filled his promise to take Richmond, 
and won the approbatiorwand applause 
of his country and the world, and, 
more than that, would ei-e this time 
have suppressed the great insurrec- 
tion. Why has the Army of the West 
been more successful than the Army 
of the Potomac 't That army has not 
conquered siipci-ior numbers, behind 
their own fortifications, which General 
McClellan was expec':ed to do, and 
which he has been censured for not 
doing. General Grant has not been 
thwarted and overruled in his plans, 
and in their execution, as McClellaa 
was. 

An hour befoi'o the letter above 
copied was sent by telegraph. General 
McClellan conferred with Gen. Heint 



44 



zelmar?. Tliis officer testifies : " About 
10 o'clock, P.M., June 27, I got a tele- 
gram that Gon. McClellan wished to 
see mc immediately, about a mile and 
a hair off. He had, in the meantime, 
establ.'fihed his headquarters on mj- 
side of the Chickahomin3% I went 
over there, and found them all packed 
up, ready to move. The general stated 
the situation of affairs, and what he 
proposed to do. One thing was to 
move aci'oss to the James Eiver. The 
other plan was to collect all the troops 
from my side of the Chickahominy 
and have a battle the next day, and 
throw everything upon the result of 
that battle. I asked him what would 
be the result if we lost. He said that 
if we were defeated the army would 
be lost, but that he was inclined to 
risk everything on that battle. I told 
him it was of vital importance to the 
countiy, I thought, to save that army; 
that we would be ruined if that army 
was lost; and I thought it would be 
better for us not to fight that battle, 
but to fall back from there to James 
Eiver ; that we could reach there with 
a loss of perhaps a few pieces of siege 
artillery and some wagons, and then 
we could receive reinforcements. He 
said that was his opinion ; still he felt 
inclined to risk everything on a battle. 
The next day we commenced to re- 
treat." Col. Alexander, of the engi- 
neer corps, on the 28th June, received 
instructions from Gen. McClellan to 
conduct a reconnoissance to James 
River for the purpose of ascertaining 
whether there was an}^ enemy on the 
road, and for ordering up supplies to 
the army, for he intended to march 
there. Thus it is evident that the 
commanding general did not rely ex- 
clusively on his own judgment in de- 
ciding on the important step he pro- 
posed to take, and that preliminary 
measures were carefully taken for the 
removal of the aimy. 

The President Hcnt a telegraphic re- 
ply to Gen. McClellan's letter : " June 
28, 1862. Save your army at all 
events. Will send reinforcements as 
fast as we can. Of course the}^ cannot 
reach you to-day, to-morrow, or next 
day. I have not said you were ungen- 



erous for saying you needed reinforce 
ments ; I thought you were '"ungene> 
rous in assuming that i[ '^id not send 
them as f;ist as I could 7. feel any 
misfortune to you and- your army 
quite as keenly as you feel it j'ourself. 
If 3'ou have had a drawn battle or a 
repulse, it is the price we pay for the 
enemy not being in Washington. We 
protected Washington, and the enemy 
concentrated on you. Had we stripped 
Washington, he would have been upon 
us before the troops sent could have 
got to you. Less than a week ago 
you notified us that reinforcements 
were leaving Richmond to come in 
front of us. It is the nature of the case, 
and neither you nor the government is 
to blame." 

The last sentence in the President's 
telegram I have italicised, and shall 
comment upon it in my ne:3t number. 

No. XVIl. 
"IT IS THE NATURE OF THE 

CASE, AND NEITHER YOU 

NOR THE GOVERNMENT IS TO 

RLAMB." 

This is the declaration communica- 
ted by the President of the United 
States to General McClellan on the 
28th day of June, 1862, immediately 
after the battle of Gaine's Mill. The 
commander-in-chief acquits his subor- 
dinate general of all blame. With 
this the general might, so far as he 
was personally concerned, have been 
satisfied. But he did not concur in 
opinion with his superior officer; he 
thought that "the nature of the case" 
might have been entirely altered by 
supplying him with reinforcements, 
and that it was clearly within the 
power of the government to supply 
the reinforcements called for. The 
conclusion arrived at by the President 
prolonged the rebellion. The conclu- 
sion of General McClellan favored the 
immediate suppression of the rebel- 
lion. How came the President to ar- 
rive at his conclusion ? He was led to 
believe that if he ient the reinforce- 
ments asked fur, he would leave 
Wasiiington unprotected. So he con- 
soles himself and tries to console the 
general by saying: " If j^ou have had 
a drawn battle or a repulse, it is the 



price "we pay for the enemy not being 
in Washington." That the President 
was wrong in his conclusion has been 
fully shown in these numbers. There 
was not a day after the army reached 
the Peninsula when General McClel- 
lan could not have been reinforced by 
more than 20,000 troops in addition to 
those already sent him without at all 
weakening the defences of Washing- 
ton. The general could safely leave 
his whole military reputation to the 
decision of a competent military tri- 
bunal on this point. Indeed, it ma}^ 
well be doubted whether there was 
any better way to defend Washington 
than by sending troops directly to 
Richmond to assault it. 

The President is not a military 
man, and was not a competent per- 
son to decide what force was required 
for the protection of Washington, nor 
how this force should be divided, nor 
where its divisions should be placed 
to effect this object. This is said with 
no intention of underestimating his 
abilities as a statesman. It is mani- 
fest that he did not rely on his own 
unassisted judgment in this particu- 
lar; then the question arises, who mis- 
led him ? who gave him bad advice ? 

It will be remembered that General 
McClellan began to call for reinforce- 
ments immediately after Yorktown 
was evacuated. On the 28th day of 
May he says: "It is the policy and 
duty of the government to send nxe by 
water all the well-drilled troops avail- 
able. I am confident that AVashing- 
ton is in no danger." Who in the 
whole army better understood what 
defences were required for the protec- 
tion of Washington? Who could give 
a more reliable professional opinion 
on this point than General McClellan? 
General McDowell saw and urged the 
necessity of sending reinforcements. 
It has been stated recently in the 
newspapers that General Wadsworth 
was in favor of sending reinforce- 
ments. 

The testimony of General Ethan 
Allen Hitchcock shows conclusively, 
I think, that he first gave the Presi- 
dent the alarm in respect to the de- 
fences of Washington, and that too in 



45 



the absence of Gen. McClellan. He 
may be regarded as the nnlitary au- 
thority upon whoso advice the Presi- 
dent acted in keeping bafk the rein- 
forcements. General Hitchcock was 
not a general having any command, 
but was a cabinet adviser of the Pres- 
ident in military matters. It may 
well be asked, ought the President to 
have any such irresponsible adviser ? 
The Secretaiy of War and the General- 
in-Chief are at the head of the military 
department of the government, sub- 
ject to the general supervision and 
control of the President himself, but 
not a particle more subject to such su- 
pervision and control than any other 
department of the government. The 
President is just as much entitled to 
select a private adviser in matters of 
finances, overlooking and ignoring the 
Secretary of the Treasury, as he has 
to select a secret adviser in military 
matters. There is no authority fur- 
nished by the testimony for saying 
that any of the commanders in the 
field dissented from the view above 
expressed by Gen. McClellan in refer- 
ence to the defences of Washington, 
or concurred in the opinion upon 
which the President acted. 

It thus appears that but for General 
Hitchcock, McDowell's corps would 
have been sent to the Peninsula — that 
reinforcements would have been sent 
sufficient to have effectually repulsed 
the enemy at Gaines' Mill, and had 
he been there so repulsed, there would 
have been no necessity for changing 
the base of operations, but the wing 
of the army on the riglit bank of the 
Chickahominy would have been able 
to enter Piichmond. 

It is easy for fancy to conjecture 
Avhat effects Avould have followed 
had this result been reached at that 
time, more than a year ago. What an 
amount of treasure would have been 
saved to the country ; what a number 
of valuable lives would have been pre- 
served ; what apprehensions, and fears, 
and alarms, and fearful forebodings 
we should all ha\>«e been spared ! Can 
any man say that General McClellan 
is to ularae for not reaching this re- 
sult ? What more could he have done 



than he did ? Yet, strange to say, 
this joint committee have made him 
the subject of their censure. The 
countxy will judge between them and 
him 

No. X^ TIL 

The autumnal eleciions, even down 
to the Municipal election of the City 
of New York, are over. These num- 
bers will now be resumed. I have 
felt an invincible reluctance to write 
or sa}^ anything in connection with 
the name of General McClellan with a 
view of influencing the elections of 
1863, and m}^ communications have 
therefore been for a time suspended. 

The last conflict of tbe Army of the 
Potomac which has been noticed is 
the battle of Gaines' Mill. Since that 
battle was the subject of comment, 
Major General Fitz John Porter has 
published under his own signature im- 
portant testimony in relation to it. 
No man is more capable of furnishing 
reliable testimonj^ relative to this bat- 
tle than General Fitz John Porter, 
since he was the principal actor in it 
on the side of our government. There 
can be no room for doubt, in a candid 
view of all the testimony, that if at 
that time General McClellan had been 
reinforced with the troojjs which he 
implored his government to send him, 
he could have taken Richmond. 

Let us pause to contemplate the 
.state of things on the Peninsula at the 
moment when General McClellan was 
forced to change his position in front 
of the rebel capital. I speak not now 
of the interference by the War De- 
partment with his original plan of 
operations, approved and sanctioned 
by that department, by withholding 
McDowell's force while our army lay 
before Yorktown, nor of preventing 
the junction of McDowell's and Fitz 
John Porter's commands at Hanover 
Court House ; but if. after these omis- 
sions or blunders, tv»^enty or even ten 
thousand fresh troops had been placed 
under McClellan's command, this gen- 
.eral could have entered llichmond, in 
the face of superior numbers fighting 
behind their own intrenchments. Im- 
probai'le as this may have seemed at 
the time, yet McClellan knew what his 



46 



brave followers were capable of per- 
forming ; and that he did not overesti- 
mate their power is proved by what 
they actually accomplished before the 
ai-rival of our army at Harrison's 
Landing. Although the enemy had 
the advantage of a defensive j^osition 
behind their own intrenchments, yet 
even ten thousand fresh troops at 
Gaines' Mill, or at Mah'ern Hill, could 
have ensured the conquest of Rich- 
mond. 

The excuse for not sending rein- 
forcements is that all the troops in 
Virginia, not before Richmond, were 
required for the defence of Washing- 
ton. It has already been shown that 
such an excuse is not a valid one. If 
there were not sufficient troops before 
Washington, or near it, for its protec- 
tion, the whole country knows that 
one call from the President could have 
collected in one week from the loyal 
cities and States more than twenty- 
five thousand true and valiant men 
ready and eager to defend the capital 
of the country. Zeal for the cause of 
loyalty was at its highest pitch of fer- 
vor at the time when General McClel- 
lan commanded the Army of the Po- 
tomac. 

Reinforcements were not sent, and 
Richmond was not taken. The omis- 
sion to send these reinforcements was 
so clearly wrong that the conviction 
has forced itself upon many minds 
that the President, influenced by the 
advice of unwise or unjiatriotic coun- 
selors, did not wish to take the rebel 
capital at that time by the instrumen- 
tality of General McClellan. But sup- 
pose this judgment to be an unchari- 
table one; suppose there was only an 
error of judgment on the part of the 
War Department, Avhy siiould the 
blame for a failure of the Peninsular 
campaign be cast upon Gen McClel- 
lan ? Why should he be held up to 
'the country as the cause of this fail- 
ure ? Why should he be hunted, as 
he has been hunted, like a deer upon 
the mountains ? He has been called a 
traitor — no soldier — a coward ! What 
justification, what apology can be giv- 
en for such persecution / Amidst all 
this manifestation of hatred and ma- 



lignity, the subject of it has remained 
silent; wlien reviled he has not reviled 
again, but with care, industry, and pa- 
tience he has written a history of his 
campaigno, fortified by ofiicial docu- 
ments and correspondence, in a report 
made to the War Department. This 
report it is said he has asked permis- 
sion to make public, so that the peo- 
ple, his fellow-citizens, may have all 
the evidence before them, to enable 
them to form a judgment upon his 
military rr.r'er. But that permission 
is denied L m, yet he remains silent; 
the articles of war will not permit 
him to speak ; he acknowledges his 
obligation to obey those articles. The 
day cannot be far distant when justice 
shall be done this accomplished sol- 
dier and true patriot. All his decla- 
rations have been inspired by the lof- 
tiest patriotism. In a conversation 
with him, not public, he informed me 
that no peace with the rebels should 
be thought of until their military or- 
ganizations wore put down, nor until 
Northern men conld be permitted to 
travel, visit or settle in the South, and 
have all their constitutional rights re- 
spected. This conversation was prior 
to the State election. in Connecticut 
in April last, and in reference to that 
election. 

Many months since Gen. McClellan 
was deprived of the command of the 
Army of the Potomac, that army 
which he loved, and which loved him. 
Little but disaster has befallen that 
army since he left it ; thousands and 
tens of thousands of the brave men 
composing it, Avhen he left the army, 
now fill honored graves. I feel confi- 
dent that the impartial judgment of 
the countr}', when the full time ar- 
rives for tlie expression of that judg- 
ment, will he that these disastrous re- 
sults would never have been beheld if 
George B. McClollan had been con- 
tinued in command. Let this fact be 
pondered by all those who have been 
bereaved of relatives and friends in 
the disastrous battles which have been 
fought since the father of the Army 
of tlie Potomac was torn from his 
fjiildi'en. But these bereaved fathers, 
and mothers, and sons, and wives, and 



47 



daugiiters are not the only persons 
who have cause of complaint and la- 
mentation. All the soldiers of the 
Northern and Eastern and Middle 
States which composed the Army 
of the Potomac, and their friends 
and fellow-citizens at home, have 
just cause of complaint. They have 
been placed in a false position ; they 
have been injured; the section of 
country in which they dwell has been 
made to suffer by a comparison with 
the inhabitants of another section; 
their reputation for valor and prowess 
has been breathed upon ; their honor 
has been tarnished. If McClellan had 
taken Richmond; if McClellan had 
been left in command of the Army of 
the Potomac, no inference unfavorable 
to the valor and skill and manhood of 
Northern and Eastern troops would 
have suggested itself to any mind. 
Then the President of the United 
States would have had no occasion to 
write to a meeting of his fellow-citi- 
zens in the city of New York : 

'■• You purpose also to celebrate our 
Western victories. Freed from ap- 
prehension of wounding the just sen- 
sibilities of brave soldiers fighting 
elsewhere, it would be exceedingly 
agreeable to me to join in a suitable 
acknowledgment to those of the gi*eat 
West, with whom I was born and have 
passed my life." 

He had reason to be proud of his 
birth-place, "the Great West," and 
but for his own interference he could 
have been spared the fear of wound- 
ing "the sensibilities of brave soldiers 
elsewhere." 

No. XIX. 
CHANGE OF BASE . 

In my previous numbers I have not 
commented on the progress of our 
army after the battle of Gaines' Mill, 
when General McClellan decided to 
change the base of operations of that 
army. Since the appeai-ance of Gen. 
McClellan's report there is no longer 
a necessity of continuing a narrative 
of the march of the army or its con- 
flicts; they are all contained in that 
report, which 1 hope will be consult- 
ed by every citizen of -he counuy. 
The campaign^of the Peninsula is an 



48 



item so important m the conduct of 
the civil war in which the country is 
engaged, that Avithout a full and accu- 
rate knowledge of it no citizen can 
pass an intelligent and just judgment 
upon the character of the present Ad- 
ministration. In viow of the fact 
that this Administration seeks a con- 
tinuance of its rule by the sufferages 
of the people, the report of Gen. 
MoClellan should be carefully studied. 
It is a document so clear in its state- 
ments, bearing on its face the impress 
of truth, and verified by official cor- 
respondence and reports, that it may 
be relied upon as an authentic history. 
I wish it were possible that every 
voter in the country could be made 
acquained with the contents of this 
report — that it could be read by every 
citizen, or read to him, if from any 
cause he cannot give it a personal pe- 
rusal. 

That the Army of the Potomac did 
make a successful change of its buse, 
and by an effectual resistance did repel 
all attacks made by the rebel army to 
prevent this change, and beat back 
with terrible slaughter the assailants; 
that the movements of our army on 
its march were by night, and the bat- 
tles were through seven continuous 
days, are facts not disputed. The re- 
port shows that these movements and 
sanguinary conflicts, terminating in 
the arrival at the position sought to 
be reached, were not unpremeditated, 
accidental or fortuitous, but were 
planned and ordered and supervised 
by the general commanding the vast 
host comprising the army of the Poto- 
mac, George B. McClellan. Never 
before on the American soil was such a 
fete performed; there is no passage 
in the military histor^^ of our countrj^ 
so luminous as that which records the 
doings of our army during those seven 
days. It is doubtful whether an}'' act 
or series of acts has shed such lustre 
on our arms in the view of scientific 
and experienced military men in Bu-' 
rope as the movements of our aimiy 
in retiring from the Chickahominy to 
the James, in the face of a foe su- 
perior in numbers and led by able 
commanders. No one military exploit 



in the progress of this civil war has 
done more to admonish foreign pow- 
ers that it would be dangerous to inter- 
fere with the operations of the lawful 
government of the country to sup- 
press the rebellion, and therefore to 
prevent such interference. 

Even Pollard, the Confederate his- 
torian of the war, is compelled to 
admit with reluctance, that " the 
skill and spirit with which Mc' "lellan 
had managed to retreat was indeed 
remarkable, and afforded no mean 
proofs of his generalship. At every 
stage of his retreat, says this author, 
he had confronted our forces with a 
strong rear guat'd, and had encoun- 
tered us with organized lines of battle. 
and regular dispositions of infantry, 
cavahy and artillery. Hisi Iieavy 
rifled cannon had been used against us 
constantly on his retreat. A ])ortion 
of his forces had now effected com- 
munications with the rivers at points 
below City Point. The plan of cutting 
off his communication with the rivdr, 
which was to have been executed by 
a movement of Holmes' division be- 
tween him and the river, was frustra- 
ted by the severe fire of the gun- 
boats, and since that the situation of 
the enemy appeared to be that of di 
vision or dispersion of his forces, one 
portion resting on the river, and the 
other to some extent involved by our 
lines." 

" It had been stated to the public of 
Richmond, with great precision of 
detail, that on the evening of Satur- 
day the 28th of June, we had brought 
the enemy to bay on the south side of 
the Chickahominy, and that it only 
remained to finish hina in a single 
battle. Such in fact appeared to have 
been the situation. The next morn- 
ing, however, it was perceived that 
our supposed resources of generalship 
had given us too much confidence; 
that the enemy had managed to ex- 
tricate himself from the critical posi- 
tion, and, having massed his forces, 
had succeeded under cover of the night 
in opening a way to the James Kiver." 

" Upon this untoward event, the 
operations of the army on the Eich- 
mond side of the Chickahominy wei'e 



49 



ie> foll®w a fugitive army through a 
eountry where he had admirable 
opportunities of concealment, and 
through the swamps and forests of 
which he had retreated with the most 
remarkable judgment, dexterity and 
j spirit of fortitude," 
^ Thus much for the testimony of our 
.(inemy. The commander and historian 
of the Army of the Potomac was 
fully authoi'ized to say : — " The seven 
days are classical in American historj' ; 
those days in which the noble soMiers 
o^' the Union and Constitution fought 
an orerwhelming enemy by day, and 
retreated from successive victoj'ies by 
night, through a Avcek of battle, clos- 
ing the terrible series of conflicts with 
the ever memoi'able victory of Mal- 
vern, where the}^ drove back beaten 
and shattered the entire Eastern army 
of the Confederacy, and thus secured 
for themselves a place for rest and a 
point for a new advance upon the 
eapital from the banks of the James." 

Hear the testimony from Europe. 
Mr. Motley, our Minister at the Court 
of Vienna, thus writes to Mr. Seward, 
Secretary of State, in October, 1862. 
The letter will be found in the diplo- 
matic correspondence communicated to 
Congress by the Secretary of State, 
pages 569' and 570. Extract : " In this 
connection I deem worthy of j'our no- 
tice a brief extract from a remarkable 
series of papers in the principal mili- 
tary journal of this empire, in which 
the course of our campaigns is criti- 
cised, sometimes severely, but never 
ungenei-ously ; always with talent, 
and with thorough knowledge of the 
subject, topographically and strategi- 
call}', and with a fii-m disposition to 
do justice. You will be interested to 
read the comments of m able a writer 
upon the withdrawal of our armies 
from the James Eiver. 

" It is not to be wondered at, then, 
if the general-in-chief of the Army of 
the Potomac was in haste to save the 
array intrusted to him from the dan- 
gers surrounding itj even from certain 
destruction ; from a noose, in fact, 
which required only to be drawn a 
little closely together in order to suf- 
focate the soul of the Union. The 



manner in whieh he acquitted him- 
self of this most difficult of all mili- 
tary tasks redounds to his infinite 
honor, and places him at once in the 
I'anks of those memorable command- 
ers whose name history treasui*es for 
posterity; men who, if they have per- 
haps, not had the art to chain victory 
to their banners, possessed, at any 
rate, the fortitude, the audacity, and 
the circumspection to rescue their 
armies from impending ruin * * » 
The American general has made a 
thorough study of war in the swamps 
of the Chickahominy, and has made 
himself a complete master in that 
most difficult of professions. * * * 
He has manifested the unquestioned 
talent to save his army, in a manner 
not sufiiciently to be admired, out of 
the most desperate of situations. 
Moreau made himself immortal by his 
famous retreat from the Iller to the 
Rhine in the year 1796. What is 
due to the Amex-ican general-in- 
chief who conducted, with a mor- 
ally and physically exhausted army, 
thi'ough a swampy pathless country, 
covered with ancient forests, and in 
face of an enemy outnumbering him 
two to one the most classical of all 
retreats recorded in military history, 
without a single disaster ? " 

No doubt this criticism, from a high 
military source, in an empire tho- 
roughly instructed in the art of war, 
must have been highly gratifying to 
our distinguished ambassador himself, 
the author of histories which are clas- 
sics in our language. Similar emo- 
tions must have swelled the hearts of 
all our loyal countrymen in Europe at 
the time. With far different feelings, 
however, were the commendations of' 
our American general regarded by the 
Committee on the Conduct of the Warj 
they could easily sacrifice their coun- 
try's renown to gratify their pei*sonai 
dislike for General McClellan. 

It is a fact familiar to the student of 
history that the military renown of 
ai'mies and the nations they served, 
has been often as much heightened by 
skilful and well-ordered rejtreats from 
situations of peril as by successful as- 
saults. The famous retixat of the ten 



50 



thousand Greeks under their leader 
Xenophon, needs only to be mentioned 
in this connection. The hai-dly less 
famous retreat of Moreau in 1796 has 
been adverted to by Mr. Motley. In 
the war between this country and 
Great Britain in 1812-15, our navy 
performed exploits highly distin- 
guished, and greatly elevated our na- 
tional character. 

In the early months of that war, 
when we had experienced little but 
disasters on the land, it was truly 
said " Our little navy has dragged up 
hy the locks the drowning honor of 
our country." But of all the feats of 
that navy in this memorable war, 
there was not one that reflected great- 
er honor upon the naval arm of the 
service than the masterly escape of 
Captain Isaac Hull when in command 
of the frigate Constitution from a 
squadron of British vessels, consist- 
ing of a razee of sixty-four guns and 
four frigates, after a close pursuit of 
three days and nights. This display 
of American seamanship was viewed 
with admiration and astonishment by 
iche greatest naval power in the world. 

I purpose to conclude this series of 
articles in two more numbers ; one, 
on the order of the General-in-Chief 
(Halleck), to General McClellan, tore- 
move the Army of the Potomac from 
the Peninsula, and the protest of the 
latter general against this order. The 
other number on the letter of General 
McClellan to|the President, dated July 
7, 1862, concluding in these words, 
remarkable for their solemnity: "I 
may be on the brink of eternity, 
and, as I hope forgiveness from my 
Maker, 1 have written this letter with 
sincerity towards you and from love 
for my country." 'y» 

When these numbers arecompleted 
they will, in compliance with nume- 
rous and urgent requests from distin- 
guished persons in many parts of the 
loyal States, be collected and pub- 
lished in pamphlet form for general 
circulation. To some extent tlie dis- 
tribution of these pamphlets must be 
gratuitous.* Persons wishing to con- 
tribute to the expense of such distri- 
Jjulaon, will please communicate with 



the Journal of Commerce, which has 
consented to receive such contribu- 
tions. 

No. XX. 

OEDER TO LEAVE THE PENIN- 

SULA. 

On the 3d of August, 1862, General 
Halleck ordered General McClellan to 
withdi-aw the Army of the Potomac 
from the Peninsula. On the next 
day, while making preparation for 
this important movement, General 
McClellan sends a remonstrance to the 
general-in-chief, entreating him, in the 
strongest terras afforded by our lan- 
guage, to rescind this order. In this 
remonstrance, couched in language 
most respectful, he argues the point 
with great earnestness and power, 
and concludes in these words: "If my 
counsel does not prevail, I will, with / 
a sad heart, obey your order to the 
utmost of my power, directing to the 
movements, which I clearly foresee 
will be of the utmost delicacy and dif- 
ficulty, whatever skill I may possess. 
Whatever the result may be — and may 
God grant that I am mistaken in my 
forebodings, I shall at least have the in- 
ternal satisfaction that I have written 
and spoken frankly, ajid have sought 
to do the best in my power to avert 
disaster from my country." 

This entreaty was unavailing — the 
order was not rescinded. 

Now the country well knows what 
has been the sad experience of the 
Army of the Potomac since, in obedi- 
ence to this fatal order, it marched 
from the Peninsula. In every great 
battle, on the soil of Virginia, this 
army has been defeated with immense 
loss in killed and wounded. At Bull 
Run under Pope; at Fredericksburg 
under Burnside ; at Chancellorsville 
under Hooker, thousands and tens of 
thousands of our bravest and most 
loyal troops have been slain or dis- 
abled. " Families without number have 
been bereaved of husbands and fathers, 
of sons and brothers and kindred, or 
have been compelled to see them crip- 
pled or maimed. These are sad re- 
sults — were they inevitable ? Might 
they not have been avoided by follow- 
ing the counsel of General McClellan ? , 



The counsel was to reinforce the army 
where he was, and from that point, 
with the reinforced army, march on 
• Richmond. Hear what he says : '• This 
array is now in excellent discipline 
and condition. TVe hold a debouche 
on both banks of the James River, so 
that we are fi'ee to act in any direc- 
tion; and with the assistance of the 
gunboats, I consider our communica- 
tion as now secure. 

We are twenty-five miles from Rich- 
mond, and are not likely to meet the 
enemy in force sufficient to fight a 
battle until we have marched fifteen 
(15) to eighteen (18) miles, which 
brings us practically within ten (10) 
ten miles of Richmond. 

"At Aquia Creek we would be 
seventy-five (75) miles from Richmond, 
with land transportation all the way. 
" From here to Fort Monroe is a 
inarch of about seventy (70) miles, 
for I deem it impracticable to with- 
draw this army and its material ex- 
cept by land. 

" The result of the movement would 
thus be a march of one hundrend and 
forty-five miles (145) miles to reach a 
point now only 25 miles distant and 
to dej)rive ourselves entirely of the 
powerful aid of the gunboats and water 
transportation. 

" Add to this the certain demoi-al- 
ization of this army which would en- 
sue, the teiTibly depressing eff'ect upon 
the people of the North, and the strong 
probability that it would induce foreign 
powers to recognize our enemies ; and 
these appear to me sufficient reasons 
to make it ray imperative duty to urge 
in the strongest terms aff'orded by our 
language that this order may be re- 
scinded, and that far from recalling this 
army, it may be promptly reinforced 
to enable it to assume the offensive. 

" It may be said that there are no 
reinforcements available. I point to 
Burnside's force; to that of Pope, not 
necessary to maintain a strict defen- 
sive in front of Washington or Harper's 
Ferry ; to those portions of the army 
in the West not required for a strict 
defensive there. Here, directly in 
front of this army, is the heart of the 
rel^llion ; it is hero that all our re- 



51 

sources should be collected to strike 
the blow which will determine the 
fate of the nation. 

" All points of secondary import- 
ance elsewhere should be abandoned, 
and every available man brought 
here ; a decided victory here and the 
military strength of the rebellion is 
crushed. It matters not what partial 
reverses we may meet with elsewhere j 
here is the true defence of Washing- 
ton, it is here on the banks of the 
James that the fate of the Union 
should be decided." 

True, this army has retrieved its 
tarnished rej^utation at South Moun- 
tain and Antietam under McClellan, 
and at Gettysburg under Meade. But 
let it be remembered that in these 
conflicts it was defending the soil of 
loyal States, not invading the region 
of rebellion. This array was repelling 
and driving back the rebel hosts who 
had the audacity to invade the terri- 
tory of the loyal States. We only 
prevented by these victories, and 
barely prevented, the States which 
had been true to the lawful govern- 
ment of the country from being over- 
run, and their cities, including the 
national capital itself, from being as- 
saulted and sacked. Were these re- 
sults caused solely by the order to 
abandon the Peninsula? Not entirely. 
It should be remembered that McClel- 
lan was not only ordered to march 
from Hai'rison's Landing to Aquia 
Creek, but was depi'ived of his com- 
mand of that army when it joined 
the Army of Virginia. If he had 
been directed when he left the Penin- 
sula to unite the Army of the Poto- 
mac, with the Army of Virginia under 
Pope, and take command of the two 
armies united, the disaster of Bull 
Run would not, it is believed, have 
occurred. This is a question which 
the military men in those armies ar« 
most competent to decide ^ but I have 
no doubt their decision would con- 
form to the opinion above given. 
One thing is very certain, that the 
officers and privates of these armies 
knew and had confidence in McClel- 
lan; they did not know, and to a large 
extent had no confidence in Pope. 



52 



This fact u proved by the evidence of 
Genei-ai i) >j ■ aside, given before a court 
martial. V*; by was this command 
withheld from General McClellan ? 
IBEe outranked General Pope. For 
the same reason, I fear, that the ori- 
ginal plans of McClellan, when he 
.went to the Peninsula, were interfered 
fisrith and defeated; for the same reason 
that McDowell was kept back from 
joining Porter at Hanover Court 
House ; for the same reason that re- 
inforcements, repeatedly called for, 
were not sent to the Peninsula. There 
was no desire on the part of irrespon- 
sible military advisers of the President, 
inferior in rank to McClellan, that 
this general should capture Eich- 
mond, and gain the credit and influ- 
ence that such a victory was sure to 
give him. Hence the mind of the 
President was kept, by generals at 
Washington, in a state of constant 
apprehension, not to say alarm, as to 
the safety of the capital. One call 
from the War Department requiring 
volunteers for the defence of Washing- 
ton, issued at any time during the 
months of April or May 1862, would 
have filled all the garrisons in and 
about the capital with some of the 
best and well drilled volunteers in the 
States of New York, Massachusetts, 
Connecticut;, and New Jersey, within 
ten days after making the call. It is 
a notorious fact that such volunteers 
in large numbei'S were not only wil- 
ling but desirous — eager for such a 
service. This, from what I saw here 
in New York, I affirm without fear of 
contradiction. 

It will be observed that my com- 
ments refer solely to the conse- 
quences of occurrences on the Penin- 
sula. What General McClellan could 
have done in command of the united 
armies before the battle of Bull Eun 
was demonstrated by what he actually 
did with these armies after they were 
demoralized by defeat. When even 
the President of the United States 
said that the troops defeated under 
Pope would not fight, those troops 
were collected, organized, and led on to 
victory under the general they ioved. 
IX is not my purpose to speak of what 



might have been done by General 
McClellan if he had not been sepe- 
rated from his command, after the 
battle of Antietam. 

But it may be enquired — " Why re- 
mind the country of these things now ? 
It is not patriotic to allude to th® 
errors or mistakes of the past, while 
the rebels are yet unconquered, and 
even confident of success ; the country 
even now has need of United senti- 
ment and action to put down the great 
rebellion." Admitted; yet it is never- 
theless useful to examine and criticise 
the past, in order to prevent the re- 
currence of errors in the future. Let 
us all hope that now a more wise and 
efficient policy will be pursued. 

There are few citizens of the loyal 
States who do not concur in the senti- 
ments long since uttered and published 
by General McClellan in these words : 
^' I am in favor of the prosecution of the 
war with all the means at the command 
of the loyal States until the military 
power of the rebellion is destroyed." 
When the military jsower is destroyed 
there may be a wide difference of 
opinion as to the policy to be inaugu- 
rated and pursued as to the States in 
rebellion. One party it is feared will 
advocate a vindictive policy inspired 
by hatred and revenge. The other 
party, which is is hoped and believed 
will be the prevailing one '.\dil tem- 
per mercy with justice-will endeavor 
by all the means practicable once 
more to unite the whole people of 
these United States in cordial support 
of the Constitution made by their 
fathers. Let us not now, in anticipa- 
tion of the coming conflict of opinion, 
to be settled, it is hoped, at the ballot 
box, be seperated upon the question 
of present duty. That duty is plain. 
In order to overcome military pow- 
er, military power must be resorted 
to. This power can only be wielded 
with any hope of success by those 
trained to its exercise. The profes- 
sion of arms must be learned by study, 
and drill and ex|)erience. The quali- 
fiications of a great military com- 
mander are most graphically sketched 
and eloquently described by Edmund 
Burke : 



" The fortitude required of him is 
very different from the untliinking 
alacniy of tlie common soldier or 
common sailor in the face of danger 
and death. It is not a passion, it is 
not an impulse, it is not a sentiment, 
it is a cool, steady, deliberate prin- 
ciple, always present, always equable, 
having no connection with anger, 
tempering honor with prudence, in- 
cited, invigorated, and sustained by a 
generous love of fame ; informed, 
moderated, and directed by an en- 
larged knowledge of its own great 
public ends ; flowing in one blended 
stream from the opposite sources of 
the heart, and the head, carrying in 
Kself its own commission, and prov- 
ing its title to every other command 
by the first anci most difficult com- 
mand, that of the bosom in which it 
resides. It is a fortitude which unites 
with the courage of the field the more 
exalted and refined courage of the 
council ; which knows as well how to 
reti'cat as to advance ; which can con- 
quer as well by delay as by the ra- 
pidity of the march or the impe- 
tuosity of an attack ; which can be 
with Fabius, the black cloud that 
lowers on the tops of the mountains, 
or, with Scipio, the thunderboalt of 
war J which, undismayed by false 
shame, can patiently endure the 
severest trial that a gallant spirit can 
undergo, in the taunts and provoca- 
tions of the enemy, the suspicions, the 
cold respect, and ' mouth honor' of 
those from whom it should meet a 
cheerful obedience, which, undisturbed 
by false humanity, can calmly assume 
that most awful moral responsibility of 
deciding when victor}^ maybe too dear; 
ly purchased by the loss of a single life, 
and when the safety and honor of their 
country may demand the certain sac- 
rifice of thousands." 

When a military leader is found 
embodying the characteristics here 
described, he must not be interfered 
with, much less controlled; he must 
be let alone to work out his OAvn plans 
by subordinate officers and agencies 
of his own selection. President Lin- 
coln is a professional man ; he is a 
lawyer, and has^ no doubt, in the 



53 

course of his professional practice, 
been entrusted by his clients with 
very important cases, involving large 
amounts of property, great public 
interests, as well as the liberty and 
life of the citizen. In every sucb 
case I can readily imagine that, 
after making himself thoroughly ac- 
quainted with the facts and the law 
applicable to the same, he has insisted 
upon his professional right to manage 
the controversy in his own way, with* 
out the interference even of his client. 
Such interference is I know, never 
permitted by any lawyer of reputa- 
tion ; no such counsellor will be res- 
ponsible for. the result of a cause 
unless committed to his sole control. 
These principles are equally applica- 
ble to the profession of arms. Let 
us hope that in General Grant the 
country has found a military com- 
mander worthy of the high trust com- 
mitted to him. This general has by 
the nomination of the President, and 
the concurrence of Congress, been 
placed at the head of the armies of 
the country. In making this selec* 
tion the whole constitutional duty of 
the President in this regard has been 
performed. If General Grant fails, 
no censure will attach to the Presi- 
dent, unless he has attempted to inter- 
ferfere with the discharge of the 
general's professional duty. The Pre- 
sident may certainly congratulate 
himself that he is relieved from all 
the care and anxiety of managing the 
armies in the field. The President 
never made a greater mistake than to 
assume, because he was commandejj- 
in-cbief under the Constitution, that, 
therefore, he was required to direct 
the military operations of the armies. 
He has, however, more than once 
made just this mistake. Should it be 
repeated, no weight of odium is too 
heavy to cast upon the President, for 
he too is none other than the agent of 
the people not the government^ but 
the chief executive officer selected by 
the people to administer a government 
whose powers are prescribed and d^ 
fined by a written Constitution. There 
are not a few intelligent citizens wbo 
predict that General Grant is called 



to Washington to be made instruraen 
tal in advancing party objects, as well 
as to control the armies. Such, it is 
not to be believed is the purpose of 
the general himself, but he may never- 
theless be made subservient to party 
purposes. If General G-rant is deter- 
mined to destroy the military power 
of the rebellion, and perseveres in 
that determination, and is not inter- 
fered with by the President or War 
Department, he will, beyond all doubt, 
succeed. If however, he allows him- 
self to become a tool of party, his 
success in putting down the rebellion 
cannot be relied on, and he will, per- 
sonally, be disgraced and ruined in 
reputation. 

No. XXI. 
THE NEW YOEK TIMES 

I had proposed to finish this series 
of communications in this number, 
but an editorial article in the New 
York Times of the 15th March, num- 
bered six of a series published in that 
paper, reviewing the report of General 
McClellan, requires a notice, and I am 
therefore prevented from executing 
my original purpose. 

The " New York Times" supports 
the Administration. To this there 
can be no objection if that support is 
rendered fairly and ingenuously. 
There are two modes of misrepresenta- 
tion and giving false coloring to facts; 
one by allegations that nre not true, 
and the other by suppressing the truth 
what in legal technicality is called 
suggestio falsi and suppressio veri. Both 
of these maxims have been violated 
by the Times in the article referred to, 
and another maxim adopted which has 
not found a place in any approved 
code of morality : "All is fair in j^oli- 
tics." 

The first great wrong done to Gen. 
McClellan, after it was decided that 
he should move on Richmond by the 
way of the Peninsula, was the with- 
holding of Gen. McDowell's corps, 
which had been promised him, as has 
been previously shown in these num- 
bers. Had not that corps been kept 
back, and the good faith of the Ad- 
ministration thereby violated, the re- 
sult of the Peninsular campaign would 



54 



have been widely different from what 
it was. Had the fact been disclosed 
to General McClellan, before he em- 
barked for Fortress Monroe, that he 
was not to have the aid of McDowell's 
command, he doubtless would rever 
have embarked — would have regarded 
the enterprise of taking Richmond as 
impracticable. But this fact was not 
communicated to the General till he 
arrived at Yorktown, when it was too 
late to recede. All the plan of his 
campaign, deeply to his regret and I 
may add grief, was thereby deranged. 
These facts are well known to the 
Times, and the only way in which the 
Administration can relieve itself of 
public censure is by showing that it 
had been jDreviously deceived by Gen. 
McClellan. This has been attempted 
before by Ethan Allen Hitchcock, a 
brigadier general of volunteers, who 
held staff relations with his Excellen- 
cy the President and the Secretary of 
War. I have heretofore commented 
at large on this attemj)t made by 
Hitchcock ; it is now renewed by the 
Times, with what success we shall see. 

The charge against General McClel- 
Ian is, that when he embarked with 
his army at Alexandria for the Penin- 
sula he violated the President's order 
" to leave Washington entirely se- 
cure." That order was issued by the 
President, and bears date March 13th, 
18(32, and is in these words : 
To Maj.-Gen. Geo. B. McClellan : 

" The President, having considered 
the plan of operations agreed upon by 
3'ourself and the commandei's of army 
cordis, makes no objections to the 
same, but gives the following direc- 
tions as to its execution : 

" 1st. Leave such force at Manassas 
Junction as shall make entirely cer- 
tain that the enemy shall not repossess 
himself of that position and line of 
communication. 

" 2d. Leave Washington entirely 
secure. 

" 3. Move the remainder of the force 
down the Potomac, choosing a new 
base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere 
between here and there; or at all 
events move such remainder of th© 



55 



army at once in pursuit of tlie enemy 
bj some route. 

" Edwin M. Stantox, 
" Secretary of War." 
This order is not given in the Times 
article, an omission which could not 
have been m^de by a fair and candid 
reviewer, sincerely desirous of estab- 
lishing the truth, especially when he 
quoted in full a previous order bear- 
ing date the 8th of March. Ry every 
approved rule of construction the or- 
der of the 8th of March was superse- 
ded b}' the order of the 13th of March. 
By this order the plan of operations 
which had been agreed upon by the 
commanders of army corps vxis not ob- 
jected to, neither was it expressly ap- 
proved, but the direction to General 
McClcllan personally in the order of 
the 13th of March was: "Leave 
Washington entirely secure; this 
was mandatory to -the commanding 
general. What should constitute se- 
curity is left to his judgment, and he 
is not concluded by the judgment of 
his corps commanders before ex- 
pressed, or thereafter to be expressed; 
but the plain import of the order is : 
" I look to 3'ou, the general-in-chief, to 
leave Washington entirely secure." 

The preparations of General Mc-«| 
Clellan, he informs us, were at once 
begun in accordance with directions 
in the order of March 13th. lie shows 
by official documents what he did. A 
fair judgment deduced from these 
documents must decide whet^ier he 
executed the order with sound judg- 
ment and in good faith. These docu- 
ments are not given, nor are their 
contents stated in the Times' article, 
but they are adverted to as '• a shuf- 
fling attempt which General McClel- 
lan makes to explain this matter." 

The first of these documents is an 
order dated March IGth, 18G2, and 
issued to Maj.-Gen. JS". P. Banks, con- 
taining specific directions what that 
General should Jo, and stating the 
general object of the order to be «'to 
cover the line of the Potomac and 
Washington.*'' 

The second is directed to Brigadier 
General Wadsworth, bearing the same 
date, March IGth, 18G2, There are 



vai-ious other ordei"S and official com- 
munications bearing on the siafety of 
Washington in the report of General 
McClellan.but they may all be summed 
up in the following paragraph in the 
same report : 

Without including Gen. Blencker's 
division, there were left 67,428 men 
and 85 pieces of light artillery, which, 
Muder existing circumstances, I deem- 
ed more than adequate to insure 
Washington against an}^ force the 
enemy could la-ing against it. The 
general gives at large the reasons for 
this opinion. Among these reasons is 
the following, wliich I think no one 
but "The New York Times" would 
regard as "a shuffling attempt to ex- 
plain away this matter." (The charge 
of having left Washington unpi'o- 
tected.) 

" It was clear to my mind, as I reiter- 
ated to the authorities, that the move- 
ment of the army to the Peninsula 
would have the effect to draw off 
the rebel arm}' from Manassas to the 
defence of their capital, and thus free 
Washington from menace. This opin- 
ion was confirmed the moment the 
movement commenced, or rather as 
soon as the enemy became aware of 
our intentions; for, with the excep- 
tion of Jackson's force of some 15,000, 
which his intructi6ns show to have 
been intended to operate in such a 
Avay as, to prevent McDowell's crojDS 
from being sent to reinforce me, no 
rebel force of any magnitude made 
its appearance in fi'out of Washington 
during the progress of our operations 
on the Peninsula; nor until the order 
was given for my return from Harri- 
son's Landing was Washington again 
threatened." 

So anxious was the general to satis- 
fy the President and Secretary of 
War, that he was abc^it to leave 
Washington in a state ol" perfect se- 
curity, so as to relieve their minds 
from all anxiety or apprehension on 
this point, that he was at pains to 
see General Hitchcock, the only mili- 
tary man who held staff relations, 
with these high officials. Here what, 
the General says in his report : 

" It is proper to remark, that just 



56 



pvevioiis to iny departure for Fort 
Moni'oe, I sent my chief of staff to 
General Hitchcock, who at that time 
held staif relations with his Excellency 
the President and Secretary of War, 
to submit to him a lii*t of the troops 
I proposed to leave for the defence of 
Washington, and the positions in 
which I designed posting them. Gen. 
Hitchcock after glancing his eye over 
the list, observed that he was not the 
judge of what was required for defend- 
ing the Capital, that Gen, McClellan's 
))osition was such as to enable him to 
understand the subject much better 
than be did. and he presumed that if 
the force designated was in his judg- 
ment suflScient, nothing more would 
be required. He was then told b}- 
the chief-of-staff that I would be glad 
to have his opinion, as an old and ex- 
perienced officer. To this he replied, 
that as I had had the entire control 
of the defences for a long time, I was 
the best judge of what was needed, 
and he declined to gjive any expres- 
sions of opinion at thjft time." 

General Hitchcock at that time — 
before the General embarked — took the 
of the matter — that Gen. 
was a better judge of the 
requirements for the safety of the 
capital than hims.elf, and that his 
judgment must control. Who has 
been found from that da}"" to this, to 
impeach the correctness of General 
MeClelian's decision ? The capital 
was not put in danger while the army 
remained on the Peninsula, r>or was 
the refceiition of McDowell's command 
neeeesarj for its protection. This is 
the testissiony of actual experience, 
ona'Of the best witnesses. Jiofore the 
•war committee General McClellan was 
.asked: ■" Was it not almost certain 
ibefor-e^iaad that the withdrawal of 
your ;armiy t^ a position where it did 
inot <e®ver Washington would cause 
ith« 'eiaejoay at least to make a threat 
'OCT felixt of iin attack upon Washing- 
ton %vh-ieh would iead to a panic, and 
])©rha|)«,t® a recall of your army, or 
^^ortioBL of it? Answer — I think 
m&t:. I di® not think that anj'thing oc- 
■curred, ;prior to the battle of Cedar 
HountaJji^ whjeh should have justified 



right view 
McClellan 



a ]')anic in Washington. The only ad- 
vance of the enemy that 1 remember 
at all was that of Jackson upon Gen. 
Banks. When I heard of that I tele- 
graphed to the Pi'esident that I be- 
lieved the intention simply to be to 
prevent reinforcements being v^ent to 
to me. I had no idea that it meant 
a serious threat upon Washington," 

I have carefully read the testimony 
of Generals McDowell, Sumner, and 
Heintzelraan, before the War Com- 
mittee, and cannot find that either of 
them was examined in reference to 
the sufficiency of the force left by 
General McClellan' for the defence of 
Washington. The)^ were witnesses, 
next to General McClellan, most com- 
petent to give an opinion upon the 
point. No opinion was sought from 
either of them. General McDowell 
was desirous of uniting his command 
with that of General McClellan, and 
earnestly protested against the alleged, 
necessity of retaining it in the vicinity 
of Washington, ^et it was retained, 
and accomplished no useful purpose, 
while, if it had embarked in the first 
instance, and gone down to Fortress 
Monroe with the other corps, or if it 
had united with the command of Gen. 
fitz John Porter at Hanover Court 
House the capture of Kichmond would 
have been made certain. Who can 
fail to see that the distribution of the 
troops for the defence of the capital, 
whether in the immediate vicinity of 
the capital, or at a greater or less 
distance from it, in the avenues 
through which the enemy must of ne. 
cessity approach Washington, were 
questions for militaiy science and ex- 
perience to decide. General McClel- 
lan, as the commander of the army, 
did decide these questions, aad mad«i 
these distributions in the exercise of 
his best judgment. There is no tes- 
timou}' whatever but that of Generals 
Hitchcock and Thomas, and, perhaps, 
I !nay add , Wads worth, tending to 
show'that his decision was erroneous. 
The evidence of these witnesses has 
been heretofore in these numbers ex- 
amined, but I may be pardoned, just in 
this connection, for again adverting to 
the topics. G©H. McClellan in his re- 



))Oi't says: " On the 2l8t day of April, 
llie (lay followinju; my dcpai'ture for 
Fort Munroe, Grcnerals llitclicock and 
Tliomas wem dirocti.'d by the Secre- 
tary of War to examine and report 
whether the President's instructions 
to me of March 8tl> and 13th had 
been complied with. On the same day 
their report was submitted, and their 
decision was that the requirement of 
the President, tliat this city (Washing- 
ton) shall be left entirely secure, has 
not been fully complied with." I have 
shown, I think, conclusively, that the 
order of March 8th was superseded 
by the subsequent order of March 
loth. It was very. pi"oper to enquire 
whethej-, under this ord-n-, the safety 
of Washini!;ton had been provided for. 
That question could only be decided 
by ascertaining" what troops and arm- 
ament had been left for such defence. 
No such investigation was made, but 
the attention of these two generals 
was directed to an enquiry whether 
or not tiie force agreed upon by the 
corps commanders had been left, and 
distributed in the manner suggested 
by them in their report. 

A proper investigation would have 
shown that a much larger force than 
was suggested by either of the corps 
commanders was actually left for the 
dclence of the capitol, although the 
force was, under the direction of the 
general-in-chief, distributed in a dif- 
ferent manner than that contemplat- 
ed b}' the corps commanders. 

Generals Hitchcock and Thomas as- 
sume that the report of the corp com- 
manders prescribed a rule of duty to 
Gen McClellan. I deny it, and hava 
shown that the only duty required of 
him by the President was ilefined in 
the last order given — leave Washing- 
ton perfect I tj secure. If he did provide, 
that which, in his own judgment, was 
perfect securit}', he obeyed the ordei\ 
1 have heretofore shown the gross in- 
justice of putting Maj' r Gen. McClellan, 
in liis absence, on trial before generals 
of inforior rank, and bringing in a re- 
port against him without giving him 
•I hearing, or any notice of an enquiry 
the result of whicti might be, and ac- 
tunli}'- was, injurir)us to his reputa- 
tion. This enquiry and report was 



made while the general himself, afc 
the head of the largest arm}' ever 
before assembled in these United 
States, was absent in the actual and 
perilous service of his country 

General McClellan further states, m 
reference to the time when the T-eport 
of Gens. Hitchcock and Thomas was 
made, as follows : " At the time this 
report was made, the only enemy on 
any approach to Washington was 
Jackson's force, in fx'ont ot Banks's, 
in the Shenandoah Valley, with the 
Manassas Gap Kailroad leading from 
this valley to W^jpShington, and it will 
be admitted, I presume, that Banks, oc- 
cupying the Shenandoah Valley, was 
in the best position to defend not only 
that approach to Washington, but 
the roads to Harper's Ferry and 
above. The number of troops left by 
me for the defences of Washington, 
as given in my letter to the Ad- 
jutant General, were taken from the 
latest official returns of that date, 
and these, of course, I constitute the 
most trustworthy and authentic source 
from which such information can be 
obtained.' 

In consequence of this report of 
Gens. Hitchcock and Thomas, made 
tK) the War Department, the Presi- 
dent's apprehension for the safety of 
Washington was excited, in conse- 
quence of which he wrote a letter to 
General McClellan, on the 9th of 
April, in which' he inquires of this 
General — " And now allow me to ask, 
do you really think I should , permit 
the line from Eichmond, via Manassas 
Junction, to this city to be entirely 
open, except what resistance could 
be prevented by less than 20,000 un. 
organized troops ? " 

Here the President plainly implies 
that no troops could be placed any- 
where to resist an attack upon Wash- 
ington except immediateh' in front of 
the Capitol. Could an}' conclusion be 
more erroneous, not to say absurd ? 

In reference to another part of the 
report of Generals Hitchcock and 
Thomas, General McClellan sa3-.s in 
his report : " In regard to the steamer 
' Merrimac,' I have also stated, *hixt 
so far as our operations on York liiver 
were concerned, the power of this 



58 



vessel was neutralized. I now pro- 
ceed to give some of the evidence 
which influenced mo in coming to that 
conclusion. 

" Previous to our departure from 
the Peninsula, Mr. Watson, Assistant 
Secretary of War, was sent by the 
President to Fort Monroe, to consult 
with Flag Officer Goldsborough upon 
this subject. The result of that con- 
sultation is contained in the following 
extract from the evidence of Admiral 
Goldsborough before the Committee 
on the Conduct of the War, viz., ' I 
told Mr. Watson, Assistant Secretary 
of War, that the President might 
make his mind perfectly easy about 
the Merrimac going up York Eiver, 
that she could never get there, for I 
had ample means to prevent that.' 
Capt. J. V. Fox, Assistant Secretary 
of the Navy, testifies before the Com- 
mittee as follows: 'Gen. McClellan 
expected the Navy to neutralize the 
Merrimac, and I promised it should be 
done.' " 

There is further given the testi- 
mony of Gen. Keyes to the same ef- 
fect, which will be found in the Report 
of Gen, McClellan. 

Thus much for this infamous pro- 
ceeding at Washington, instituted and 
consummated by Generals Hitchcock 
and Thomas and the Secretary of 
War, immediately on Gen. McClellan's 
leaving Washington, on a mission no 
less important than the conquest of 
the rebel capital. This proceeding, 
which resulted in the withholding of 
Gen. McDowell's corps from the Pe 
ninsula, prevented that conquest. 
But for this trial and conviction of 
Gen. McClellan in his absence, and 
without notice, the rebel capital would 
have been in the possession of the 
lawful government of this country 
more than eigliteen month ago, and 
Major General George B. McClel- 
lan would, by general acclamation, 
have been hailed as the savior of his 
country. That he has not been is no 
fault of his own. 

NO. XXII. 
NEW YORK TIMES. 

In my last number I attempted to 
answer Article No. 6, in " the New 



York Times" review of General Mc- 
Clellan's report — with what success 
the careful and candid reader must de- 
cide. No. 7, in the same journal, .-^hall 
now be noticed, and then, I have no 
moi-e to do with " the New York 
Times." 

No. 7 censures General McClellan for 
not having assaulted the enemy's lines 
at Yorktown instead o^ laying siege to 
his line of works. In the remarks of 
■' the Times" our own general is treated 
with marked contempt. A comparison 
between him and the Duke of Marl- 
borough is instituted greatly to the dis- 
advantage of our countryman. S;ich 
a comparison was uncalled for. Gen- 
eral McClellan, before he was sum- 
moned from the pui'suits of civil life, 
and it may be added the profitable 
pursuits of civil life, to enter the ser- 
vice of the country, and assist in put- 
ting down the rebellion, had been ed- 
ucated in the militaiy academy at West 
Point, and seen some actual service in 
the Mexican war, but he had never 
risen in the regular army above the 
grade of captain. He had retired fcom 
even this military position, and he 
sought not to enter military life a sec- 
ond time, but he was called from his re- 
tirement to that service, and, prompted 
by love of country, and gratitude tc a 
government which had given him a 
military education, he promply obeyed 
that caU. From the day he re-entered 
the army to the day when he was re- 
lieved of his command by i>rder of the 
President, ho addressed himself dili- 
gently to the duties of his calling in 
the position assigned him No man 
can deny him this meed of praise; he 
'was industrious, watchful, and perse- 
vering by day and by night ; he did 
the best ho could with all fidelity to 
his government. I am unauthorized, 
upon authority which cannot be gain- 
said, to declare that the President of 
the United States, after the battle of 
Antietam, expressed the highest confi- 
dence in this general's military capa- 
city and generalship, believing him 
superior to any and everj'- other gen- 
eral in the service, with no fault but 
being in his opinion too cautious. 

Now this recent captain made no 



59 



claim to the abilities and experience 
of the greatest general that England, 
through a course of centuries, has pro- 
duced — the illustrious Duke of Marl- 
borough. When treneral McClellan 
went to the Peninsula he commanded, 
indeed, the largest army ever before 
assembled in his native country — he 
did not usurp that command ; he did 
not intrigue for, or even solicit this 
command ; but it was conferred upon 
him, inexperienced as he was. He ac- 
cepted it, and did the best he could. 
Impartial, judicious military men, 
have said that he did as well and ac- 
complished as much as any other gen- 
eral, ancient or modern, could have 
done, or accomplished, in his position, 
under all the circumstances which actu- 
ally existed. This is all that can be 
said about it. It is ungenerous to 
taunt him because he did not, in the 
first act of his first great campaign, rise 
to an equality with the renowned Duke 
of Marlborough. The Committee on 
the Conduct of the War took a large 
amount of testimony on this disputed 
point of assault or siege. I have here- 
tofore examined in the numbers re- 
ferred to this testimony, given on both 
sides, with as much candor and impai*- 
tiality as I was able, and shown that 
the testimony in favor of siege greatly 
preponderated. The witnesses exa- 
mined were of the committee's own 
selection, and they were selected with 
no partiality for Genera,! McClellan, 
yet the result of this testimony, and of 
tte public authentic documents access- 
ible to the committee, was entirely fa- 
voi'able to the siege. Many other offi- 
cers could have been examined, and it 
would have been entirely practicable 
to examine, on this point, Ijieut.-Gen. 
Scott himself. What their judgment 
would have been it is imj)0ssible to 
say, but there can be no doubt that an 
overwhelming majority of the rank 
and tile of the whole army would have 
ratified the decision of the command- 
ing general. Certain it is. that on the 
6th of Ma}', two days after the evacu- 
ation by the enemy, the Congress of 
the United States voted thanks to Gen. 
McClellan for those high viiiitarij quali- 
ties which secure important results with 



but little sacrifice of life. One would 
think that controversy on this point 
should cease. Not so thinks the "New 
York Times." This journal makes no 
reference to the testimony taken be- 
fore the War Committee; it takes no 
notice of the reports of our own gene- 
rals; it ignores the opinion of the 
Army of the Potomac, the most en- 
lightened body of citizen soldiers ever 
combined; it does not even mention 
the resolution of Congress; it enters 
into no discussion whatever upon the 
question, but pronounces, ex cathedra, 
a sentence of condemnation of General 
McClellan for having laid siege to 
Yorktown. The article in the "Times," 
now reviewed, opens thus: -'There is 
now, we suppose, not the shadow of a 
doubt, that had the Army of the Poto- 
mac been simply allowed to walk on 
up to Richmond, it would have been 
able to walk over all the force which 
Gen. Magruder had to oppose it. We 
now know how contemptible that force 
was." The italics are not mine. 

Suppose this assertion to be true: 
General McClellan, in April, 1862, 
could not act upon what we now know, 
and of which he was then ignorant. 
All he could do was to use the best 
means then in his power, and collect 
the most reliable information attaina- 
ble at that time, as to the number and 
condition of the enemy, and act upon 
that information. He might have 
been misinformed; he might have 
failed to obtain accurate information; 
instances might be cited where great 
generals have been deceived without 
any fault or remissness of their own. 
But how do we noio know what our 
army could have accomplished, more 
than it did accomplish before York- 
town two years ago ? The "New York 
Times" answers this question in the 
following sentence : "General Magru- 
ger's official report of the operations 
on the Peninsula shows that his whole 
army consisted of eleven thousand 
men ; of these six thousand wei-e use- 
less to him, being placed in garrison at 
Gloucester Point, Mulberry Island, 
&c. ; so that it will be seen," adds he, 
"that the balance of the line, embra- 
cing a length of thirteen miles, was 



defended by about five thousand men." 
"Says" who? General Magruder. And 
who is General Magruderi* He is the 
■witness — the chief witness produced 
by the accuser and i-oviler of General 
McClellan, and the ijublic are entitled 
to know the position and character of 
this witness by whose testin\ony it is 
sought to condemn our own general. 
General Magruder is a rebel officer; 
he was well and extensively known 
when he served nnder the United 
States Government. The officers of 
our regular army are not ignorant that 
his characteristics were, first, a great 
amount of pomposity and desire of 
show in his personal bearing; second, 
a habit of appropriating to General 
Magruder a lion's share of all the cre- 
dit and renown which attached to 
every military enterprise in which he 
happened to be engaged; third, he 
was habitually in a state of artificial 
excitement, sometimes called intoxica- 
tion, but more commonly, drunkenness; 
and, lastly, he is universally known as 
a traitor to his lawful government, 
which educated him to the profession 
of arms. Behold the witness put upon 
the Bland by the " New York Times," 
to blacken the character of General 
McClellan ! What says this general 
as to the force of the enemy when he 
arrived at Yorktown ? He testifies 
before the War Committee that when 
Gen. Heintzelman landed on the Pe- 
ninsula there was not at tliat time 
much more than Gen. Magruder's 
command, which had been always es- 
timated from 16,000 to 20,000. It will 
bo remembered that Gen. Heintzelman 
landed on the Peninsula, not at York- 
town, but at Fortress Monroe, thirty 
miles from Yorktown. The general 
proceeds in his testimony: "Move- 
ments of troops had been going on 
across the James River to the Penin- 
sula for some daj^s before my arrival. 
I renvember that immediately ujion 
my arrival at Fort Monroe, I was told 
that quite a large number of troops 
had been crossed over to Yorktown 
from the south bank of the James. 1 
therefore hurried my own movements, 
and Ktarted from Fort Monroe sooner 
than i should have don©. From the 



60 
best information that I have been able 
to get, I think that the large masses 
of the reinforcements arrived in York- 
town from one to two days before I 
reached its vicinity. Johnston himself 
arrived there the day before I did." 
Gen. Heintzelman, whose division was 
the first to arrive before Yorktown, 
testifies that a few days after he land- 
ed at Fortress Monroe (March 23) he 
got information that Gen. Magruder 
had a small force only, not exceeding 
10,000 men, on the Peninsula, but h© 
further testifies: "By the time we got 
to Yorktown (April 5) their arm}^ had 
been largely reinforced there. Gen.. 
McClellan arrived at Fortress Monroe 
April 2, ten days after Heintzelman. 

On this information Gen. McClellan 
acted — he could not act upon any 
other, and better evidence than Gen. 
Magruder's report will be required to 
show that this information was incor- 
rect. 

The future historian of this great 
rebellion will gather from all sources 
of information all the facts, carefully 
collate them, and record the results; 
but, at this time, it cannot be admit- 
ted that judgment upon the perform- 
ances and character of our generals 
should be pronounced upon testimony 
derived from rebel official reports. In- 
deed the very circulation of these re- 
ports has been pi'ohibited by a milita- 
ry order in some, if not all, the de- 
partments of our military service. 
Those who take the trouble to exa- 
mine will find conflicting statements 
of facts in the reports of our com- 
manding generals, and the reports of 
commanding rebel generals, and in no 
one particular is there so strong a mo- 
tive to vary from strict accuracy of 
statement as in giving the numbers 
engaged. Through all time the habit 
of commaniing generals has been to 
understate their own numerical force, 
and exaggerate the force of their ene- 
mies, when giving accounts of battles 
which have been fought, or conflicts 
terminated. It cannot be ST^pposed 
that such a man as Gen. Magruder 
would be an honorable exception to 
this custom. Even Gen. Lee, the com- 
mander of the purest character in tke 



61 



rebel service, in giving an account of 



the battle of Gettysburg, would not be ^ his views to the President, uj^on anj 
believed by loyal men in preference to 'subject of public interest. This no 

deny, 



Gen. Meade, our own commander 
Much less ought the testimony of Gen. 
Magruder to out-weigh that of Gen. 
McClellan. 

I shall conclude these numbers in 
my next. 

No. XXII I.— Part I. 
LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. 

On the 7th July,, 1862, the head- 
quarters of the Army of the Poto- 
mac were near Harrison's Landing, 
Vii'ginia, the seven days' fight was 
ended, the rebels were in front with 
the jiurposo of overwhelming our 
army by attacking our positions, or 
I'educiug us hy blocking our communi- 
cations on tlie James River. The po- 
sition of our army was one of peril. Up 
to this date General McClellan had com- 
municated with the President of the 
United States and the Secretary of 
War on military subjects only. On 
this da}' he sent a letter to the Presi- 
dent, laying before him, for his private 
consideration, his general views con- 
cerning the then existing state of the 
rebelli«n. These views, the general 
says, •' amount to convictions, and are 
deej^ly impressed on my mind and 
heart," 

It has been objected that the general 
had no right to send such a letter, 
although a private one, to his superior 
in command, the chief executive of 
the country. There is no evidence 
that the President himself ever made 
this objection, but some of his zeal- 
ous friends have done so. Tliese 
friends betray ignorance of the char- 
acter and spirit ot our republican in- 
stitutions. Tlie President is not a 
monarch or ruler of any sort by he- 
reditary right J he is an agent of the 
people, chosen by them to execute 
specified duties under the constitu- 
tion. Every citizen in the land is one 
of his constituents, and has a person- 
al interest in the government of the 
countrj- which the President is chot'en 
to administer for a limited period. It 
le people's government, to be ad- 
tered for their benetit. Thei'e is 
not one of the.se people who lias not 



the right respectfully to submit 



and if 
on 



George 
the 7th 



B. 

of 



is tl 
mini 



man will 

McClellan had been, 
July, 1862, a private citizen, an unof- 
ficial person, his right to communi- 
cate his views tf) the President, or 
any other ofiicer of the government, 
would be unquestioned. But because 
George B. McClellan was an officer of 
the government, subordinate to the 
President, it is alleged that he has for- 
feited the right which would clearly 
have been his as a private citizen. 
If the general had submitted his views 
to the President in a spirit of insub- 
ordination, that is, in the mani- 
festation of a spirit that denied 
the authority of his superior, the 
objection wouM have been valid; 
but when the communication is per- 
fectly respectful, and made evidently 
with a desire to promote the general 
welfare, and dictated by strong con- 
victions of duty, who can rightly cen- 
sure it? The captain of a ship is su- 
preme in his command J his authority 
cannot be questioned ; but if, in a 
time of great peril, the mate of the 
same ship should respectfully suggest 
to him a course to be steCred, and 
what sails ought to be taken in, and 
what other sai 1 s ought to be set, in order 
to save the ship and cargo, who can say 
that such a subordinate officer ought 
to be censured? Especially if the sug- 
gestion was made privately, and not in 
the presence of the crew ; and more 
especially if the mate happened to be 
one of the owners of the ship and 
cargo ? 1 shall not attempt further 
to argue or illustrate this point: Gen. 
McClellan had a perfect right to send 
to the President just such a letter as 
he did send, if, in his judgment, after 
mature reflection, it contained what 
he deemed useful and timely advice. 
Had he failed to send it, he would 
have fallen short of his duty as an 
American citizen and a military com- 
mander 

Let us next see what advice he 
gave the President. Gen. McClellan 
says : " Our cause must never he aban- 
doned ; it is the cause of free institu- 



62 



tions and self government." This dec- 
laration is too plain to require expla- 
nation or illustration. 

The general also says: " The Consti- 
tution and the Union must be preserved, 
whatever may he the cost, in time, trea- 
sure and blood." 

Time was when this declaration 
would have received not only the as- 
sent, but the hearty commendation of 
every loyal Amei'ican citizen.' Then 
we all loved the Constitution — we 
were proud of it : but the time is 
when many American citizen-s, pro- 
fessing loyalty more loudly than their 
neighbors, can see no beauty in this 
Constitution, and are willing to dis- 
card it, or mar it, so as to leave it no 
longer the frame of government which 
it was designed to be by the illustrious 
men who made it, and the people, our 

S'cdecessors, who adopted it. Gen. 
cClellan is not one of these new 
lights; he regai-ds the Union as indis- 
pensable to the preservation of popu- 
luar liberty, and the Constitution as 
the only clear and well defined, thor- 
oughly understood bond of that Union 
to which the people have given their 
assent. The manner in which free 
institutions shall exist, and by which 
they have existed, is here a mat- 
ter of agreement. The government 
which exists and can only exist 
by the consent of the govei-ned, is 
embodied in the Constitution, and the 
only mode hy which this government 
can be altered or varied is prescribed 
in the Constitution itself If this 
Constitution is stripped Of its sanc- 
tions, it is impossible to predict what 
substitute will receive the consent of 
the governed. or how that consent 
will be obtained. Witiiout a consti- 
tion which has been adopted by the 
people, we have no government, and 
are in a state of anarchy; out of 
which it is not given human foresight 
to scan what form of governmeni will 
arise. 

The general further says: " iei 
neither military disaster, political fac- 
tion, nor foreign war shake our settled 
purpose to enforce the equal operation 
of the laxos of the United States upon 
the people of every State." 



Tliis is simply declaring that the 
whole people of the United States, 
loyal and disloyal, must be governed, 
protected, or punished by law, sover- 
eign law. All are entitled to the pro- 
tection which the law provides — all 
who violate the law must be punished 
according to law. These propositions 
are simple expressions of elementary 
truths. To the mind of all enlightened 
in the j)rinciples which govern and 
preserve society^ they are eleinentary 
truths ; an attempt to prove them 
would only cloud them with obscurity. 
Yet a doctrine has gained currency, 
even among some respectable people, 
that rebels are entitled to no protection, 
or advantage from the laws which they 
have violated, and the Constitution 
which the}' have cast off. How can 
these rebels be punished ? Who shall 
prescribe that punishment? By what 
rule shall it be meted out ? The ans- 
wer to each of these questions is the 
same, and is very simple. The offence 
to be punished consists in the viola- 
tion of the will and deci-ees of the 
community ; this will and these de- 
crees find their only expression and 
embodiment in law. No po^er on 
earth but the community whose law 
has been violated has a right to pun- 
ish that violation, and that community 
can only utter its voice in form of 
laW' — therefore punishment must be 
prescribed by law. In a Christian 
community it will not be denied that 
all men have violated the law of God, 
and except these violaters of the law 
have thrown away their weapons of 
rebellion, they are all rebels against 
the government of God. Yet what 
child born of Christian parents does 
not know that these rebels will be 
judged b}' the law which they have 
violated, and trampled under theii 
feet ? •' Did not Moses give you the 
law and yet none of you keepeth tiia 
law?" "Doth our law judge any 
man before it hear him and know what 
he doeth ? " 

Nothing C'an be more clear than 
that General McClellan's policy, re- 
commended in the strongest manner 
to the President, was to put down the 
military resistance to the e^ovemme! t 



63 



by fovf^e of arms. Btit that policy 
looko<^t bej'ond the suppression of the 
miHtry combinations of rebels, to a 
re-establishment of the authority of 
government over all the people within 
the territorial limits of the United 
States. When the victory of arms is 
made complete then the operation of 
moral causes must be relied upon to 
unite the people of the whole country. 
The sword must not be the sole re- 
liance to accomplish a reunion, but 
the olive branch must be held out. 

Let us now refer to the moral in- 
strumentalities the employment of 
which the geneeral' recommends. 
They are : 

" This rebellion has assumed the 
character of war; as such it should 
be regarded : and it should be con- 
ducted on the highest principles 
known to Christian civilization. It 
should not be a war looking to the 
subjugation of the people of anj' State 
in any event. It should not be at all 
a war upon population, but against 
armed forces and political organiza- 
tions. Neither confiscation of property, 
political executions of persons, territo- 
rial oi*anization of States, or forcible 
abolition of slavery should be contem- 
plated for a moment. In prosecuting 
the war, all private property and un- 
armed persons should be strictly pro- 
tected, subject only to the necessity 
of military operations. All private 
property taken for military use should 
be paid or receipted for; pillage and 
waste should be treated as high 
crimes ; all unnecessary trespasses 
sternly prohibited, and offensive de- 
ineanor by the military towards citi- 
zens pron7<Tly rebuked. Military ar- 
rest should not be tolerated, except in 
places where active hostilities exist, 
and oaths, not required by enactments 
eonstitutionall}'' made, should be 
neither demanded or received. Mili- 
tary government should be confined 
to the preservation of public order 
and the protection of political rights. 
^Military power should not be allowed 
to interfere with the relations of ser- 
vitude, either by supporting or impair- 
in-:; the authority of the master, ex- 
cejiling for repressing disorder, as in 



other cases. Slaves contraband under 
the act of Congress, seeking military 
protection should receive it. The 
right of the government to appropri- 
ate permamently to its own service^ 
claims to slave labor, should be as- 
serted, and the right of the owner to 
compensation therefor should be re- 
cognized. 

*' This principle might be extended 
upon the grounds of military necessity 
and security to all the slaves within a 
particular State, thus working manu- 
missions in such State ; and in Mis- 
souri, perhaps in Western Virginia 
also, and possibly even in Maiyland, 
the expediency of such a measure is 
only a question of time. 

" A system of policy thus constitu- 
tional and conservative, and pervaded 
by the influences of Christianity and 
freedom, would receive the support of 
almost all truly loyal men, would 
deeply impress the rebel masses and 
all foreign nations, and it might be 
humbly hoped that it would commend 
itself to the favor of the Almighty." 

Here we have a delineation of the , 
the policy w4iich alone can restore 
peace to the country. It may not be 
practicable at this time to pursue 
literally this line of policy, but the 
spirit which dictated it is that which 
must guide the action of the govern- , 
ment if we would have p ace. There 
is nothing new in the policy here re- 
commended, for it is substantially the 
same as that announced by the Pre- 
sident in his inaugural address, and 
which was embodied in the virittenden 
resolutions adopted by both houses of 
Congress. This was the policy of the 
beginning of the contest, and which 
called forth volunteei'S unprecedented 
in numbers, inspired by a patriotic 
zeal of the most intense fervor. To 
gather an army then it was not neces- 
sary to ofter bounties to soldiers the 
most tempting ever presented to swell 
the ranks of an army, which has gone 
far to exhau.st the resources of the 
countr3^ Had that policy not been 
clianged, but persevered in, faithfully, 
the contest would haye been ended long 
ere this. But it was changed, and the 
now policy adopted of the universal 



64 



abolition of slavery by the Federal 
'-<jOvernment, Hence the war has been 
prolonged, and will be prolonged 
until title government returns to the 
-point whence it departed, under the 
-pressurn brought to bear upon the 
President by the outside influence of 
a few noisy, zealous, pei'sistent radical 
men, who were not, and are not, the 
true friends of the Constitution made 
by our fathers, and which, at this mo- 
ment, is the fundamental law of the 
land. 

No. XXIII.— Part ii. 
AMALGAMATION. 

That Constitution recognized a dis- 
tinction between the white race and 
the descendants of the African race in 
this country, and did not admit the 
latter to equal privileges with the 
former. The effort now is to abolish 
that distinction, and place the two 
races upon the same footing, political- 
ly. This effort, if successful, must, as 
a necessary consequence, lead to the 
blending of the two races, as races 
have been blended, dwarfed and de- 
moralized, in Mexico and more South- 
ern latitudes. To this complexion the 
American people are not willing to 
come, but they revolt at it. Yet the 
purpose to reach this result is now 
openly avowed, and defended by the 
same persons whose influence led the 
President to change the policy origi- 
nally avowed by him for the suppres- 
sion of the rebellion. 

A work has lately appeared entitled 
"Miscegenation; the Theory of the 
Blending ot the Races as applied to 
the American Whiteman and Negro," 
in which such blending is warmly re- 
commended. In the appendix to the 
work, extracts from the testimony of 
Wendell Phillips, and the testimony of 
Theodore Tilton are given, showing 
the same earnestness and zeal in sup- 
port of this theory as they have here- 
tofore shown in the anti-slavery cause, 
and maintaining that such blending is 
the necessary sequence to abolition. 
If the Republican party should suc- 
ceed at the next election, the abolition 
section of that party will confidently 
assert that the American people have 
decided in favor of the political equali- 



ty and amalgamation of the white a:i< ; 
negro races, and the other section will 
not deny it. It will then be insisted 
that the descendants of Africa shall, 
equally with the whites, be eligible to 
seats in the jury box, and on the 
bench of the judiciary, and in the le- 
gislatures of the several States, and in 
the Congress of the United States. 
Next will follow amalgamation of 
blood. It remains to be seen whether 
the free white race of the country is 
prepared for this change. 

Although the President has changed. 
Gen. McClellan has not changed ; he 
stands, to-day, committed to the poli- 
cy which he proclaimed in his address 
to the Union men of Western Virginia, 
on the 26th of March, 1861, months 
before he was called to Washington to 
command the Army of the Potomac. 
In that address he says : " I have or- 
dered troops to cross the Ohio river. 
They come as your friends and broth- 
ers — as enemies only to the armed re- 
bels who are preying upon you. Your 
homes, your families and your proper- 
ty shall be under our protection. All 
your rights shall be religiously re- 
spected, notwithstanding all that has 
been said by traitors to induce you to 
believe that our advent among you 
will be signalized by interference with 
your slaves. Understand one thing 
clearly; not only will we abstain from 
all such interference, but we will, on 
the contrary, with an iron hand, crush 
any attempt on their part." 

Such w^as the policy he proclaimed 
to the world before he was called by 
the President, with the hearty appro- 
val of the nation, to be general-in-chief 
of tlie armies of the United States. 
Western Virginia afterwards pro- 
claimed her fidelity to the Union. But 
the utterance of these sentimonts was 
remembered by the radical abolition- 
ists of the country, who early con- 
spired, and pcrseveriugly labored to 
destroy" the man vvho avowed them, 
until their influence exiled him from 
command, and their bitter hatred still 
pursue.*, him, for no other reason but 
his firm adherence to the principles 
which guided him in re-entering, when 
called upon, the military service of . 



his country. Abraham Lincoln has 
suffered himself to be pushed and 
turned aside from every purpose which 
he avowed upon entering on the duties 
of President of the United States. A 
recent document has appeared under 
his own hand, being a letter bearing 
date the 4th April ultimo, addressed to 
A. G. Hodges, Esq., Frankfort, Ken- 
tucky, in which he acknowledges, vin- 
dicates, and attempts to justify this 
change. In this document he admits 
that he took an oath to preserve the 
Constitution, yet, in effect, affirms that 
it was impossible to keep this oath 
without losing the nation. He main- 
tains ''that measures otherwise uncon- 
stitutional, might become lawful by 
becoming indispensable to the preser- 
vation of the Constitution through the 
preservation of the nation. Eight or 
WRONG," he declares, " I assumed this 

GROUND, AND NOAV AVOAV IT." This is 

a bold avowal to be made by the chief 
magistrate of a republic, as much obli- 
gated to obey the law as the humblest 
citizen in the country. This right or 
wrong doctrine is certainly a very 
dangerous one to teach the people of 
the country. What was it that right 
OR WRONG the President resolved to 
do, and actually accomplished ? No- 
thing, on the first breaking out of the 
rebellion, when possibly summary 
measures by the power which alone, 
in the absence of Congress, controlled 
the government, might, by general 
consent, have been justified. But this 
right or wrong action Avas taken after 
Congress assembled, and time had 
been afforded to provide, by legisla- 
tion, for the wants of the country in 
the exigency which then existed. 
"After the months of March and May, 
1862," he savs, " he was. in his judg- 
ment, driven to the alternative of 
either surrendering the Union, and 
with it the Constitution, or laying 
strong hand upon the colored ele- 
ment." The meaning of this is, that 
he was compelled, ns the executive 
power of the govei'nment, to abrogate 
the relation of master and slave, or 
the Union and the Constitution must 
perish. Admitting l^r the present that 
if there had been sufficient grounds in 



65 



the actual state of flxcts existing at the 
time to drive the President to this al- 
ternative, he would have been justified 
in the decision he made, the important 
question ai'ises. What were these causes? 
Who would have compelled the des- 
truction of the Union and the Constitu- 
tion if the President had not laid a 
strong hand upon the colored element ? 
It is very certain the rebels had not the 
power to accomplish this result. The 
declaration, by whomsoever made, that 
the rebels possessed this power, would 
not be believed. There had been no 
evidence given whatever that the nu- 
merical force of the free white loyal 
citizens of the country was not suffi- 
cient to put down the rebellion. But 
there had been melancholy evidence 
that the Administration had not th® 
wisdom to direct that force, or, having 
the wisdom, it did not wish to termis. 
nate the rebellion, until an ulterior 
object — the abolition of slaveiy — had 
been accomplished. Some of the best 
men in the country believe that this 
was the policy which guided the con- 
duct of the Administration, and there 
are not a few Kepublicans who, be- 
lieving, justify it. 

I am not willing to believe, for I 
have not sufficient evidence of the fact, 
that the President himself has not at 
all times been willing and desirous of 
bringing the wtir to a close by subdu- 
ing the enemy; but I have what I 
deem sufficient evidence that promi- 
nent members of his own party, near 
to his person, had no desire that Gen. 
McClellan should take Eichmoud, but, 
on the contrary, labored to prevent 
such conquest, and that these j)ersons 
so operated by their influence on the 
President as to make him an instru- 
ment in carrying out their designs. 
This I charge. 

The rebels had it not in their power 
to destro}^ the Union if the negroes 
had not been emancipated, or if they 
had not been enrolled in the army. It 
is a gross libel upon the white popula- 
tion in the loj'al States to affirm that 
they were not sufficiently numerous, 
patriotic and brave, to conquer the 
military force of the rebels without 
the aid of the negroes. What was it. 



m 



then, that compelled the President, 
*' I'ight or wrong," to lay a strong 
hand upon the colored element? Was 
this measure rendered necessary by 
the threatened interference of one or 
more foreign powers in our domestic 
affairs? If it were, and our govern- 
ment, was awed by that threat, our 
conditiou is mortifying in the extreme, 
and the people are entitled to know 
what nation or nations have thus 
humbled us. If the rebels themselves 
could not do it, nor the interference 
of foreign nations, tliere is only one 
other |)ower which could exercise an 
influence to destroy the nation if the 
President had declined to avail him- 
self of the negro element to preserve 
it. That power was the President's 
own party. The leading influence of 
that party might have demanded that 
the President, right or wrong, should 
use the power of the Executive to de- 
stroy slavery, and threatened, if he 
did not do so, they would abandon the 
government. The enemies who would 
have destroj^ed the government in the 
contingency supposed, must have been 
the abolitionists. It is well known 
that these abolitionists were no friends 
of the Constitution ; that they had 
been trying, for a number of years, to 
weaken the regard and reverence of 
the people for that Constitution. If 
this was the power — and I suspect it 
was — that compelled the President, in 
order to preserve the Union, to lay a 
strong hand upon the colored element, 
the people of the country ought to 
know it. They ought to know who 
the real traitors in the loyal States 
are. Pi'fvy, Mr. Lincoln, enlighten 
the public on this point; favor that 
game public with another letter under 
your own signature. 
,. The President asserts, with much 
confidence, that he has made no loss, 
but a great gain, by laying his hand 
on the colored element. It shows, he 
says, a gain of quite a hundred and 
fchirty thousand soldiers, seamtn and 
laborers. In stating the account of 
loss and gain resulting from measures 
adopted and carried out by the Presi- 
dent, in respect to wliat he calls the 
colored element, many items ought to 



be inserted which his Excellency has 
net probably thought of 1st. He has 
made the negro a soldier. Now there 
is no fact more clearly demonstrated, 
and thorougMy known, than that, in 
this country, the negro is regarded by 
the Avhite man as his inferior; he con- 
siders himself degraded by an associa- 
tion with the negro. There is another 
fact, well established, that the fellow- 
ship in arms is one of a peculiarly 
honorable and endearing character. 
By the measure adopted the negro is 
made the fellow soldier of the white 
man. It ought to be considered how 
this forced lellowship will operate upon 
the morale of the American white sol- 
dier; will it not impair his self re- 
spect ? Must he not feel degraded by 
the comjjany he is compelled to keep ? 
If these results are inevitable, will the 
white soldier fight as well, will he ac- 
complish as much, in such company ? 
There is but one anwer to this ques- 
tion — he will not. 

Again. The negro is not as coura- 
gous as the white man ; he does not 
possess the same mental resources ; he 
is more easily frightened, and, when 
frightened", he will run ; he will flee 
from the face of an enem}^; his tear 
may easily become contagious in the 
ranks of an army, and thus a panic 
may be excited. It is therefoi'e by no 
means certain that an addition of 
130,000 negroes to an army of white 
men is. so many clear gain. On the 
contraiy, this addition may be, in fact, 
a loss. 

2d. The President by his proclama- 
tion has dissolved or attempted to dis- 
solve the legal relation of master and 
slave in States in rebellion, not within 
our military lines. The object of thin' 
proclamation was to deprive the mas- 
ter of the service of his slave, and ex- 
cite him to hostility against his mas.^ 
ter. There are thousands of true and 
loyal men who deny the right of the 
President to do this act, and in con- 
tests between tlie negro and American 
white men, once their fellow citizens, 
although in rebellion, their sympathy, 
their natural sympathy — for it is a 
sympathy of race and caste — is with 
the white man. There is no disputing 



these fuels, and their influence oper- 
ates to divide the loyal men of the 
country, and thereby to weaken the 
power of our government ; while the 
same facts unite, nerve, exasperate, 
and make desperate the enemy. These 
facts, in the account credited with 
130,000 negro soldiers, are to be placed 
per contra, on the other side. 

The truth is the President's mode of 
dealing with the colored " element,'" 
lias been unfortunate in the extreme. 
So far from being indispensable to the 
preservation of the legitimate govern- 
ment of the country, it has been most 
influential in strengthening and in- 
spiring hopes of perpetuity to the il- 
legitijnate Confederate government. 
The traitorous leaders of that govern- 
ment could not have suggested meas- 
ures better calculated to unite the peo- 
ple upon whom it relied for support. 
These leaders justified the rebellion 
which they inaugurated by confident 
and earnest declarations that the Fed- 
eral government intended to destroy 
their property in slaves; the Union 
loving men in the South, relying upon 
our solemn protestations that such 
was not our purpose, are pointed to 
these measures of the President as a 
fulfillment of these predictions. 

On the other hand the sympathizers 
with secession among ourselves, for 
there are such, point to the same m'eas- 
ux'es to show that the abolitionists, 
never friends of the Constitution, have 
gained the point for which they have 
been striving through a long course of 
years — the abolition of slavery, right 
or wrong. The secessionist and aboli- 
tionists have thus succeeded in break- 
ing down or sensibly impairing the 
organic law, the Constitution of the 
country. How infinitely better it 
would have been, in dealing with the 
colored element, to follow the ? \vice 
Otf General McClellan. " Military pow- 
er should (he says) not be allowed to 
interfere with tlie relations of servi- 
tude, either by supporting -or impair- 
ing the authority of the master, except 
for repressing disorder as in other 
cases. Slaves contraband under the 
act of Congress, seeking military pro- 
tection sliould receive it. The right 



67 

of tne goveriiioi.l to approp.riate per- 
manentl}' to its own service claims to 
slave labor, should be asserted and 
the right of the owner to compensa- 
tion therefor should be recognized." 

" This principle might be extended, 
upon grounds of militaiy necessity and 
security, to all the slaves within a par- 
ticular State, thus working manumis- 
sion in such State ; and in Missouri, 
23erhaps in Western Virginia also, and 
probably even in Maryland, the expe- 
diency of such a measure is only a 
question of time." 

It remains to be seen wuether the 
people of this country will set their 
seal of approbation upon a policy 
which, instead of seeking, as its ulti- 
mate object, the suppression of the 
rebellion, aims to abolish, throughout 
the country, the institution of slavery, 
without the consent of the States in 
which that institution exists, and to 
elevate the African race to a political 
equality with the white race. 

President Lincoln's views on these 
points have been clearly avowed, and 
his determination to enforce them, 
right or wrong, has been cai"ried into 
practical operation. 

General McClellan's views have also 
been clearly made known; he has de- 
clared them to amount to convictions 
deeply impressed upon his mind and 
heart, and, as we have seen, they are 
" That the Constitution and Union must 
be preserved, whatever may he the cost in 
time, treasure or blood." He would 
"also enforce the equal operation of the 
laws of the United States upon the peo- 
ple of every State." He has expressed 
his belief •' that the Constitution gives 
power suflicient even for the present 
exigency.' The thought of violating 
the Constitution, in letter or spirit, by 
an usurpation of power, has never been 
permitted to enter his mind. 

Thus have I concluded this series of 
numbers — their purpose has been de- 
clared, and I respectfully, yet confi- 
dently, submit that it has been shown 
to be a fair deduction from the evi- 
dence before the country : — 

1st. That General McClellan, if he 
had been sustained by the government, 
according to promise, would have ta- 
ken Eichmoud. 



68 



2d. That tlicre was no sound or valid 
reason for withholding the force prom- 
ised for his support, and 

3d. That he did the best he could, 
or that anj?- other general could undpr 



the circumstances, with the forces 
placed under his command ; and 

Lastly, That G-eneral McClellan has 
been deeply injured by the Adminia- 
tratioQ. 



INDEX. 



PAOg 

Author's reasons for publishing 3 

First Propositio.v. — General McClellan would have captured Richmond, if not in- 
terfered witli by tha President 4 

Prince de Joinville's testimony 4 

General McDowell's force withheld ; this deranged the whole plan of the campaign 4 

General Fitz John Porter takes Hanover Court House 4 

Further testimony of De Joinville 5 

Testimony of General Franklin - 5 

Testimony of General Hunt / 5 

Second PROPOsrriON. — No good reasons for withholding McDowell's command 5 

The reason that this command was required for the protection of Washington — not 

supported by facts or sound opinions 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 

Third Proposition. — The original plan being deranged, General McClellan did the 

best he could with the forces under his command 12 

Torktown 12 to 20 

McClellan meets a force numerically equal to his own 13 

Two general principles adopted by General McClellan 13 

His opinions of the power and skill of the enemy 13 

Charge — that McCWIan spent too much time before Yorktown, refuted by the 

evidence 14 

Prince de Joinville's testimony 14 



70 

General McClellau's testiinon_y 14 

General Barnard's testimony , X4 

General Kejes 14 

General Fltz John Porter I5. 

General Heintzelman 15 

General Hooker 15 

Rules of Evidence 20 21 

President, though commander in chief, not expected to take command of armies — 

Constitutional doctrine on this point 20 21 

From Yorktown to Williamsburg 21 to 24 

From Williamsburg to Ghickahorainy 24 to 28 

General Hooker's testimony 24 

General Keyes' testimony .' 24 ! 

General McClellan's testimony 25 

Prince de Joinville's testimony 26 

Before Richmond 28 to 32 

General Barnard's testimony as to Naijoleon's maxims 30 

Condition of the Chickahominy 30 

General Howard's opinion 31 

Numbers from II to Xlt run together through inadvertance of the press 31 

No. XII 31 

No. XIII.— Fair Oaks 32 to 36 

Questions Answered. — What could the General have done to-day which he did not 

do ? , .^,^j.|. 33 

What has he left undone to-day which he might have done ? 33 

Prince de Joinville's testimony 33 

Senator Chandler 34 

B. Estvan'a (colonel in Confederate army) testimony ,.:...;„,. ,^vy^ 35 

QoESTiON Considered. — Ought the left wing of our army to have followed the Rebel 

army into Richmond ? 35 

General Heintzelman's testimony 35 

General Hooker's testimony 35 

General Keyes' testimony 36 

General McClellan's testimony 36 

No. XIV. — Gross Injustice of the Committee 36 to 37 

Summary Review 37 



71 

Pollard's History of the War 33 

What was- the force of' the enemy when General McClellan reached Yorktown 38 

Greneral McClellan's testimony 38, 39 

No. XV.— Before Richmoud 39 

General Hunt's testimony 39 

General Keyes' testimony 40 

Telegrams •. . .' 40, 41 

No. XVI.— Change of Base , 41 

General McClellan's testimony i 42 

Why the battle of Gains' Mill was lost ? 43 

Conference between Generals McClellan and Heintzelman 43, 44 

No. XVII. — Comments on the passage in the President's letter to General McClellan. 

" It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor the Government is to blame." 

General Hitchcock first gave the President the alarm as to the safety of Washington 45 
No. XVIII. — State of things on the Peninsula at the moment McClellan was forced 

to change his position 46 

No. XIX.— Change of Base 47 

McClellan's Report 47 

No act of the war has shed more honor on our arms than the manner of changing 

base 48 

Pollard's testimony 48 

Mr. Motley's (Minister at Vienna) testimony 49 

Xenophon's retreat ; Moreau's retreat ; Commodore Hull's retreat 50 

Na XX. — Order to leave the Peninsula bO 

General McClellan's remonstrance 50 

G^iueral McClellan in favor of destroying the military power of the rebellion 52 

Qualities of a great general. Burke's description 52, 53 

General_Grant 53 

No. XXI.~New York Times j 54 

No. XXII.— New York Times '. 58 

No. XXIII.— Part I. General McClellan's letter to the President, dated July 7, 1862. . 61 

Objection answered that the General had no right to send this letter 61 

Advice given by General McClellan to the President 61, 62, 63 

The policy which can alone restore peace to the country 63 

No. XXHI. — Part II. Amalgamation 64 

Work on Miscegenation , ; 64 



72 
The President has changed his policy, but General Movlellan has not changed .' 64 

President's letter of 4th April, 1864, to A. G. Hodges , 65 

President's right or wrong doctrine considered . . . , ; . 65 

Oeaeral Deductiooe ;... «.... ..-^^.^ ^^^^ >- 67,86 



WATCHWORDS FOR PATRIOTS. 

MOTTOES FOR THE CAMPAIG]^, SELECTED PROM: GEJiTBEAIi 

MgcleUjAits writings. 

Our cause must never be abaiuloned ; it is the cause of free institutions and self- 
government. — IlarrisoiCs Landing Letter. 

We are fighting solely for the integiity of the UnioB, to uphold the power of 
our national government, and to restore to the nation the blessings of peace and 
good order. — Instructions to General llalleck, November 11, 1861. 

You -will please constantly to bear in mind the precise issue for which we are 
fighting ; that issue is the preservation of the Union and the restoration of the full 
authority of the general government over all portions of our territory. — Instruc- 
tions to General Buell^ November 7, 1861. 

We shall most readily suppress this rebellion and restore the authority of the 
government by religiously respecting the constitutional rights of all. — Instructions 
to General I3uell, November 7, 1861. 

Be careful so to treat the unarmed inhabitants as to contract, not widen, the 
breach existing between us and the rebels. — Ii'structions to General Buell^ 
November 12, 1861. 

I have always found that it is the tendency of subordinates to make vexatious 
aiTrests on mere sus|ncion. — Instructions to General Luell^ November 12, 1861. 

Say as little as possible about poUtics or the negro. — Instructions to General 
Burnside, January 1 ^ \'^^2. 

The unity ol^ this nation, the preservation of our institutions, are so dear to me 
that I have willingly sacrificed my private happiness with the single object of doing 
my duty to my country. — Letter to Secretary Cameron., October., 1861. 

f he Constitution and the Union must be preserved, whatever may be the cost 
in time, treasure, or blood. — Harrison'' s Bar Letter. 

^Neither confiscation of property, political executions of persons, ten-itorial or- 
ganization of States, nor forcible abolition of slavery should be contemplated for a 
moment. — Letter to President Lincoln., July7,lSQ2. 

In prosecuting this war, all private property and unaiirred pei'sons shotild be 
strictly protected, subject to the necessity of miltary operations. — Letter to the 
President, July 7, 1862. 

Military arrests should not be tolerated, except in places where active hostilities 
exist ; and oaths, not ^required by enactments constitutionally made, should be 
neither demanded nor received. — Letter to the President., Julyl, 1862. 

It should not be a war looking to the subjugation of the people of any State in 
any event. It should not be at all a war upon populations, but against armed 
forces and political oi-ganizations. — Harrison^ s Bar Letter. 

If it is not deemed best to entrust me with the command even of my own 
anny, I simply ask to be permitted to share their fate on the field of battle. — Bes- 
))atch to General Ilalleck, Anyust 30, 1862. 

In the arrangement and conduct of campaigns the direction should be left to 
professional soldiers. — General Mc Clellan''s Report. 



tV 



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